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The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services is seeking to move medical providers from a fee-
for-service reimbursement model to a value-based reimbursement model. In this dissertation, we 
studied the financial rewards and risks that accompany capitation contracts. We employed Poisson 
regression to estimate health-care utilization of beneficiaries under the care of primary care providers 
with varying levels of capitation. Then, we calculated capitation contract results for primary care 
practices using Monte Carlo simulations. We used three methods to predict medical payments for 
beneficiaries: (1) empirical probability distributions of annual medical payments, (2) theoretical 
probability distributions of annual medical payments, and (3) accumulated costs from simulating 
individual medical services received. We found that Medicare Advantage beneficiaries under the 
care of primary care physicians who were engaged in capitation contracts experienced significantly 
fewer visits in inpatient, outpatient, carrier, home health, and skilled nursing facility health-care 
venues. Their visit counts were 48.2%, 57.6%, 35.0%, 74.3%, and 66.2% fewer for the respective 
venues, compared with a group of Traditional Medicare beneficiaries. Reducing health-care service 
utilization was the greatest determinant of achieving positive financial rewards under capitation. 
Stop-loss provisions were, however, essential to protect practices from extreme costs that occurred 
for a few very sick patients. We found that, with appropriate contract provisions and proven 
reductions in healthcare utilization, primary care practices could have been protected from the 
financial failures of prior capitation attempts. Upside-only contracts also protected small practices 
from financial failure while providing strong financial incentives to reduce health care utilization. 
 Keywords: capitation, primacy care practice, heath-care utilization, annual medical 
payments, Monte Carlo simulation, Poisson regression, Medicare Advantage 
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 Fee-for-service is the most common form of medical provider reimbursement in the United 
States health care system (James & Poulsen, 2016). However, fee-for-service (FFS) allegedly 
misaligns the financial incentives of medical providers and those paying the medical providers (Floyd, 
2014). Under FFS, medical providers are reimbursed for services rendered. Reimbursement is based 
on volume and expense instead of patient outcomes. To better align financial incentives, the Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and Medicare Advantage (MA) payers are looking to use 
value-based reimbursement structures to pay medical providers (James & Poulsen, 2016).  
Value-based reimbursement, however, can be a misnomer. Providers reimbursed via FFS 
would likely consider all services they provide to add value to the patient. Likewise, value can have 
different meanings for different parties. As Bauer (2020) states, “Patients value compassionate care 
that decreases suffering and pain and is available at their convenience with minimal out-of-pocket 
expenses, while payers define value as overall population health at the lowest cost possible.” Porter 
(2010) draws a distinction. He argues that value should be defined as “[patient] outcomes relative to 
costs.” Patient outcomes are a function of results not processes or inputs. Often an effective strategy 
to reduce costs is to increase provision of some services to reduce the need for other services 
(Porter, 2010). In short, value-based reimbursement seeks to reward efficient patient outcomes 
instead of volume of services rendered. 
In its most extreme form, global capitation pays medical providers a per-member-per-month 
fixed amount. Whether the patient needs few services or many services, medical providers are paid 
the same fixed amount. This creates the financial incentive for medical providers to be conscious of 
long-term outcomes and costs during care provision. There are many forms of value-based 
reimbursement. In our research program, we will focus on forms of capitation with quality bonuses 




in combination with FFS. For our dissertation, we only evaluated the outcomes of capitation 
contracts. 
We are making several assumptions in the above statement about global capitation. First, 
capitated practices must bear at least partial financial risk for all medical services including 
emergency and hospital care. Second, capitated practices cannot prevent patients from receiving 
emergency care. Third, if a patient receives emergency care, additional hospital care could follow 
without intervention by the capitated practice. Finally, capitated practices serve the same core patient 
pool for an extended period of time. These assumptions create a situation where capitated physicians 
are rewarded if their patients have less emergency and hospital care. The result is long-term cost 
savings and higher capitated revenue for the capitated practice. 
Prior research has found that total health care expenses decrease when spending for 
primary care increases (Bazemore, Phillips, Glazier, & Tepper, 2018). This is allegedly because 
medical services shift from restorative care to preventative care. For example, if a patient has 
diabetes, the patient can live uninhibited by the disease through blood monitoring, proper diet, 
physical activity, proper medications, etc. (MayoClinic.org). However, over time the patient’s health 
can degrade if appropriate preventative care is not performed. Some of the complications for 
diabetes include cardiovascular disease, nerve damage, kidney damage, eye damage, foot damage 
leading to amputation, skin conditions, hearing impairment, Alzheimer’s disease, and depression 
(MayoClinic.org). The power of preventative care is in avoiding these complications. This is beneficial 
for the patient and cheaper in the long run. In sum, value-based reimbursement helps shift the mix 
of patient care to preventative primary care instead of restorative care. This in turn reduces overall 
health care expenses. 
 Capitation is designed to align the financial incentives of primary care medical providers with 
the interests of both patients and insurers. However, when capitation was widely adopted in the 




1990s, many provider groups failed financially because they were unable to manage the cost of 
unexpected levels of required care for which they became financially responsible (Frakt & Mayes, 
2012; James & Poulsen, 2016). Various arrangements for reimbursement can be designed that 
combine fee-for-service, capitation payments, and outcome-based incentives (based on both patient 
outcomes and costs incurred). Our long-term research program will investigate how primary-care 
practices can best be managed to provide effective care under different blends of capitation, fee-for 
service, and incentive arrangements. The ultimate goal of this line of inquiry is how to deliver medical 
services that promote the health of patients under care while generating financial returns to the 
practice commensurately with the risk assumed in contracts with health insurers and protecting the 
practice against financial failure.  
However, achievement of the ultimate goal must be achieved in stages. For our dissertation, 
we investigated health-care utilization differences between Medicare beneficiaries under the care of 
primary care providers (PCP) with varying degrees of capitation (Chapter 4). We furthered this 
analysis by comparing frequency differences in services received by beneficiaries received under 
the care of different PCPs (Chapter 4). Poisson regression analysis was used to investigate these 
questions. Then, we evaluated outcomes of capitation contracts for primary care practices using 
Monte Carlo simulations. We created custom databases in SAS for this analysis. We perform this 
analysis using three different methods to estimate total medical payments for each beneficiary. In 
Chapter 5, we used a empirical distribution of total medical payments. In Chapter 6, we used 
theoretical probability distributions of total medical payments. In Chapter 7, we predict the number 
of visits to five health care service venues. Then, we apply a payment for each visit. The results of 
this dissertation provide a starting point for the long-term research program.  
 The results of our research provide primary care practitioners and health care insurers 
valuable information. They can help them as they negotiate reimbursement contracts and manage 




their respective businesses to facilitate high levels of patient care at reasonable cost and with a fair 
sharing of the risks and rewards involved. This is critical as CMS and MA payers seek to move 
medical providers to value-based reimbursement. 
The first three chapters of our dissertation both inform the research question examined in 
this dissertation along with the long-term research program. It is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, 
we introduce the topic and review prior research related to reimbursement mechanisms for medical 
providers. We present an argument for a tailored combination of capitation payments, fee-for-service, 
and incentives-based components as the best arrangement for improving health outcomes and 
lowering total costs in the U.S. health care system. We conclude Chapter 1 with literature focused 
on issues faced in the 1980s and 1990s when capitation was widely adopted. Chapter 1 thus 
establishes the motivation for our investigation. 
Chapter 2 presents prior research on determinants of health care outcomes and 
management of medical practices. We briefly review the use of mathematical programming for 
strategic planning of medical practices with recognition of financial and operational constraints and 
then concentrate on studies that employ statistical modeling and discrete-event simulation relevant 
to this undertaking. 
In Chapter 3, we present an overview of the research methods we used in Chapters 4-7. We 
also present outlines of the models to be used in our long-term research program and give details 
about the sources of data to be used to construct them. In Chapter 4, we present details and results 
of the Poisson regression models to investigate the frequency of health care visits. Chapters 5 – 7 
contain the details and results of the capitation contract simulation experiments. Chapter 8 contains 
a discussion of the implications of our research for primary care practices, policy makers, and MA 
payers. In Chapter 9, we discuss future research. 
  




Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Fee-for-service is the most common form of medical provider reimbursement in the United 
States health care system (James & Poulsen, 2016). However, fee-for-service (FFS) allegedly 
misaligns the financial incentives of the medical providers and those paying the medical providers 
(Floyd, 2014). Under FFS, medical providers are reimbursed for services rendered. Reimbursement 
is based on volume and expense instead of patient outcomes. To better align financial incentives, 
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and Medicare Advantage (MA) payers are 
exploring value-based reimbursement structures to pay medical providers (James & Poulsen, 2016).  
Value-based reimbursement can be a misnomer. Providers reimbursed via FFS would likely 
consider all services they provide to add value to the patient. Likewise, value can have different 
meanings for different parties. As Bauer (2020) states, “Patients value compassionate care that 
decreases suffering and pain and is available at their convenience with minimal out-of-pocket 
expenses, while payers define value as overall population health at the lowest cost possible.” Porter 
(2010) draws a distinction. He argues that value should be defined as “[patient] outcomes relative to 
costs.” Patient outcomes are a function of results not processes or inputs. Often an effective strategy 
to reduce costs is to increase provision of some services to reduce the need for other services 
(Porter, 2010). In short, value-based reimbursement seeks to reward efficient patient outcomes 
instead of volume of services rendered. 
In its most extreme form, global capitation pays medical providers a per-member-per-month 
fixed amount. Whether the patient needs few services or many services, medical providers are paid 
the same fixed amount. This creates the financial incentive for medical providers to be conscious of 
long-term outcomes and costs during care provision. There are many forms of value-based 
reimbursement. We will focus on forms of capitation with quality bonuses in combination with FFS in 
this research.  




We are making several assumptions in the above statement about global capitation. First, 
capitated practices must bear at least partial financial risk for all medical services including 
emergency and hospital care. Second, capitated practices cannot prevent patients from receiving 
emergency care. Third, if a patient receives emergency care, additional hospital care could follow 
without intervention by the capitated practice. Finally, capitated practices serve the same core patient 
pool for an extended period of time. These assumptions create a situation where long-term patient 
outcomes are rewarded with less emergency and hospital care for the patient. The result is long-
term cost savings and higher capitated revenue for the capitated practice. It also means patients 
would have fewer and less intense health complications. 
Prior research has found that total health care expenses decrease when spending for 
primary care increases (Bazemore et al., 2018). This is allegedly because of shifts of medical 
services to preventative care instead of restorative care. For example, if a patient has diabetes, the 
patient can live uninhibited by the disease through blood monitoring, proper diet, physical activity, 
proper medications, etc. (MayoClinic.org). However, over time the patient’s health can degrade if the 
condition is left unmanaged. Some of the complications of diabetes include cardiovascular disease, 
nerve damage, kidney damage, eye damage, foot damage leading to amputation, skin conditions, 
hearing impairment, Alzheimer’s disease, and depression (MayoClinic.org). The power of 
preventative care is in avoiding these complications. This is beneficial for the patient and more 
economical in the long-run. In sum, value-based reimbursement helps shift the mix of patient care to 
preventative primary care instead of restorative care. This in turn reduces overall health care 
expenses. 
 Capitation is designed to align the financial incentives of primary care practices. However, 
when capitation was widely adopted in the 1980s and 1990s, many practices failed financially 
because they were unable to manage the cost of required care for which they became financially 




responsible (Frakt & Mayes, 2012; James & Poulsen, 2016). Our long-term research program will 
investigate how primary-care practices can best be managed to provide effective care under blends 
of capitation and fee-for service arrangements. The goal is to deliver medical services that promote 
the health of patients while generating financial returns to the practice commensurately with the risk 
assumed in contracts with health insurers and protecting the practice against financial failure.  
 Our immediate research question is, “Which capitated contract terms provide the correct 
balance of financial rewards and financial risks for primary care practices, given differing practice 
characteristics, patient populations, and care dynamics?” To investigate this topic, we investigated 
utilization shifts for Medicare beneficiaries under the care of primary care physicians (PCP) who bear 
varying degrees of risk. We also ran Monte Carlo Simulations to investigate capitation contract 
outcomes. Revenue for a primary care practice comes from many forms (Stout, 2020). The capitation 
contract would be the main source of potential profits and losses for a practice under capitation. 
Practices still receive FFS reimbursement for the services they render. We do not, however, consider 
these as we investigate the capitation contract outcomes. The capitation contract represents a 
potential bonus in addition to the FFS revenue, or it could result in the practice owing the MA plan. 
A positive contract result would benefit a practice, but a negative result would hurt a practice.  
For our dissertation, we stop our investigation with the capitation contract results. We thus 
ignore changes in the scope of practice which could impact FFS income. Over the next three 
chapters, we present the literature review and plan for our long-term research program. Some of this 
information will not apply directly to our dissertation research but provides valuable context. However, 
it provides valuable context for our dissertation. Our dissertation represents the first few steps of 
many in this stream of research.  
 For our long-term research program, our models will estimate the capacity of a primary care 
practice in terms of time available to provide care. Then, historic patient health care needs will be 




used to simulate care required by the patient population. These needs will either be served by the 
primary care practice or result in external referrals, emergency care, or inpatient hospital stays. The 
care provided will impact the financial statements for the primary care practice. Other statistics such 
as waiting times for appointments, times in the waiting room, and times spent with medical 
practitioners and support staff will be generated to represent service delivery. Finally, cost of external 
patient referrals, emergency care, and inpatient hospital care will be captured as a proxy for health 
outcomes of patients. Sensitivity analysis will be conducted on several experimental variables to 
evaluate their impacts on financial, service, and health related measures. This will provide context 
how a primary care practice can be managed to achieve some of the results we observe in our 
dissertation. 
1.1 Health Care Reimbursement Structures 
 CMS has a triple aim to improve population health, improve patient engagement, and lower 
per-capita health care costs (Floyd, 2014). There have been many reimbursement structures used 
in Medicare over the years, but the financial incentives created for medical providers by each 
reimbursement structure are vastly different. Under Agency Theory the incentives each structure 
generates will lead to different behaviors by the agents (Conrad, 2015; Eisenhardt, 1989). Medical 
providers are the agents we are researching with this study. We are particularly interested in PCPs 
who are engaged with MA capitation contracts. 
1.1.1 Cost-plus. Cost-plus was the original Medicare reimbursement structure. Under cost-
plus, medical providers estimated their cost for providing each unit of care. They were then 
reimbursed the cost plus a markup (James & Poulsen, 2016). Under this structure, a revenue 
maximizing strategy would be to spend without restraint and make services as expensive as possible. 
It created no incentive to control costs. Likewise, it created no incentive related to patient outcomes.  




1.1.2 Fee-for-service. The main form of reimbursement to medical providers today is 
referred to as fee-for-service. Under FFS, medical providers are paid a contracted rate for each 
service rendered. There are many nuances and caveats to these contracts causing them to be quite 
complex. Fundamentally, medical providers are paid for each service rendered (James & Poulsen, 
2016). Without additional provisions in the contract, no reimbursement is made based on patient 
outcomes.  
Strictly from a short-term financial perspective, medical providers could lose revenue under 
FFS by returning a fixed pool of patients to health quickly and efficiently. FFS also rewards volume 
of services with the most expensive services receiving the most reimbursement. According to Floyd 
(2014) this “has encouraged overuse of surgery, office visits, and testing with no accountability for 
outcomes and efficiency” (p.17). Furthermore, the advancement of technology in the U.S. has led to 
rising health care costs (Bodenheimer, 2005a). Under FFS, medical providers profit from advanced 
procedures and are the ones recommending these procedures to patients. As such, frequency and 
use of advanced technology in the U.S. surpasses other developed nations (Bodenheimer, 2005a). 
1.1.3 Bundled Payments. Another structure is called bundled payments or per case 
reimbursement. With bundled payments, medical providers are paid for the care of a patient for all 
services required for a medical condition or procedure. For example, all physician visits, the surgery, 
and any medications required for a hip replacement would be reimbursed en masse for the full 
procedure instead of paying for each individual service (Porter & Kaplan, 2016). This reimbursement 
structure encourages removing waste caused by disjoint procedures. It does not encourage avoiding 
procedures which are not needed in the first place or preventative care to maintain each patient’s 
health. For example, a better alternative to open-heart surgery would be keeping the patient healthy 
and preventing the need for surgery. In this example, bundled payments would not reward avoiding 
an unnecessary surgery. They would only reward an efficient surgery. For this reason, bundled 




payments would effectively align the financial incentives for hospitals and outpatient surgery centers, 
but they would not align the financial incentives of the entire health care industry. 
1.1.4 Salary. Under salaried reimbursement, a medical provider receives the same income 
regardless of the volume or quality of services rendered. Salaried reimbursement is not common 
from an MA payer to a PCP. However, there was a time when salaried reimbursement was common 
within hospitals. In the 1990s, hospitals experienced poor productivity from physicians reimbursed 
via salaried arrangements. This led them to cease employing PCPs. PCPs then returned to private 
practice (Floyd, 2014). Roland and Dudley (2016) predict this outcome when they explain salaried 
reimbursement creates an incentive for low productivity. Furthermore, there is no incentive for PCPs 
to receive more patients or provide high quality care (Roland & Dudley, 2016). 
1.1.5 Capitation. The final reimbursement structure we will consider is called capitation. As 
we will discuss, there is a wide range of capitation contracts. In its most extreme form called global 
capitation or pure capitation, medical providers simply receive a fixed payment each month for each 
patient under care (James & Poulsen, 2016). Whether the patient needs $100 or $100,000 in medical 
services, the provider will receive the same fixed payment. For this reason, capitation rewards 
reductions of all forms of waste (James & Poulsen, 2016). Blomqvist and Busby (2012) find PCPs 
today act more as patient managers and provide fewer direct services than in the past. They believe 
the best reimbursement structure is on a per-patient basis (i.e. capitation). However, they state 
capitation would be less applicable for specialists. 
 Bodenheimer (2005b) suggests capitation is an effective method to contain health care 
costs. Fisher, et. al (2009) suggest three principles to guide Medicare reform. First, local 
organizations should be accountable for the continuum of patient care including outcomes, quality, 
and costs. This includes current and future health system capacity. Second, provider incomes need 
to be decoupled from volume and intensity. Instead, providers should be paid for improved patient 




health and outcomes, better quality, and reduced costs. Third, informed patient choice should be 
encouraged through balanced information on the risks and benefits associated with treatments. 
Likewise, there should be comprehensive and transparent measures of system performance 
regarding outcomes, quality, and costs. 
 Our study is predicated on decoupling provider income from volume and intensity alone. 
Capitation with quality incentives does this. Since providers are paid the same amount whether their 
patients are healthy or become sick, providers are encouraged to help patients maintain health and 
return them to health as quickly and efficiently as possible should they become sick. Under global 
capitation, providers can be liable for all medical expenses incurred by the patient, so they are 
encouraged to manage the entire spectrum of care instead of just the services they render.  
 Capitation therefore reduces risk exposure for MA payers while creating asymmetric risk for 
practices. When few services are rendered to patients, practices are provided a fixed payment to 
help cover fixed costs. However, when many services are rendered to patients, practices can end 
up paying MA payers. This means capitation patients could create less revenue for the practice than 
their FFS counterparts. When this occurs in the extreme form, these contracts can generate negative 
revenue for the practice.  
There appears to be some misunderstanding in the literature regarding the nature of modern 
capitation contracts. The main form of capitation we saw mentioned is global capitation as it is 
described above. We found only three recent papers by two authors that mentioned a spectrum of 
capitation contracts (Bazemore et al., 2018; Stout, 2018, 2019). There are more papers from the 
1990s and early 2000s which mention variations to capitation contracts (Anderson & Weller, 1999; 
Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 1996; Hurley, Grossman, Lake, & Casalino, 2002; Simon & Emmons, 
1997; Super, 2006; Zuvekas & Cohen, 2010). This misconception in recent articles can lead to false 
conclusions regarding financial risks to the providers. Under global capitation, there are substantial 




and likely financial risks because a few sick patients could deplete the funds available for care. The 
practice would be liable for any additional medical care needed for its patients. In health care, 5% of 
patients incur 50% of costs Sheets et al. (2017). If a small practice happens to have a couple more 
sick patients than average, under global capitation it could fail financially. Therefore, some scholars 
dismiss capitation as being unrealistic for medical practices (Frakt & Mayes, 2012; Porter & Kaplan, 
2016). 
Based on industry experience, there exists a spectrum of capitation contracts. Some forms 
include bonuses for profits, but no liability for losses; others only capitate certain services; still others 
have stop loss provisions to protect providers financially from a few sick patients. Instead of viewing 
capitation as an all or nothing proposition, capitation should be viewed as a spectrum with FFS on 
one end and global capitation on the other end. This means, there are potential contracts which could 
engaged all PCPs in some form of capitation without overexposure or any exposure to financial ruin. 
 We recognize not all practices can engage in global capitation contracts. Likewise, 
opportunities for capitation mainly exist in managing patients with chronic conditions. Therefore, we 
investigate a blend of reimbursement combining FFS and capitation with quality incentives. Our study 
is intended to investigate the proper blend to maintain the profitability of the practice, contain risk 
commensurately with profit, and to do so without sacrificing patient service and medical outcomes. 
  




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Lessons from Prior Capitation Efforts 
 Capitation is not a new idea. Capitation was widely adopted in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Zuvekas & Cohen, 2010). Between 1987 and 1995, capitation nearly tripled for Medicare patients 
(Berwick, 1996). Capitation remains today in markets with a strong HMO presence, but it is rare 
elsewhere. The issues created by FFS still exist, and modern payment reform structures usually 
include components of capitation (Zuvekas & Cohen, 2010). Therefore, it is important to learn from 
past capitation experiences. Capitation should not be viewed as an ethical or efficiency panacea. 
Capitation can motivate physicians who are primary care focused and equate good patient care to 
cost-effective care. It can also motivate physicians from a purely economic means who deny care 
(Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 1996). Unethical providers under FFS tend to over-provide care. 
Unethical providers under capitation tend to under-provide care (Cox, 2011). While some see 
capitation to be an effective method for containing health care costs, others see it as a threat to 
patient welfare through denial of care (Berwick, 1996).  
 Kralewski, Wingert, Knutson, Johnson, and Veazie (1996) studied practices in the 
Minneapolis/St. Paul area using data from 1992. They found that management capacity correlated 
with the practice having patient care control systems. They did not find a statistically significant effect 
for capitated payments to correlate with having patient care control systems. However, the authors 
note this could be partially due to having a small sample size. The authors note most practices at the 
time had not implemented computer systems to monitor patient–physician encounters based on 
diagnosis codes. 
 Super (2006) conducted a case study of a large medical practice in the Cincinnati, Ohio 
area. The practice was compelled by consumer demand shifts to move to FFS after operating under 
capitation for nearly 30 years. Their experience helps inform the FFS–capitation debate. After 




adopting FFS, less profitable services were eliminated such as mental health, eye care, and dietary 
counseling. (Dietary counseling can greatly impact a patient’s health, but it is not rewarded under 
FFS.) Surprisingly, physicians under FFS were more likely to follow up with patients who missed 
preventative care appointments. This might be because inpatient hospital payments were not 
included in their capitation contracts. The contract included only primary and specialty care. The 
financial incentives aligned more closely to salaried reimbursement instead of capitation. The 
physicians interviewed found “neither capitation nor FFS is all good or all bad” (p. 224). 
Bankruptcy can be a real concern for capitated practices. Rosenthal, Frank, Buchanan, and 
Epstein (2001) studied physician organizations in California. Between 1998 and 2001, 31 of the 153 
organizations studied failed financially. The authors call for research predicting success or failure of 
capitated physician organizations. Our research will contribute to this knowledge gap. Small 
practices can be greatly impacted by a few individuals who incur large medical expenses over a year 
(Anderson & Weller, 1999). Cox (2011) used statistical sampling theory to show small practices had 
lower probability of profits and larger probability of net losses and large net losses under global 
capitation. 
 Anderson and Weller (1999) and Bodenheimer and Grumbach (1996) identified three ways 
to reduce financial risk for practices with capitation contracts. First, stop-loss provisions (also called 
reinsurance) limit exposure to the risk of having a couple patients with high medical costs. Second, 
carve-outs exclude certain services, conditions, or populations from the contract. For example, 
Rosenthal et al. (2001) identified pharmacy claims as a source of large financial losses for capitated 
medical providers. Carve-outs could be used to exclude pharmacy claims from a capitation contract. 
Third, risk adjustment provides more revenue for patients with higher expected costs (like patients 
with chronic conditions). 




Using data from a 1995 nationally representative physician survey, Simon and Emmons 
(1997) found use of capitation was widespread. More than 33 percent of physician practices had at 
least one capitated contract. Of these practices, nearly 20 percent of revenue was capitated. Many 
of the contracts did not have stop loss provisions. Of the physicians surveyed, 54% did not know if 
there were stop-loss provisions in their contract. These responses did not vary greatly by practice 
size. While 59 percent of practices of 50 physicians or more carried stop-loss, only 5 percent of solo 
physicians carried stop-loss. Given the lack of stop-loss, the failure rates mentioned previously would 
have been likely for small practices. Lack of stop-loss also indicates there was wide-spread 
ignorance of the risks assumed by practices with capitation.  
Some authors mentioned ways to be profitable under capitation. Kerr et al. (1995) used self-
report surveys to evaluate how practices manage health care costs under capitation. Many used 
practices such as gatekeeping, preauthorization, profiling, education, and guidelines to ensure only 
needed specialist care was provided. Kolb and Horowitz (1995) listed these success factors for 
capitation: "acquiring managed care contracting expertise, upgrading information systems, 
measuring and reporting performance, enhancing preventive services, integrating services, creating 
management incentives that reward efficiency, and allocating capital to strengthen the primary care 
base and expand off-campus services" (p. 69). Hurley et al. (2002) identified several factors for 
capitation success in local markets: “(1) plans’ competence in selecting suitable risk-contracting 
partners; (2) presence of provider organizations willing and able to manage risk; (3) ability of plans 
and providers to agree on the appropriate scope of services for which risk can be transferred; and 
(4) adequacy of capitation payments to providers" (p. 152). 
 Applying these lessons to medical services under Medicare Advantage arrangements, there 
are several considerations. First, there must be an opportunity to create lower expenses than 
average through quality care. Therefore, we are only evaluating capitation for MA patients. This 




opportunity exists by avoiding chronic disease complications in this population through proactive 
primary and specialist care. The lower costs would manifest through lower utilization at other health 
care venues including hospitals. Therefore, it is imperative to have primary care practices bear risk 
for hospital care in their capitation contracts. However, due to net losses on pharmacy claims, 
pharmacy claims should be carved out from capitated contracts. It is possible future research could 
investigate the impact of capitation contracts on physician awareness to achieve cost savings to use 
generic drugs. Likewise, revenue for sick patients must be higher. This is accomplished through the 
Medicare Risk Adjustment mechanism. Finally, stop loss likely plays a key role in keeping small 
practices solvent.  
To protect patients, it is important to have quality metrics in place. Quality bonuses fill this 
role in modern MA capitation contracts. Plus, Medicare participating hospitals are not allowed to turn 
away patients with emergency medical conditions (CMS.gov, 2012). If practices bear risk on 
emergency care, this creates a strong financial deterrent from denying care. Finally, each MA plan 
has a CMS star rating indicating the quality of the plan. When a Medicare patient selects a plan 
during open enrollment, the CMS star rating is provided. Two components of this rating system are 
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) measures for clinical quality and 
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) surveys for patient 
satisfaction (IBX.com). The controls for quality are more robust today than they were 20 to 40 years 
ago. 
While capitation does not resolve every issue in health care; it does create the opportunity 
to shift to a more primary care centric health care model that rewards efficiency and patient health. 
This quote sums it up nicely. 
Those who truly desire to improve will recognize that, in the right organizational environment 
and guided by the right values, capitated payment can provide a rational financial context 




that vastly increases the opportunities for doctors and system managers to make changes 
that result in better and more efficient care for patients and communities (Berwick, 1996, p. 
1230). 
2.2 Estimating practice capacity 
 This next section mainly relates to the long-term research program, but it is useful for context 
for our dissertation research. We now shift focus to health care delivery and management of medical 
practices. When evaluating capitated primary care practices, practice capacity to provide care is a 
constraint on the outcomes. If patients are unable to receive care from their primary care providers, 
they may seek care from another more expensive source. For example, patients could go to the 
emergency room because proper primary care was not received (Lines, Li, Mick, & Ash, 2019). Under 
a capitated contract, these expensive services would negatively impact the primary care practice. 
Patients could visit an emergency room instead of their PCPs. This means several thousand dollars 
would be added to the expenses of the capitation contract. This would reduce the revenue for the 
practice. 
 Palmer, Fulop, and Utley (2018) conducted a systematic literature review of published 
operational research methods for modelling patient flow within community-based health care. Chand, 
Moskowitz, Norris, Shade, and Willis (2009) analyzed patient flow at an outpatient clinic of the 
Indiana University Medical Group. Authors created a process map, collected data on task times, and 
created a simulation model based on the process map. The authors identified operation 
enhancements to be implemented. There are two sources of complexity in the model. First, patients 
need to be seen by their respective physicians. Second, the queue for patients starts and ends at 
zero each day.  
 Clague et al. (1997) used object-oriented design simulation to evaluate the relationship 
between staffing, scheduling, patient wait times, and physician wait times. They found mean 




appointment times were 40 minutes for new patients and 13 minutes for return patients. Physician 
wait times decrease as support staff increase. Non-attendance rate was about 20 percent, and the 
majority of patients arrived early for appointments. 
 Deo, Iravani, Jiang, Smilowitz, and Samuelson (2013) use a finite horizon stochastic 
dynamic program to evaluate the impact of scheduling on patient outcomes. This enabled the 
practice to adjust the duration between visits at a patient level depending on the health state of the 
patient, the tightness of the capacity for the practice, and the health state of the entire patient 
population. The authors projected up to 15% health gains for the community over the current policy. 
This research demonstrates primary care needs can vary across individuals. When these varying 
needs are met, overall health can improve. 
 Kucukyazici, Verter, and Mayo (2011) studied stroke patients discharged from acute care 
hospitals in Quebec to their homes. The authors use a Markov model to simulate patient flow among 
multiple care-provider visit patterns. Authors found when an appointment with a PCP was facilitated 
at discharge from the hospital, the largest decrease in patient mortality and average cost per patient 
were realized. Shi, Peng, and Erdem (2014) used discrete event simulation model to evaluate a 
Veterans Affairs primary care clinic. The parameters of the model were walk-in arrival rate, no-show 
rate, post-triage rate, new patient rate, number of double bookings, and nurse-only appointment rate. 
The authors recommend eliminating the use of double bookings, manage the walk-in patients by 
adjusting the admission policy, and enact policies to reduce the patient no-show rate. 
 Swisher and Jacobson (2002) used a discrete-event simulation model in a visual simulation 
environment to evaluate a family practice outpatient clinic. The authors evaluate appropriate staffing 
and facility size to optimize a metric they created called “clinic effectiveness”, which compiles clinic 
profit, patient satisfaction, and staff satisfaction. A deterministic allocation model is presented by van 




Zon and Kommer (1999) to demonstrate how patient care decisions can impact future patient care 
requirements. The authors used simulated data to demonstrate the effect. 
 Bretthauer and Cǒté (1998) developed an optimization/queueing network model to evaluate 
capacity planning in both a blood bank and a family practice clinic. The authors focused on the 
physical locations within the practice as the units of investigation. The authors mapped the routes 
patients take within the practice between the stations: sign in, nurse’s aid station, examining room, 
lab/x-ray, and check out. The authors optimized practice cost while controlling customer service by 
placing a constraint on patient waiting times. 
 Shortle, Thompson, Gross, and Harris (2018) wrote a textbook presenting Queueing Theory 
in depth. Bitran and Tirupati (1988) evaluate various methods for analyzing queueing networks. They 
find the decomposition method provides solutions which do not closely follow the events being 
modeled. Results were improved when interference was added to the analysis. Brennan, Golden, 
and Rappoport (1992) sought to improve donor experience with the American Red Cross through 
simulation analysis. The authors found donor arrival and donor time did not follow a Poisson 
distribution. Many steps followed a lognormal distribution, whereas two steps followed a Weibull 
distribution. These findings were corroborated by Bretthauer and Cǒté (1998) who found service 
times for the nurse’s station and examination room followed a Weibull distribution. Service times for 
the lab and x-rays followed a Gamma distribution.  
 Smith‐Daniels, Schweikhart, and Smith‐Daniels (1988) reviewed prior literature and show 
management of health care capacity consists of managing three main resource categories: 
workforce, equipment, and facilities. These decisions impact three distinct time horizons. Long-term 
planning involves the acquisition of facilities. Mid-term planning involves the acquisition of equipment 
and hiring workforce. Short-term planning consists of scheduling. 




2.3 Estimating health care needs of patients 
 This section informs the analysis in Chapters 4-7. It also informs the long-term research 
program. It is written from the perspective of building the model for the long-term research program. 
Once the capacity of the medical practice has been determined, we will need to estimate the medical 
services required for the patients under care. Much research has been conducted aimed at 
estimating the health care needs of patients. For example, Charlson et al. (2008) used the 
comorbidity score along with demographics to predict the total cost of care for a patient in a year. 
They find annual costs increase exponentially as the patient’s comorbidity score increases. Sheets 
et al. (2017) use contrast mining on electronic health records to predict which patients will have the 
highest cost. This is important because 5% of patients incur 50% of health care expenses. They 
validated their findings using multiple logistic regression. The annual range of medical expenses for 
patients can vary greatly. The highest annual costs in their dataset were $3,029,833 in 2013 and 
$4,288,603 in 2012. The impact of these annual costs could be catastrophic for a small practice with 
a capitated contract without stop loss provisions. 
Avila, Jupiter, Chavez-MacGregor, De Oliveira, and Kaul (2019) studied high-cost inpatient 
hospital visits for cancer patients. They found the median cost in the most expensive decile almost 
five times the median cost of least expensive decile. Patients in the most expensive decile were more 
likely to have five or more comorbidities and receive chemotherapy. Furthermore, utilization can vary 
depending on whether the patient has private or public insurance. Lines et al. (2019) find among 
non-elderly patients in Massachusetts, patients with private insurance were more likely to have a 
primary care visit (83% to 70%), have a visit with their personal PCP (44% to 38%), and less likely 
to have a primary care sensitive emergency room visit (9.0% to 36.5%). 
 O’Caoimh et al. (2015) conducted a literature review for studies predicting hospitalizations 
and other adverse events in an elderly population. In addition to demographics and comorbidities, 




several of the studies use items for which we do not have data. For example, some of the additional 
measures were living with spouse, informal caregiver availability, and patient balance problems. 
While these can be important measures for predicting hospitalization, it would not be feasible to 
collect this data for the patients in the Medicare dataset we will use. 
2.4 Calculating income for practices 
For the long-term research program, practice capacity and medical needs of patients will be 
used to determine the income for a practice. Our main measure of financial performance we will be 
Net Income Before Taxes. For each practice, fixed costs will be calculated for its facilities, equipment 
and staff. We will use benchmark data provided by MGMA for this along with de-identified income 
statement data for practices in the St. Louis market. Variable costs for patient visits will be estimated 
according to the time and resources consumed. All cost data will be adjusted for inflation to align 
with 2016 revenue data. We will allocate fixed costs to each patient group using activity-based 
costing (Lanen, Anderson, & Maher, 2020). This will enable us to calculate profits and losses for 
each patient group. 
We will calculate the reimbursement for each patient group according to the assumed terms 
of their insurance: Traditional Medicare FFS, MA capitation, and commercially insured FFS. Details 
for the MA capitation calculations are found in the research methods section. Reimbursement for 
Traditional Medicare FFS will be pulled directly from the CMS historical data. Any FFS charges that 
impact a capitated contract will use the Traditional Medicare FFS fee schedule. Curto, Einav, 
Finkelstein, Levin, and Bhattacharya (2019) found MA reimbursement follows Traditional Medicare 
FFS fee schedules. We will subtract the total costs for the practice from the total reimbursements 
received to calculate Net Income Before Taxes. Details for the calculations are found in the research 
methods section. 




For this dissertation, we will not be calculating the net income for the practice. Instead, we 
will be calculating the financial result of the capitation contracts. The results and processes 
developed as part of our dissertation will be crucial elements for the long-term research program. 
The goal for our dissertation is to capture the components needed to calculate the contract results. 
In the future, these results would be compiled with other sources of revenue and costs to calculate 
the net income for the practice. 
2.5 Long-term Experimental Factors 
 There are several factors which materially affect the outcomes of capitation contracts. We 
will perform sensitivity analysis on some of these factors with our dissertation. Others will be 
investigated with future research. 
2.5.1 Practice Size. The Medicare Shared Savings Program is an Accountable Care 
Organization (ACO) program which enables participating providers to share in the savings with CMS 
if health care expenditures are kept under a benchmark (McWilliams, Hatfield, Chernew, Landon, & 
Schwartz, 2016). Fisher et al. (2009) found 5,000 beneficiaries were required per ACO in order to 
achieve stable financial results. It is expected that larger practices will be able to bear more financial 
risk than smaller practices. We will mainly be investigating small practices with fewer than 700 
beneficiaries contained in the practices patient panel. This will provide evidence if small practices 
can bear capitated risk without over exposure of financial failure. 
2.5.2 Physician Mix & Scheduling. Stout (2018) found several capitated PCPs stated the 
need to be a full-service practice to minimize referrals to third-parties because quality care provided 
within the practice is more cost effective than referrals. This was accomplished by hiring specialists 
to provide frequently needed care. The PCPs interviewed stated this improved customer service 
along with financial results. Furthermore, six of ten captitated PCPs mentioned the need to be 




accessible to patients. Rosenthal et al. (2001) also found provider groups contracted with specialists 
to minimize external referrals. Future research will be needed to investigate these considerations. 
2.5.3 Financial and Operating Leverage. The accounting literature on leverage is useful 
for investigating capitated PCP practices. The amount of leverage a practice has will determine how 
much risk it can bear while remaining solvent. Modigliani and Miller (1958) state when returns are 
sure, the choice between debt and equity financing is unimportant. Increasing the ratio of debt to 
equity increases the expected returns to the equity holder, but this occurs at the expense of increased 
outcome dispersion. For independent PCPs, they can be both the equity holder of the company and 
its key employees. Financial loss could result in significant personal loss for the PCP caused by 
greater financial results dispersion. 
 Baxter (1967) finds high degrees of leverage increase the probability of bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, firms are able to bear more leverage when they have stable income streams. For 
example, a utility company may rely on debt for financing due to the stable nature of its income 
stream. Hamada (1972) finds "if the Modigliani & Miller corporate tax leverage propositions are 
correct, then approximately 21 to 24% of the observed systematic risk of common stocks (when 
averaged over 304 firms) can be explained merely by the added financial risk taken on by the 
underlying firm with its use of debt and preferred stock. Corporate (financial) leverage does count 
considerably" (p. 451). Likewise, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) find financial leverage of a firm 
determines the point at which changes in income will cause a firm to become insolvent. 
Operating leverage exists in addition to financial leverage. Lev (1974) defines a firm’s 
operating leverage as “the ratio of the fixed to variable operating costs; a high operating leverage 
refers to a high share of fixed costs relative to variable costs" (p. 627). Lev found high degrees of 
operating leverage were associated with larger overall and systematic risk of stocks. Gahlon and 
Gentry (1982) show how the degrees of operating leverage and financial leverage magnify income 




variability. Mandelker and Rhee (1984) show how managers can maintain a constant total leverage 
by making trade-offs between financial leverage and operating leverage. We will not be evaluating 
these effects in our dissertation. With our long-term research program, we will evaluate how leverage 
both in the practice and for the physician personally can lead to different financial outcomes for 
physicians under capitation.  




Chapter 3: Method 
 The research for this dissertation will concentrate on compensation models that hold a 
capitated practice accountable for the total costs of services received by their patients in all service 
venues. This chapter presents the research methods that will be used with the long-term research 
program. Some elements from this chapter are implemented for the analysis for our dissertation, but 
the focus of this chapter is the long-term research program. Details for the analysis conducted with 
our dissertation are presented in Chapters 4-7. As an overview, we investigated health-care 
utilization frequency differences of Medicare beneficiaries using Poisson regression analysis in 
Chapter 4. We investigated the utilization differences between MA and FFS beneficiaries under the 
care of different PCPs when controlling for other variables. We utilized new proxy variables to capture 
varying degrees of capitated risk of each PCP. 
 In Chapters 5-7, we conducted Monte Carlo simulations using custom SAS databases to 
investigate capitation contract results. We investigated these results varying the size of the practice, 
contract terms, and the percentage of patients who receive a PCP visit. We evaluated how these 
results changed as health-care utilization is reduced based on the results from Chapter 4. We also 
conducted stress tests to investigate the impact of adding one or two patients to the panel who 
exhibited large medical payments. 
The rest of this chapter presents the long-term research program. Our long-term model will 
focus on patient flow within a primary care practice. The output variables we will evaluate are Net 
Income before Taxes for the practice. We will also present the cost of external referrals, emergency 
care, and inpatient hospital care. Finally, we will capture waiting times for appointments, times in the 
waiting room, and times spent with medical practitioners and support staff to represent service 
delivery. We will use a three-step approach in our analysis. First, we will evaluate patient flow within 
a primary care practice to determine its capacity. Then, we will evaluate the care needed for the 




patient population. Combining these we will determine which services can be provided by the practice 
and which services will result in external referrals, emergency care, and inpatient hospital care. Using 
this information, we will calculate the income for the practice. The revenue for the practice will consist 
of FFS revenue, capitation contract results, and quality bonuses. For each scenario, we will conduct 
discrete-event simulations.  
3.1 Estimating practice capacity 
 Exhibit 1 represents patient flow within a primary care practice which is presented by 
Bretthauer and Cǒté (1998, p. 252). Even though there is only one box for examining rooms, 
physicians and nurses can use multiple examining rooms. Bretthauer and Cǒté (1998) found 
physicians within the practice he studied were allocated either two or three examining rooms. 
Therefore, capacity of the practice is impacted by physical space limitations, available equipment, 
and time limitations of personnel. We will consider these factors in our analysis. In order for service 
to be provided, the physical space, equipment, and personnel must be available. Furthermore, the 
services needed must be within the license of the nurse or physician. Bretthauer and Cǒté (1998) 
also present a table containing the probability distributions of moving from one station to another 
station. 
 Some practices have locations to conduct lab work and X-rays for patients. A practice could 
have both locations, just lab, just X-ray, or neither. We will consider this in our analysis. Practices 
with these locations will be able to administer more services than practices without them. Additional 
equipment will be needed for these services. However, having the equipment will limit external 
referrals and provide additional FFS revenue but will increase capital costs. 
  




Exhibit 1. Patient Flow in a Primary Care Practice 
 
 Likewise, there are administrative tasks within the practice. These tasks occur at the check 
in and check out stations. These can either be the same physical space or separate spaces. The 
employee at each station can either be different people or the same person. Our analysis will not 
consider the physical space for these stations. But we will consider the number of administrative 
staff. A list of the input variables for our model for the practice are found in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 
PCP Model Parameters 
Variable Impact 
  
Number of physicians Determines the number of patients under care 
  
Number of examining rooms 
per physician 
Determines efficiency of the practice 
  
Number of nurses per 
physician 
Determines efficiency on the practice 
  
Specialist on staff and type 
of specialist 
Determines if specialist care can be provided within the practice 
or not 
  
Number of office staff (Check 
In & Check Out) 
Determines efficiency of Check In & Check Out stations 
  
Lab (yes or no) 
Determines if blood services can be provided within the practice 
or not 
  
X-ray (yes or no) Determines if X-rays can be taken within the practice or not 
  




 Finally, we will evaluate the recommendations from physicians interviewed by Stout (2018) 
recommending adding certain specialists to the practice. This increases the types of services that 
can be provided to patients. Specialist practices are not the focus of our research, so we will assume 
specialist care has a simple flow found in Exhibit 2. If specialist care is needed, the patient flow would 
follow this path. Therefore, we are assuming specialist patients would draw on administrative 
resources but would not impact other primary care resources.  
Exhibit 2. Specialist Care 
 
3.2 Estimating health care needs of patients 
Several factors influenced our choice of method for estimating patient health care needs. 
First, patients with outlier utilization and costs can and do occur as shown by Sheets et al. (2017). 
Second, many factors impact the health-care utilization of a patient which would be infeasible to 
measure. Third, health care is inherently interdependent. Treatment can vary greatly patient to 
patient even if they have the same condition. The analysis conducted in this dissertation informs how 
to effectively estimate health-care utilization and costs for a patient panel. 
  In our dissertation we estimated total health care costs using three different approaches. 
We first used empirical distributions of total medical payments for an FFS beneficiary. Next, we found 
theoretical probability distributions for the empirical distributions using Arena v14.7. Finally, building 
on prior work we predicted service events and applied a cost per event (Smith, Stout, & Wieck, 2021; 
Stout, 2020). Further work with seasonality will be needed to determine the distribution of each event 
throughout the year. We will expand this analysis for younger patients. We will use the NAMCS 
Dataset for 2015 – 2017 provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC.gov, 
2017). 




 We will need time distributions for each activity within the practice. This will enable us to 
integrate provider capacity and patient health care needs. Bretthauer and Cǒté (1998) presented 
two tables concerning patient time at each station. One table presents the minimum, average, 
median, maximum, and standard deviation for each station. The second table presents the 
distribution characteristics for each station. We will start with these times in our analysis. To ensure 
these times are representative, we will compare them to physician time spent with patient. This 
measure is contained in the NAMCS Dataset (CDC.gov, 2017). It is likely times for activities have 
changed over time. If they have, a time study with a practice will be needed. 
 In the model, scheduled care will be prioritized for each day. Scheduled care will be provided 
first. Unscheduled care will be provided if there is scheduling capacity to receive the patient. If only 
some of the unscheduled care needs can be provided, patients will be selected at random until the 
schedule is full for the day. If urgent care is required before the next available opening in the 
schedule, the patient will be transferred to an urgent care center or an emergency care center 
depending on the condition. This can also distract urgent care resources needed for other patients. 
If specialty care is needed, it will be provided by a specialist. If inpatient hospital care is needed, it 
will be provided by a hospital. 
3.3 Calculating Income for Practices 
 The main outcome variable we will be analyzing is Net Income before Taxes for the practice. 
For each practice based on the capacity determined, fixed costs will be calculated. We will use 
benchmark data provided by MGMA for this along with de-identified income statement data for 
practices in the St. Louis market. We will also calculate a per visit variable cost based on this data. 
All cost data will be adjusted for inflation to align with 2016 revenue data. The medical services 
provided will be multiplied by this rate to determine variable cost for each simulation run. Aggregate 
data from these sources will also be used to validate the final results of the model. We will allocate 




fixed costs to each patient group using activity-based costing (Lanen et al., 2020). This will enable 
us to calculate profits and losses for each patient group. 
 Revenue will be calculated for each of the three patient groups. Traditional Medicare FFS 
patients will create practice revenue based on services rendered. Each service will be reimbursed 
based on the Medicare FFS cost schedule. Revenue for Commercially Insured FFS patients will be 
calculated by multiplying the Medicare FFS reimbursement by a factor. We will conduct sensitivity 
analysis using factors ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 at an increment of 0.1. 
Calculating the revenue for MA patients is more complicated. It consists of several 
components which are described by Stout (2020). He presents several formulas for calculating the 
financial reimbursement received by primary care practices under capitation. There are many forms 
of capitation, and the resulting formulas can be increasingly complex. We will use the simplest 
formula to demonstrate the effects created as the input variables change. However, practices can 
also receive FFS revenue and quality bonuses for MA patients (Stout, 2020). We used these 
formulas in our dissertation research. We did not consider FFS revenue or quality bonuses. 
Reimbursement to the practice for the capitation contract follows the below formula, where 
C represents the payment the MA plan receives from CMS, R represents the percentage of the 
payment retained by the MA plan (0 ≤ R ≤ 0.15), E represents the total medical expenses, and S 
represents the share of the risk owned by the practice (0 ≤ S ≤ 1). 
PCP Earnings = ([C – (C * R)] – E) * S 
The practice can impact the variables C, E, and S. The practice can impact E by providing 
preventative and proactive care to its patients. The practice can impact S through the contract. The 
practice can also impact C, but the mechanism is more intricate. C is calculated at a patient level 
with the formula below, where the Base Rate is determined by CMS for each county and the MRA 




factor is determined by the Medicare Risk Adjustment score for the patient, and CIA is the coding 
intensity adjustment (Better Medicare Alliance, 2017). 
C = (Base Rate * MRA factor) * (1 – CIA). 
The MRA factor is based on diagnosis coding for beneficiaries for chronic medical 
conditions. MA plans receive larger reimbursement from CMS for beneficiaries who have more 
chronic medical conditions. This means if diagnosis coding is more intense for MA patients, the MA 
plan and the primary care practice will receive larger reimbursements. This would result in higher 
reimbursement for the MA patient. For this reason, CMS reduces the reimbursement for MA patients 
by a coding intensity adjustment. CIA is the adjustment for coding intensity differences between MA 
patients and FFS patients. 
 Geruso and Layton (2015) found patients in MA plans received 6% to 16% higher diagnosis-
based risk scores compared with Traditional Medicare FFS. GAO.gov (2013) estimated coding 
differences between MA and Traditional Medicare were 4.2% higher in 2010, between 4.6% and 
5.3% higher in 2011, and between 4.9% to 6.4% higher in 2012. These percentages were larger than 
the coding intensity adjustment. Kronick and Welch (2014) found the MA risk scores increased at a 
faster rate than Traditional Medicare FFS risk scores in the years 2006-2011. However, when the 
mean risk scores are compared between MA and Traditional Medicare, (instead of annual increases 
in scores during this time frame) Traditional Medicare risk scores were higher than MA risk scores 
until 2013. We will conduct sensitivity analysis of the MRA factor in the above formula by including a 
variable: diagnosis intensity factor (DIF). DIF will be evaluated with values ranging from 1.00 to 1.15 
at an increment of 0.01. This will be important for PCPs to understand, so accurate diagnoses are 
submitted for their capitated patients. The final formula for C is as follows. 
C = (Base Rate * MRA factor * DIF) * (1 – CIA). 




Finally, practices will frequently purchase stop loss in case some patients become 
exceedingly ill. In the event stop loss impacts the contract, it will cause a reduction in the value of E. 
Also, the cost for the stop loss contract will be on a per member basis for the practice. For our 
analysis, we will evaluate five variations of capitated contracts. There are many more variations of 
capitation contracts. We chose these five to demonstrate a range of possible contracts. The first 
contract will have S = 0.8 and no stop loss. The second contract will have S = 0.8 with stop loss. The 
third contract will have S = 0.6 with stop loss. The final two contracts are referred to as up-side-only 
contracts. They will have S = 0.25, but any contracts with a negative final amount will not negatively 
impact the practice. We will test one of these contracts with stop loss and the other without stop loss. 
For all contracts, we will assume the practice does not share risk on pharmacy claims. Stout (2020) 
also identified how quality bonuses can impact capitated contracts. Future research will be needed 
to investigate appropriate quality bonuses and their impact on practices. 
The three forms of revenue for Traditional Medicare FFS, commercially insured FFS, and 
MA capitation will be summed to provide the total revenue for the practice. The fixed costs and 
variable costs will be summed to provide total costs. The total costs will be subtracted from the total 
revenue to provide Net Income Before Taxes. 
3.4 Analysis Details 
 In future research, Net Income Before Taxes for the practice and cost of external referrals, 
hospital stays, and emergency room visits will be captured for each run. Each measure will be 
normalized by the count of physicians in the practice. We will also capture waiting times for 
appointments, times in the waiting room, and times spent with medical practitioners and support staff 
to analyze service delivery. The minimum, maximum, and decile values for each scenario will be 
presented for the practice’s financial results. We will also present statistics for the costs of external 
referrals, hospital stays, emergency room visits, and the service variables. 




 Physician income risk will be measured in three ways based on the Net Income Before Taxes 
for the practice. All measures will be normalized by the count of physicians in the practice. First, the 
standard deviation will be presented for each scenario. This captures overall variation. Second, the 
percentage of simulation runs which resulted in Net Income Before Taxes less than $0 will be 
presented. This captures solvency for the practice. Third, the percentage of simulation runs which 
resulted in Net Income Before Taxes less than $150,000 will be presented. This captures opportunity 
costs for the practice operating with only FFS reimbursement.  
This amount of $150,000 is arbitrary because a low-income threshold for a year will vary by 
physician. This amount is close to the 10th percentile for salary and bonus for a primary care 
physician in the St. Louis, Missouri market in 2016. To calculate this amount, we collected the salary 
and bonus distributions for Physician - Generalist, Physician – Family Practice, and Geriatric 
Physician in the St. Louis, Missouri market (Salary.com, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). The amounts 
collected represent 2020 incomes. Therefore, we adjusted these values independently by the 
consumer price index (CPI) and physician fee schedule. These percentages were collected from the 
2020 CMS Medicare Advantage capitation rates (CMS.gov, 2019). The CPI % change is from the 
Calendar year CPI percent change from the Part A projections (p. 12). Physician fee schedule is the 
summation of the Fees and Residual values from the Part B projections (p. 12). Details for this 
analysis is found in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. Table 3.3 also provides a reference for evaluating 
simulation results. These values will be used to further validate our model. 
For our dissertation, we will be compiling contract results for the practice. While this does 
not capture the full net income for the practice, the capitation contract represents the source of risk 
for a practice engaged with capitation. Therefore, we will still inform our research question. Practices 
receive FFS revenue for each visit. This revenue is included in the total medical payments for the 
contract. Positive capitation contract results represent a bonus the practice receives, and negative 




results represent a payment they owe the MA plan. As a result, our evaluations at this stage become 
simpler. Any contracts with final values greater than $0 benefit the practice. If the contract result is 
less than $0, we can assume the practice would be worse off financially by engaging in a capitation 
contract. 
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
 These tables represent the sensitivity analysis we will conduct in our long-term research 
program. All hypotheses are contained in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. Hypotheses related to practice income 
are found in the column labeled “Expected Correlation to Practice Income.” Hypotheses related to 
practice income risk are found in the column labeled “Expected Correlation to Practice Income Risk.” 
Most hypotheses will be evaluated in future research. 
  



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.5.1 Practice Size. We will conduct sensitivity analysis in our dissertation to evaluate the 
impact the size of a practice has on its capitation contracts. We will evaluate practices with one and 
five physicians employed. We will also evaluate the impact to a single PCP practice that has different 
patient panels sizes. 
3.5.2 Physician Mix. In future research, we will analyze the output of our models to 
determine which services are most frequently needed that result in external referals. We expect the 
practice would need to be sufficiently large to justify hiring a specialist. For example, if only 10% of 
patients require oncologist care, we would estimate about one specialist would be needed for every 
10 PCPs employed. We will determine the minimum number of PCPs needed to justify hiring a 
specialist. Also, we will evaluate how many specialists should be hired as the size of the practice 
increases. We recognize care intensity can vary between a primary care provider and a specialist. 
We will compare these differences using the NAMCS Dataset (CDC.gov, 2017). 
3.5.3 Patient Population. In future research, sensitivity analysis will be conducted regarding 
patient mix between Traditional Medicare FFS and MA capitation patients assuming 10%, 25%, 50%, 
75%, and 90% commercially insured FFS patients. For each mix of commercially insured patients, 
the mix of Traditional Medicare patients to MA patients will be varied. We will use percentages of 
100% Traditional Medicare patients and 0% MA patients shifted to 0% Traditional Medicare patients 
and 100% MA patients at increments of 10%. This will help determine the most profitable mix of 
patients. This will be important for policy makers and payers to understand when evaluating 
reimbursement rates for primary care practices. 
3.5.4 Physician Scheduling. In interviews conducted by Stout (2018), six of ten captitated 
PCPs mentioned the need to be accessible to patients. This translates to having scheduling capacity 
to accommodate unplanned patient visits. In future research, we will evaluate the percentage of the 
daily schedule which is left open for unscheduled patient visits. We will increment from 0% to 30% 




by 5% intervals. We expect the results will shift depending on the percentage of MA capitation 
patients. As the percentage of MA capitation patients increase, we expect the percentage of the 
schedule needing to be available to increase. Capacity for unplanned care will be adjusted in the 
model by the number of patients served by the practice. As the practice has more patients under 
care, it will have less capacity for unplanned care. 
Related to scheduling capacity, we will evaluate if certain months have more unscheduled 
care needs. We expect winter months will correlate with more respiratory illnesses like the cold and 
the flu. Also, there will likely be more falls related to patients slipping on ice. We will evaluate if it 
would be financially beneficial for capitated practices to shift annual visits to summer months to allow 
additional capacity for unscheduled care in the winter. 
 Likewise, we will evaluate physician vacation weeks. We will iterate from two to six weeks 
by one week intervals. We will assume the vacation time is evenly distributed throughout the year 
with one week taken at Christmas. We will also evaluate if better financial results would be achieved 
if all vacation was taken during the summer.  
3.5.5 Financial and Operating Leverage. For a PCP practice, higher degrees of capitation 
can result in greater dispersions of financial results. Since a PCP practice does not offer all the 
potential services required by its patients, costly external referrals may be needed. These external 
referrals result in reduced revenue for the capitated PCP practices, but they have no impact on the 
revenue of FFS PCP practices. The combination of operating leverage and financial leverage 
translates to the amount of fixed expenses which need to be paid out of the revenue of the PCP 
practice. This includes interest on debt. 
The majority of expenses within a practice are fixed and cannot be shifted to variable. For 
example, rent, salaries, equipment leases, etc. are all fixed expenses. According to anecdotal 
evidence, many practices have similar cost structures. However, the profit for a practice is often the 




personal income for the physician. If the physician has personal financial leverage, the physician will 
need income with less variation. The results we will capture regarding financial outcomes dispersion 
will help inform this consideration. 
We will also be able to evaluate shocks to the health care system like the COVID-19 
shutdowns. In this environment, capitated PCPs would have received a steady income even in the 
absence of patient visits. Their FFS counterparts would have faced a significant drop in revenue.  
 The following chapters cover in detail the analysis conducted as part of our dissertation. We 
do not investigate every variable presented in Chapters 1-3. However, we present research to gain 
an initial understanding of our research question, “Which capitated contract terms provide the correct 
balance of financial rewards and financial risks for primary care practices, given differing practice 
characteristics, patient populations, and care dynamics?” The research that follows presents an 
analysis of possible capitated contract results, but it does not investigate how these results are 
achieved. The question of how will be investigated in future research. We begin our investigation in 
Chapter 4 by evaluating utilization differences within the Medicare population. Then, in Chapters 5-
7 we investigate capitation contract outcomes incorporating our results from Chapter 4. 
 
  




Chapter 4: Prediction of Services Required by the Practice’s Patient Pool 
 This study is conducted as part of a broader research program on the effect of insurance 
arrangements and reimbursement practices for Medicare beneficiaries (Stout, 2020; Stout et al., 
2021; Smith et al., 2021). Stout (2020) provides an excellent overview of the Medicare industry, 
principal-agency relationships, and the CMS data used to investigate these issues. Stout et al. (2021) 
reveal differences in the characteristics of individuals who enroll in Medicare Advantage (HMO) plans 
versus Traditional Medicare fee-for-service plans (FFS) and dramatic differences in service utilization 
by enrollees in the respective plans. Differences in usage and mix of services in five major venues 
(hospital inpatient, hospital outpatient, general carrier services, home health, and skilled nursing 
facilities) persisted when the researchers controlled statistically for medical condition and 
demographic characteristics of insured individuals, availability of medical services in the counties 
where they reside, and reimbursement arrangements for beneficiaries’ primary-care providers. Smith 
et al. (2021) illustrate how Poisson regression models that include nonlinear effects of co-morbidity 
scores and age, together with the other factors mentioned above, effectively predict the use of 
medical services in each of the five service venues across the entire risk spectrum. In this phase of 
the research program, we use the same filtering of data and the same analytical techniques as 
reported in these studies. 
 We would like to provide a brief explanation of the changing terminology we use. The reader 
will hear us refer to both beneficiaries and patients. An individual is a beneficiary of the Medicare 
program and a patient to a primary care provider. As we discuss our research, we try to use the term 
beneficiary when we are discussing the overall Medicare program and the term patient when we are 
discussing a primary care practice. Throughout the following chapters, the reader can think of terms 
beneficiary and patient as the individual receiving health care services. 




4.1 Data Preparation 
 4.1.1 Medicare Data. The Medicare data used for this research were provided by CMS 
through the Research Data Assistance Center (ResDAC). The data are compiled from insurance 
records of all medical care received by a random sample of Medicare beneficiaries living in the state 
of Missouri during the year 2016. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the Medicare beneficiary counts 
included in this sample. 
Table 4.1 
Missouri Medicare Beneficiary Counts  
Measure FFS MA/Other Total 
    
Total Number of Missouri Medicare Beneficiaries 812,974 347,119 1,160,093 
% of Total Missouri Medicare Beneficiaries 70.1% 29.9% 100.0% 
    
Total Number of Random Sample Beneficiaries 708,665 291,334 999,999 
% of Total Random Sample Beneficiaries 70.9% 29.1% 100.0% 
    
Total Number of Included Beneficiaries 432,704 211,861 644,565 
    
Note: This table was shared with permission from Dr. Steven Stout (2020). 
The filtering criteria with the justification is provided in Table 4.2. These filters were applied 
to avoid spurious conclusions driven by different care dynamics for these groups of patients. The 
Medicare data we used for this study has several nuances which will be important to understand. 
First, the data for Traditional Medicare patients and the data for Medicare Advantage patients are 
split between separate tables. For both Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage, the detailed 
records are split between five categories representing different treatment settings. These categories 
are inpatient, outpatient, carrier, skilled nursing, and home health. Within each of these categories, 
there are two tables. One table contains the details for the claim for Traditional Medicare or the 
encounter for Medicare Advantage. The second table contains the details for the lines contained on 
the claim or encounter. 





Beneficiary Records Excluded from the Study 
Excluded Group Reason for Exclusion 
  
Beneficiaries under age 65 To focus the study on elderly population by 
omitting younger beneficiaries who receive 
Medicare coverage due to their physical 
disabilities 
  
Beneficiaries with either non-Missouri residences 
or non-Missouri mailing addresses 
To eliminate the effects of healthcare 
utilization that may occur outside of the state 
  
Beneficiaries with mid-year zip code changes To eliminate the effects of possible changes 
in provider access 
  
Beneficiaries with mid-year plan changes To eliminate the effects of possible changes 
in provider access and benefits coverage 
  
Beneficiaries receiving hospice care Medicare Advantage Plans generally do not 
pay for hospice care benefits 
  
Beneficiaries experiencing end-stage renal 
disease 
Beneficiaries in this category may receive 
care through a special needs program 
(SNP), and access to SNP plans varies 
throughout the state 
  
Note: This table was shared with permission from Dr. Steven Stout (2020). 
 To provide context, we will give a brief explanation of a few terms. A claim in our data are 
roughly equivalent to a healthcare visit. This is not a perfect definition. There are between 10-15% 
of claims for primary care visits which have multiple claim IDs and occur between the same PCP and 
patient on the same day. However, for simplicity, the reader can think of claims as a visit. An 
encounter also corresponds to a healthcare visit. It is called an encounter in the Medicare Advantage 
dataset because Medicare Advantage insurance companies are not required to submit payment 
information to CMS (CCWdata.org, 2018). For this study, we will refer to both claims and encounters 
as claims unless we are explicitly referring the Medicare Advantage encounters.  




Each claim can have multiple line items. A line item on a claim roughly corresponds to each 
procedure performed. Again, this is not a perfect definition because some line items can refer to 
supplies needed or simply capture information for the patient. For example, some lines can simply 
state what the patient’s blood pressure was during the visit. For our purposes, the reader can 
consider the claim line to refer to procedures performed. During the data preparation steps, we 
remove the non-procedure line items. 
 As mentioned previously, Medicare Advantage insurance companies are not required to 
submit payment information to CMS. Therefore, payment information for each line item on each claim 
is only contained in the Traditional Medicare datasets. Payment information is not contained in the 
Medicare Advantage datasets. 
 Finally, there is some concern the dataset contains duplicate records for Medicare 
Advantage. To address this concern, the researchers at ResDAC recommend comparisons be made 
based on dates of service instead of based on claim or line counts (Stout, 2020). In response to this, 
we used the following definitions (Table 4.3) for the outcome variables to compare service utilization 
between Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage beneficiaries. 
  





Service Category Utilization Definitions 
Service Category Variable Name Description 
   
Inpatient Discharges Numipadmits Count of hospital discharge dates 
   
Outpatient Service Events Numopsrvcevents Count of dates with patient outpatient 
services 
   
Carrier Provider Days AllCarrVisitCnt Count of dates with claims from 
individual care providers 
   
HHA Visits Hhvisitrecs Count of claims records pertaining to 
revenue centers tied to physical 
activity in patients’ place of residence 
   
SNF discharges Numsnfdiagevents Count of discharges and other dates 
with diagnostic billings from skilled 
nursing facilities. 
   
Note: This contents of this table were presented by Smith et al. (2021).  
 
 We also use some explanatory variables from Smith et al. (2021). These variables and 
definitions are contained in Table 4.4. It is worth noting the variables for gender and race were 
provided in the CMS data. Our definitions for these variables reflect the definitions provided by CMS 
(Stout, 2020). The corresponding explanatory variables were included in the Medicare data in the 
Master Beneficiary Summary files. 
  





Explanatory Variable Definitions 
Explanatory Variable Description 
  
Maxchscoreallserv The largest of the Charlson co-morbidity scores computed from 
diagnostic information recorded in any of the five treatment 
settings 
  
Maxchscoresq The squared term of Maxchscoreallserv 
  
Maxchscore3 The cubed term of Maxchscoreallserv 
  
Female (0-1), To indicate the beneficiary is recorded as female in the 
Master Beneficiary Summary record 
  
Yrendage The beneficiary’s age in years at the end of 2016. 
  
Ageover62 The difference between the beneficiary’s age and 62. 
  
Ageover62sq The squared term of Ageover62 
  
Ageover62_3 The cubed term of Ageover62 
  
Asian (0-1), To indicate the beneficiary’s ethnicity is recorded as such in 
the Master Beneficiary Summary record 
  
Black (0-1), To indicate the beneficiary’s ethnicity is recorded as such in 
the Master Beneficiary Summary record 
  
Hispanic (0-1), To indicate the beneficiary’s ethnicity is recorded as such in 
the Master Beneficiary Summary record 
  
Othernonwhite (0-1), To indicate the beneficiary’s ethnicity is recorded as such in 
the Master Beneficiary Summary record 
  
White (0-1), To indicate the beneficiary’s ethnicity is recorded as such in 
the Master Beneficiary Summary record 
  
Medianhouseeval The median assessed valuation (in thousands of dollars) for 
single-family homes in the postal Zip-code area where the 
beneficiary’s principal residence is located 
  
Zpctbachelorsormore Percentage of residents in the beneficiary’s Zip-code area who 
hold bachelor’s degrees or higher as reported in the U.S. Census 
  




Explanatory Variable Description 
  
Zpctmanprofoccs Percentage of residents in the beneficiary’s Zip-code area 
employed in managerial or professional occupations as reported in 
the U.S. Census 
  
Hospitalaccess1 (0-1), To indicate at least one general hospital is located in the 
county of the beneficiary’s principal residence 
  
Hospitalaccess2 (0-1), To indicate no general hospital is located in the county of the 
beneficiary’s principal residence, but at least one is located within 
27 miles of the county seat 
  
Hospitalaccess3 (0-1), To indicate no general hospital is located in the county of the 
beneficiary’s principal residence, and none are located within 27 
miles of the county seat 
  
Physiciansper1000 The number of physicians per 1,000 residents registered as 
practicing in the county of the beneficiary’s principal residence 
  
Note: This contents of this table were presented by Smith et al. (2021).  
4.1.2 Primary Care Data. For this study, we are particularly interested in the carrier 
datasets. It contains the medical and ancillary services which are not provided in a hospital, skilled 
nursing facility, or in the beneficiary’s home. Included in the carrier data are the primary care visits, 
which we are modeling. Several steps are needed to restrict the carrier data to primary care visits. 
Additional steps are needed to reformat the data into a usable form for multivariate analysis. Below 
are the steps we took to reformat and filter the data. We will explain each step in greater detail below. 
For this analysis, we will refer to the Traditional Medicare datasets as the Fee-For-Service (FFS) 
datasets and the Medicare Advantage datasets as the MA datasets. 
4.1.2.1 PCP Data Preparation Steps – Outline. 
1. Extract needed variables from the FFS Carrier data 
2. Summarize the procedures performed and payments received for each patient visit 
3. Repeat steps one and two for the MA Carrier data 
4. Combine the separate FFS and MA datasets into a single dataset 




5. Summarize the procedures performed and payments received for each beneficiary and 
physician combination by month 
6. Summarize the procedures performed and payments received for each beneficiary and 
physician combination by year 
7. Create a list of primary care physicians, create the proxy variables that identifies how 
much capitated risk each physician bears, and identify the primary care physician for 
each beneficiary 
8. Merge the primary care visit data with PCP capitated risk variables and the data created 
by Smith et al. (2021). In this same step, split the data into a fitting dataset and a testing 
dataset. 
4.1.2.2 PCP Data Preparation – Step One. Table 4.5 contains the fields we used from the 
CMS Traditional Medicare Carrier Lines dataset. This table was used as a starting point for the FFS 
dataset.  








BENE_ID A unique identifier for each Medicare beneficiary 
  
CLM_THRU_DT The date services ended for a claim 
  
CLM_ID A unique identifier for each claim 
  
LINE_NUM A unique identifier for each line-number on each claim 
  
LINE_PLACE_OF_SRVC_CD Identifies the type of facility where the services were performed 
  
PRF_PHYSN_NPI NPI is a unique identifier assigned to licensed clinicians 
  
HCPCS_CD Identifies the procedures conducted 
  
CARR_CLM_PMT_DNL_CD Field used to identify denied claims. 
(CARR_CLM_PMT_DNL_CD = 0 indicates a claim was 
denied.) 
  
Procedure Created field: Contains a categorization of HCPCS_CDs (Details 
found in Table 4.6) (Ahlman et al., 2016) 
  
HCPCSCategory Created field: Identifies if HCPCS_CDs are Category I, II, or III 
(Ahlman et al., 2016)  
  
TotPmtCar Created field: The total payment issued to the practice 
(ResDAC.org) 
  
InsPmtCar Created field: The payment made by insurance (either CMS or 
private) (ResDAC.org) 
  
DedCoinsCar Created field: The payment made by the patient (ResDAC.org) 
  
BilledAmtCar Created field: The amount that was billed for the services (This 
is rarely the amount which gets paid.) (ResDAC.org) 
  
Note: The variables containing underscores are included with the original datasets provided by CMS. 
Our derived variables do not contain underscores. 




 HCPCS_CD stands for Health Care Common Procedure Coding System (ResDAC.org). 
Within the Medicare data, HCPCS_CDs are used to identify the procedures conducted. The ultimate 
goal of our research program is to develop a roadmap for primary care practices to remain profitable 
while engaging in capitated contracts. To simulate the resource utilization for each patient visit, the 
HCPCS_CDs for each line of each claim is categorized into high-level procedure categories. These 
definitions are contained in Table 4.6. These procedure category definitions are from the Current 
Procedural Terminology (CPT) 2017 Standard Edition manual (Ahlman et al., 2016). Not all 
HCPCS_CDs refer to procedures performed. Category I, II, and III define different types of 
HCPCS_CDs. These definitions are contained in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.6 
Procedure Categories  
HCPCS_CD Range PROCEDURE 
  
00100 – 01999 Anesthesia 
  
10021 – 69990 Surgery 
  
70010 – 79999 Radiology 
  
80047 – 89398 Pathology and Lab 
  
90281 – 99199 Gen Med Srvc 
  
99201 – 99498 Eval and Mgmt 
  
99500 – 99602 Home Health Srvc 
  
99605 – 99607 Other 
  
A0000 – Z9999 Level 2 
  
Note: These definitions are provided in the CPT 2017 Standard Manual (Ahlman et al., 2016). 
 
  




Table 4.7  
HCPCSCategories 
Criteria HCPCSCategory Updated Procedure 
   
HCPCS_CD between 00001 
and 99999 and does not end 
in an F or T 
Category I No update 
   
HCPCS_CD between 00001 
and 99999 and ends in F 
Category II: Supplemental Info Updated to “None” 
   
HCPCS_CD between 00001 
and 99999 and ends in T 
Category III: Emerging 
Technology 
Updated to “Emerging 
Technology” 
   
HCPCS_CD not between 
00001 and 99999 
N/A No update 
   
Note: These definitions are provided in the CPT 2017 Standard Manual (Ahlman et al., 2016). 
 
4.1.2.3 PCP Data Preparation – Step Two. Once the needed variables are extracted, the 
data from step one need to be summarized for each carrier visit. We define a carrier visit in the data 
as unique combinations of BENE_ID, CLM_THRU_DT, LINE_PLACE_OF_SERVICE_CD, and 
PRF_PHYSN_NPI. For each carrier visit, we summarize the counts of all procedures, each 
procedure category, and each payment variable. We also identify if an evaluation and management 
HCPCS_CD for the visit indicates that a new patient was seen. Finally, we identify the complexity for 
the evaluation and management HCPCS_CDs as a proxy for the period of time the patient spent 
with the physician. Table 4.8 provides the logic to populate each of the new fields. 
We removed records with Procedure = “None.” We also removed denied claims which are 
identified by CARR_CLM_PMT_DNL_CD = “0.” 
  





FFS Carrier Visit Summary Variables 
Variable Definition 
  
NewPatInd (0-1): 1 if a HCPCS_CD for the visit is contained in the set (‘99201’, 
‘99202’, ‘99203’, ‘99204’, ‘99205’) 
  
VstCmplxInd (0,1,2,3,4,5): 1 if a HCPCS_CD for the visit is contained in the set 
(‘99201’,’99211’), 
2 if a HCPCS_CD for the visit is contained in the set 
(‘99202’,’99212’), 
3 if a HCPCS_CD for the visit is contained in the set 
(‘99203’,’99213’), 
4 if a HCPCS_CD for the visit is contained in the set 
(‘99204’,’99214’), 
5 if a HCPCS_CD for the visit is contained in the set 
(‘99205’,’99215’) 
0 if these HCPCS_CDs are not included for the visit. 
  
ProcCnt Count of the Procedures variable for the visit 
  
AnesthesiaCnt Count of Procedures = ‘Anesthesia’ for the visit 
  
EmrgTechCnt Count of Procedures = ‘Emerging Technology’ for the visit 
  
EvalAndMgmtCnt Count of Procedures = ‘Eval and Mgmt’ for the visit 
  
GenMedSrvcCnt Count of Procedures = ‘Gen Med Srvc’ for the visit 
  
HomHlthSrvcCnt Count of Procedures = ‘Home Health Srvc’ for the visit 
  
PthlgyAndLabCnt Count of Procedures = ‘Pathology and Lab’ for the visit 
  
RadiologyCnt Count of Procedures = ‘Radiology’ for the visit 
  
SurgeryCnt Count of Procedures = ‘Surgery’ for the visit 
  
OthrPrcCnt Count of Procedures = ‘Other’ for the visit 
  
Level2Cnt Count of Procedures = ‘Level 2’ for the visit 
  
TotPmtCar Sum of the TotPmtCar variable for the visit 
  
  
InsPmtCar Sum of the InsPmtCar variable for the visit 






DedCoinsCar Sum of the DedCoinsCar variable for the visit 
  
BilledAmtCar Sum of the BilledAmtCar variable for the visit 
  
Note: These definitions are provided in the CPT 2017 Standard Manual (Ahlman et al., 2016). 
4.1.2.4 PCP Data Preparation – Step Three. It is slightly more complicated to compile the 
MA Encounter datasets. We can only obtain the variables listed in Table 4.9 line-level detail table. 
The remaining variables are found on the encounter level table. To get all the fields needed for our 
study, we start with the line-level table. We then merge these records with the records contained in 
the encounter-level table. The two tables are linked by using the ENC_JOIN_KEY variable 
contained in both tables. We then format the combined records to align with the FFS Carrier 
datasets created in step two. 
The same steps used to derive Procedure and HCPCSCategory for the FFS carrier dataset 
are used to derive these variables for the MA carrier dataset.  
 
  








BENE_ID A unique identifier for each Medicare beneficiary 
  
CLM_THRU_DT The date services ended for an encounter 
  
ENC_JOIN_KEY A unique identifier for each encounter 
  
CLM_LINE_NUM A unique identifier for each line-number on each encounter 
  
HCPCS_CD Identifies the procedures conducted 
  
Procedure Created field: Contains a categorization of HCPCS_CDs (Details 
found in Table 4.6) (Ahlman et al., 2016) 
  
HCPCSCategory Created field: Identifies if HCPCS_CDs are Category I, II, or III 
(Ahlman et al., 2016)  
  
Note: The variables containing underscores are included with the original datasets provided by CMS. 
Our derived variables do not contain underscores. 
  We then create the table summarizing each encounter by BENE_ID, CLM_THRU_DT, 
CLM_PLACE_OF_SRVC_CD, RNDRNG_PHYSN_NPI, and ORG_NPI. Since, 
CLM_PLACE_OF_SRVC_CD, RNDRNG_PHYSN_NPI, and ORG_NPI are found on the MA carrier 
encounter table, there is a single combination of these fields per ENC_JOIN_KEY. This means, data 
will not be duplicated when merging the line-level data with the encounter-level data. The following 
variable definitions are provided on the ResDAC website. CLM_PLACE_OF_SRVC_CD identifies 
the type of facility where the services were performed. The physician who rendered services to the 
patient is the RNDRNG_PHYSN_NPI. ORG_NPI is the institutional provider certified to provide 
services to the patient (ResDAC.org). 
 The summarized MA carrier table is filtered to include only lines with the Procedure not equal 
to “None.” Also, the encounter has the CLM_FINL_ACTN_IND = “Y.” The variables identified in Table 




4.8 are also populated on the MA carrier table. Except, TotPmtCar, InsPmtCar, DedCoinsCar, and 
BilledAmtCar are all set to $0.00 because payments are not provided in the MA datasets. 
 4.1.2.5 PCP Data Preparation – Step Four. The next step is to combine the FFS and MA 
carrier datasets. We append the MA carrier dataset created in step three to the FFS carrier dataset 
created in step two. We created three new variables: Month, PlaceOfSrvcCd, and PhysnNPI. The 
definitions for these variables is provided in Table 4.10.  
Table 4.10 
Combined Carrier Variables 
Variable FFS Logic MA Logic 
   
SrcFile “FFS” “MA” 
   
Month Month is extracted from 
CLM_THRU_DT 
Month is extracted from 
CLM_THRU_DT 
   
PlaceOfSrvcCd LINE_PLACE_OF_SRVC_CD CLM_PLACE OF_SRVC_CD 
   
PhysnNPI PRF_PHYSN_NPI RNDRG_PHYSN_NPI if 
populated; Otherwise, ORG_NPI 
   
 
 4.1.2.6 PCP Data Preparation – Step Five. We next summarize the visits by SrcFile, 
BENE_ID, PhysnNPI, and Month. Table 4.11 contains the new variables created in the monthly table. 
The remaining variables represent the sum of the procedure counts and payments for the month.  
  





Monthly Summary Variables 
Variable Description 
  
VisitCnt Count of visits in the month 
  
NewPatThisYearInd (0-1), 1 if there is at least one record in the year for the 
BENE_ID and PhysnNPI with NewPatInd = 1. 
  
NewPatThisMthInd (0-1), 1 if there is at least one record in the month for the 
BENE_ID and PhysnNPI with NewPatInd = 1. 
  
EMCmplxSum Sum of the VstCmplxInd for the month 
  
EMCmplxLvlOneCnt Count of visits in the month with VstCmplxInd = 1 
  
EMCmplxLvlTwoCnt Count of visits in the month with VstCmplxInd = 2 
  
EMCmplxLvlThreeCnt Count of visits in the month with VstCmplxInd = 3 
  
EMCmplxLvlFourCnt Count of visits in the month with VstCmplxInd = 4 
  
EMCmplxLvlFiveCnt Count of visits in the month with VstCmplxInd = 5 
  
January (0-1), 1 if Month = 1 
  
February (0-1), 1 if Month = 2 
  




December (0-1), 1 if Month = 12 
  
 
4.1.2.7 PCP Data Preparation – Step Six. We then summarize the monthly data by year. 
For this table, unique records are identified by SrcFile, and BENE_ID. Each of the EMCmplx, 
Procedures, and Payments are summed for the year.  
4.1.2.8 PCP Data Preparation – Step Seven. The CMS data contain no identifier for the 
primary care provider for each beneficiary. Therefore, we go through several steps to identify primary 




care providers, proxy variables for the level of capitated risk of the PCP, and the PCP for each 
BENE_ID. The FFS Carrier data contain a field PRVDR_SPCLTY which contains the specialty for 
the physician who provided service for the claim. A similar field exists for the MA data, but it is not 
populated. For this reason, we start with the FFS data to identify PCPs. We then determine the 
number of MA patient visits in 2016 as a proxy for capitation level. Finally, we identify the PCP for 
each beneficiary by determining which PCP each beneficiary visited most frequently in 2016. When 
more than one PCP for a beneficiary is identified by this logic, the PCP seen last in the year is 
identified as the PCP. 
First, we identify primary care providers by requiring at least 100 claims in 2016 to FFS 
Traditional Medicare beneficiaries. We require PCPs to have a PRVDR_SPCLTY contained in the 
set (‘01’, ‘08’, ‘11’, ‘38’, ‘84’). These PRVDR_SPCLTYs correspond the following values: 01 = general 
practice, 08 = family practice, 11 = internal medicine, 38 = geriatric medicine, and 84 = preventive 
medicine (ResDAC.org). We also require these visits to have been performed in the office setting 
identified by LINE_PLACE_OF_SRVC_CD = ‘11’ (ResDAC.org). These filters ensure physicians on 
our PCP list serve on average at least two Traditional Medicare beneficiaries per week, self-identify 
as primary care physicians, and practice in an office setting. These standards may present a “” to be 
considered a PCP for our study. These standards remove the physicians who provide infrequent 
services to Medicare beneficiaries. 
Starting with the FFS PCP list, we evaluate if the physician also served MA beneficiaries. 
We categorize PCPs into four categories based the number and type of MA beneficiaries served in 
2016. If the PCP provided service for fewer than 100 MA encounters, the physician is classified as 
having no capitation. If the physician provided service for between 100 and 499 MA encounters, the 
physician is classified as having low capitation. If the physician provided service for at least 500 MA 
encounters, the physician is classified as having mid capitation. Finally, we evaluate if the PCP 




served Essence beneficiaries. Stout (2020) has verified Essence has capitated contracts with each 
of its PCPs in the St. Louis market. Each of these PCPs bear significant capitated risk (Stout, 2020). 
To be classified as high capitation, the PCP must have provided service for at least 500 MA 
encounters and served beneficiaries enrolled in an Essence MA plan in 2016. Table 4.12 contains a 
beneficiary count for who were matched with each PCP type. Any beneficiaries in our sample who 
did not visit a PCP on our list in 2016 were classified as No PCP. 
We define the capitation proxy variables for each beneficiary at the physician level. 
Capitation contracts are often entered into at the practice level. We chose to use a physician variable 
in case there are varying degrees of engagement with MA beneficiaries within a practice among 
physicians. Also, this avoids some confounding that would occur from creating variables that would 
be highly correlated with size of the total practice. 
We selected these proxies for the following reasons. PCPs who have fewer than 100 MA 
patient visits are likely just treating the occasional MA patient, but these PCPs are likely being 
reimbursed on an FFS basis. There are likely no financial incentives for providing specific services 
between the PCP and the MA insurance company. PCPs who have more than 100 MA patient visits 
but fewer than 500 patient visits do not have a large enough MA patient panel to bear significant 
capitated risk. However, these PCPs could earn performance rewards for seeing their MA patients 
for annual checkup, etc. Finally, PCPs who have more than 500 patient visits have the potential to 
bear capitated risk because their patient panels are sufficiently large. With each of these categories, 
there will be PCPs who bear no capitated risk; this may somewhat confound our measures of the 
capitation effects. 
We recognize these proxy variables are crude. The variables are defined at the physician 
level, and they do not directly measure capitation. However, multiple beneficiaries enrolled in various 




MA plans could be under the care of a single physician. This could confound the effects of our proxy 
variables.  
Bearing capitated risk can completely change the dynamics of a primary care practice. We 
are not arguing capitation directly causes better patient health. We are arguing capitation financially 
rewards PCPs to help their patients achieve better health. This means we would expect to see fewer 
episodic care events (inpatient, outpatient, specialty care, home health, and skilled nursing) while 
seeing more preventative care events (more PCP care).  
Table 4.12 
Beneficiary Counts per PCP Type 
PCP Capitation Level FFS MA Total 
    
No PCP Visit in 2016 168,571 52,187 220,758 
    
No Capitation (FFS Clms >=100 & MA Encs < 100) 14,832 2,248 17,080 
    
Low Capitation (FFS Clms >=100 & 100 <= MA Encs < 500) 113,199 37,618 150,817 
    
Mid Capitation (FFS Clms >= 100 & MA Encs >= 500) 93,113 70,241 163,354 
    
High Capitation (FFS Clms >= 100, MA Encs >= 500, & serves 
MA beneficiaries enrolled in an Essence plan) 
42,989 49,567 92,556 
    
Total 432,704 211,861 644,565 
    
 
4.1.2.9 PCP Data Preparation – Step Eight. Finally, the datasets were merged with the 
datasets created by Smith et al. (2021) that provide master-beneficiary summary information and 
information about medical services available near each beneficiary’s place of primary residence. We 
produced four datasets based on the above information. We created annual summaries for 
beneficiaries who received a PCP visit. We created fitting and testing samples from this summary 
file. The fitting dataset comprised 75% of beneficiaries included in our sample, and the testing dataset 




comprised 25% of beneficiaries included in our sample. The samples were split randomly. The 
resulting tables are PCP Visit Annual Summary – Fitting Sample and PCP Visit Annual Summary – 
Testing Sample. We also created annual summaries for all beneficiaries regardless of whether they 
received a PCP visit. We split this table into fitting and testing samples. The resulting tables are 
Annual Visit Summary for All BENE_ID – Fitting Sample and Annual Visit Summary for All BENE_ID 
– Testing Sample. Table 4.13 contains the record counts for each table. 
  





Record Counts for Final Data Tables 
PCP Capitation Level FFS MA Total 
    
PCP Visit Annual Summary – Fitting Sample 197,943 119,794 317,737 
    
PCP Visit Annual Summary – Testing Sample 66,180 39,890 106,070 
    
Annual Visit Summary for All BENE_ID – Fitting Sample 324,107 159,031 483,138 
    
Annual Visit Summary for All BENE_ID – Testing Sample 108,597 52,830 161,427 
    
 
 




4.2 Health Care Service Utilization 
 4.2.1 Introduction. With an assumption that the medical practice is responsible for costs 
incurred in all service venues (hospital inpatient, hospital outpatient, general carrier services, home 
health assistance and skilled nursing facilities), we must estimate the frequency with which individual 
beneficiaries are expected to receive care in each venue. This chapter extends the work of Stout 
(2020) and Smith et al. (2021). These authors conducted Poisson regression for the five settings of 
health care provision. They controlled for the variables in Table 4.4. Stout (2020) found when 
controlling for linear effects of Charlson Score and Age that MA patients exhibited statistically 
significantly lower utilization. Inpatient discharges, outpatient visits, carrier visits, home health visits, 
and skilled nursing visits were 29.9%, 46.3%, 17.7%, 52.6%, and 58.2% lower, respectively. 
Likewise, Smith et al. (2021) controlled for the variables in Table 4.4 with non-linear effects of 
Charlson Score and age. They observed similar reductions in utilization for MA patients. Inpatient 
discharges, outpatient visits, carrier claims, home health claims, and skilled nursing stays were 
30.8%, 47.3%, 5.7%, 53.1%, and 58.5% lower, respectively. 
 We conducted similar Poisson Regression analysis for this research. Our analysis estimates 
log(mean) of predicted events. However, we replaced the single indicator variable capturing whether 
a patient is enrolled in an MA plan with ten categorical variables. The ten categorical variables pertain 
to involvement with primary care physicians as described earlier. The record counts are contained 
in Table 4.12. These variables link a beneficiary to the primary care provider (PCP) from whom he 
or she received the most primary care visits in 2016. The capitation level of this PCP was used to 
establish the capitation category of the PCP serving the beneficiary. We identified proxy variables 
for the level of capitation for each PCP. We then evaluated how receiving care from each type of 
PCP correlates with utilization for the five service categories. It is worth noting that while we classify 
the proxy variables as levels of capitation, other factors besides capitation could be causing the 




differences in utilization. While our explanations describe the effect of utilization for beneficiaries 
under the care of PCPs with more or less capitation, we realize our proxy variables could be capturing 
other factors. These could include tendencies of beneficiaries with particular characteristics to seek 
care from particular practitioners, practitioners’ collaboration with MA insurance companies, access 
to analytics offered by MA insurance companies, etc. 
 For this analysis, we use the aggregated data with a single record per beneficiary. Before 
determining the PCP categorical variables, we split the data into a fitting sample and testing sample. 
We placed 75% of beneficiaries in the fitting sample and 25% of beneficiaries in the testing sample. 
All statistical modeling was done with the fitting sample. Then, the testing sample was used to 
evaluate how well the models can predict activities for beneficiaries in an independent sample. 
 Table 4.14 contains summary statistics for the variables used in the Poisson regression 
analysis. Tables 4.15 to 4.18 contain means and standard deviations for each explanatory and 
outcome variable, respectively when the dataset is filtered to the ten categorical variables. All 
statistical tests compare the respective means with those for FFS PCP Low Cap beneficiaries. As 
can be seen from the tables, MA beneficiaries exhibit lower utilization for all service categories than 
FFS patients. Also, MA beneficiaries under the care of PCPs with higher capitation levels exhibit 
lower utilization than their MA counterparts under the care of PCPs with lower capitation levels.  
The lower utilization is achieved despite having many health and demographics variables 
which would correspond to higher utilization. For example, MA patients have higher Charlson Scores 
than their FFS counterparts under the care of PCPs with the same capitation level. Also, PCPs with 
higher capitation levels serve beneficiaries with higher Charlson scores. It is outside the scope of 
this research to evaluate how much of this difference is caused by the true health state of each 
beneficiary or by potential diagnostic upcoding on the part of physicians to maximize reimbursement. 
As will be seen, the differences in utilization would far exceed any differences in diagnostic coding.  




Also, we believe beneficiaries who received no PCP visit represent a special category. We 
expect these patients would exhibit higher utilization of emergency care. However, they could exhibit 
lower utilization for other services. By not receiving care from a PCP, these beneficiaries would be 
ignorant of their need for care. Therefore, the lower utilization could be driven by ignorance more 
than superior health. As an example, if we have two people with cancer, but only one person receives 
a cancer screening, this person will receive care. Both people need care, but one person is ignorant 
of the need. For this reason, we do not spend much time discussing the beneficiaries who did not 
visit a PCP in 2016. We include their data for completeness. 
  





Summary Statistics for Service Utilization Variables 
  
  
Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum
numipadmits   483,138          0.257          0.724       124,211               -           23.000 
numOPsrvcevents   483,138          7.127         11.523    3,443,398               -         366.000 
AllCarrVisitCnt   483,138         20.072         21.265    9,697,572               -         496.000 
hhvisitrecs   483,138          1.640          8.607       792,215               -         563.000 
numsnfdiagevents   483,138          0.140          0.874         67,552               -           22.000 
maxchscoreallserv   483,138          2.169          2.439    1,048,071               -           20.000 
female   483,138          0.577          0.494       278,612               -            1.000 
ageover62   483,138         13.481          7.493    6,513,287          3.000         50.000 
FFSNoPCPInd   483,138          0.261          0.439       126,155               -            1.000 
FFSPCPNoCapInd   483,138          0.023          0.150         11,178               -            1.000 
FFSPCPMidCapInd   483,138          0.144          0.351         69,605               -            1.000 
FFSPCPHighCapInd   483,138          0.066          0.249         32,103               -            1.000 
MANoPCPInd   483,138          0.081          0.273         39,246               -            1.000 
MAPCPNoCapInd   483,138          0.003          0.059          1,662               -            1.000 
MAPCPLowCapInd   483,138          0.058          0.234         28,092               -            1.000 
MAPCPMidCapInd   483,138          0.109          0.312         52,804               -            1.000 
MAPCPHighCapInd   483,138          0.077          0.267         37,227               -            1.000 
Asian   483,138          0.005          0.067          2,179               -            1.000 
Black   483,138          0.069          0.253         33,100               -            1.000 
Hispanic   483,138          0.002          0.041             811               -            1.000 
Othernonwhite   483,138          0.016          0.124          7,571               -            1.000 
medianhouseeval   483,138       135.130         36.548  65,286,634         55.900       197.300 
zpctbachelorsormore   480,343         28.272         16.150  13,580,247               -         100.000 
zpctmanprofoccs   480,264         35.669         11.701  17,130,536               -         100.000 
hospitalaccess1   483,138          0.872          0.334       421,457               -            1.000 
hospitalaccess2   483,138          0.073          0.260         35,270               -            1.000 
physiciansper1000   483,138          2.448          1.920    1,182,733               -           12.496 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2.2 Inpatient Admits Poisson Regression. When we controlled for each of the 
explanatory variables, the reductions in services were magnified for MA beneficiaries. Surprisingly, 
we did not observe similarly magnified reductions for FFS patients. Table 4.19 contains the reduced 
model for the Poisson regression output. We first ran the analysis including all explanatory variables 
previously identified. Then, we used backwards elimination to remove any statistically insignificant 
variables. We did not remove statistically insignificant categorical variables, since this indicates the 
categorical variable is just statistically insignificantly different from the excluded categorical variable. 
Including these variables also aids with interpreting the results. We also did not exclude any squared 
or cubed terms of age or Charlson Score if these terms were statistically insignificant. For the PCP 
variables, we excluded FFSPCPLowCapInd = 1. We made this selection due to the larger sample 
size. We also wanted to avoid using FFSNoPCPInd = 1, since this represents FFS beneficiaries who 
did not visit a PCP in 2016. This could cause issues for reasons stated previously. 
Table 4.19 contains the Poisson regression model for inpatient discharges. Table 4.20 
contains an evaluation of the actual events for the fitting sample and the predicted events for the 
fitting sample. Beneficiaries were ranked based on predicted events and placed in groups. The 
aggregate predicted and actual counts for each group were compared to determine the fit of the 
model. Table 4.21 contains a similar model comparison for the testing sample. Table 4.22 contains 
expected inpatient discharges for a white female of various ages, health statuses, and PCP variables. 
All other variables were set to rounded mean values for this analysis. 
As can be seen in Table 4.19, MA beneficiaries under the care of a PCP with high capitation 
levels exhibit 48.2% fewer inpatient discharges than FFS beneficiaries under the care of a PCP with 
low capitation levels. This represents the largest reduction of inpatient discharges of any variable 
with the exception of comparing high Charlson Scores to low Charlson Scores. For MA beneficiaries, 
higher capitation levels are correlated with lower inpatient utilization. MA Beneficiaries under the care 




of PCPs with no capitation, low capitation, mid capitation, and high capitation exhibited 19.5%, 
24.4%, 34.4%, and 48.2% reductions, respectively. Table 4.22 can be viewed for the relative impacts 
of age, Charlson Score, and the PCP categories. 
Surprisingly, a similar trend does not hold for FFS beneficiaries. The only FFS beneficiaries 
who have statistically significantly different inpatient discharges are under the care of a PCP with 
mid capitation levels. All other FFS beneficiaries exhibit no change in utilization. This goes against 
the statement of some high capitation PCPs interviewed by Stout (2018) who state FFS and MA 
patients are treated the same. Further research is needed to determine the root cause of the lack of 
utilization differences. It is possible insurance plans play a significant role to equip physicians to 
impact patients. Perhaps, patients are treated to the best of the ability of the PCPs. However, private 
insurance companies provide important information to PCPs that impact the health of beneficiaries. 
It is also possible the lower utilization is not driven by the health of beneficiaries, but it is 
driven by the role PCPs play as gatekeepers. Perhaps, PCPs simply deny referrals. This is unlikely 
due to the increasing MA enrollments (Medpac.gov, 2019). If inferior service was provided, it is 
unlikely MA enrollments would be increasing. In the second half of this chapter, we will conduct some 
exploratory analysis on the procedure counts beneficiaries receive from PCPs. This will help us gain 
an initial understanding of the differences in utilization, but more research will be needed to determine 
the root cause.  
The model predicted 257 inpatient discharges per 1,000 beneficiaries for the testing sample. 
This is within 0.3% of the cumulative actual carrier visits. The group with the most inpatient 
discharges had 1,393 visits per 1,000 beneficiaries. The group with the fewest inpatient discharges 
had 34 visits per 1,000 beneficiaries. 
  






















Intercept -2.2532 0.0248 0.1051 -90.9970 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.6811 0.0050 1.9761 135.5440 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0530 0.0008 0.9484 -64.9410 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0015 0.0000 1.0016 42.3610 0.0000
female 0.0973 0.0058 1.1021 16.7450 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0500 0.0040 0.9512 -12.4330 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0031 0.0002 1.0031 12.9250 0.0000
ageover62_3 -5.00E-05 4.30E-06 1.00E+00 -10.7250 0.0000
FFSNoPCPInd -0.3168 0.0088 0.7285 -36.0520 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0048 0.0178 0.9953 -0.2670 0.7896
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.0600 0.0091 0.9418 -6.6210 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.0136 0.0112 0.9865 -1.2140 0.2248
MANoPCPInd -0.6753 0.0143 0.5090 -47.2170 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.2164 0.0481 0.8054 -4.5020 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.2799 0.0134 0.7559 -20.8540 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.4214 0.0109 0.6562 -38.5710 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.6571 0.0131 0.5184 -49.9950 0.0000
Asian -0.3372 0.0553 0.7138 -6.1030 0.0000
Black -0.0621 0.0107 0.9398 -5.7890 0.0000
Hispanic -0.0209 0.0696 0.9793 -0.3000 0.7642
Othernonwhite -0.1966 0.0287 0.8215 -6.8610 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0014 0.0001 0.9986 -15.0910 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0013 0.0003 0.9987 -4.4760 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.0915 0.0118 0.9126 -7.7430 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 -0.0686 0.0134 0.9337 -5.1270 0.0000































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2.3 Outpatient Visits Poisson Regression. We observe similar trends in outpatient visits 
reductions as we did for hospital inpatient discharges. As can be seen in Table 4.23, MA beneficiaries 
under the care of a PCP with high capitation levels exhibit 57.7% fewer outpatient visits than FFS 
beneficiaries under the care of a PCP with low capitation levels. This represents the largest reduction 
of outpatient visits of any variable with the exception of comparing high Charlson Scores to low 
Charlson Scores. For MA beneficiaries, higher capitation levels are correlated with lower outpatient 
utilization. MA beneficiaries under the care of PCPs with no capitation, low capitation, mid capitation, 
and high capitation exhibited 36.3%, 40.6%, 50.3%, and 57.7% reductions, respectively. Table 4.26 
can be viewed for the relative impacts of age, Charlson Score, and the PCP categories. 
Unlike inpatient discharges, the effects of capitation levels of PCPs were evident for FFS 
patients as well. FFS beneficiaries under the care of PCPs with no capitation, mid capitation, and 
high capitation exhibited a 2.9% higher, a 15.7% lower, and an 8.0% lower in outpatient visits, 
respectively. More research will be needed to determine why beneficiaries under the care of PCPs 
with mid capitation levels exhibit fewer outpatient visit reductions than those under the care of PCPs 
with high capitation. 
Table 4.23 contains the Poisson regression model for outpatient visits. Table 4.24 contains 
an evaluation of the actual events for the fitting sample and the predicted events for the fitting sample. 
Table 4.25 contains a similar model comparison for the testing sample. Table 4.26 contains expected 
outpatient visits for a white female of various ages, health statuses, and PCP variables. All other 
variables were set to rounded mean values for this analysis. 
 Included in outpatient visits are emergency room visits. Notice that FFS beneficiaries who 
did not visit a PCP had the most outpatient visits. Also, MA beneficiaries who did not visit a PCP had 
the smallest reduction. This corroborates the point that not visiting a PCP likely leads to ignorance 
of one’s health status. 




The model predicted 7,144 outpatient visits per 1,000 beneficiaries for the testing sample. 
This is within 0.0% of the cumulative actual carrier visits. The group with the most outpatient visits 
had 23,416 visits per 1,000 beneficiaries. The group with the fewest outpatient visits had 2,018 visits 
per 1,000 beneficiaries. The model overpredicts the highest group by 3.1%. More research will be 
needed to determine the cause of this. 
  























Intercept 1.4379 0.0053 4.2117 273.7550 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.3950 0.0009 1.4843 458.4910 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0333 0.0002 0.9672 -210.2960 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0011 0.0000 1.0011 145.3080 0.0000
female 0.2286 0.0011 1.2568 203.7710 0.0000
ageover62 0.0058 0.0007 1.0058 7.7020 0.0000
ageover62sq -0.0001 0.0000 1.0000 -1.1530 0.2487
ageover62_3 3.11E-06 7.96E-07 1.00E+00 3.9100 0.0001
FFSNoPCPInd 0.1409 0.0015 1.1513 92.3080 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd 0.0285 0.0034 1.0289 8.4010 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.1707 0.0018 0.8431 -92.9110 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.0836 0.0023 0.9199 -35.8150 0.0000
MANoPCPInd -0.4473 0.0026 0.6394 -175.2100 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.4502 0.0107 0.6375 -41.9580 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.5206 0.0029 0.5942 -176.5340 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.6987 0.0024 0.4972 -289.4250 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.8591 0.0030 0.4235 -288.4350 0.0000
Asian -0.2974 0.0100 0.7428 -29.7210 0.0000
Black -0.1130 0.0024 0.8931 -46.3530 0.0000
Hispanic -0.1032 0.0138 0.9020 -7.4970 0.0000
Othernonwhite -0.0852 0.0050 0.9183 -17.0960 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0030 0.0000 0.9970 -158.6660 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0009 0.0001 1.0009 8.8950 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs 0.0031 0.0001 1.0031 23.7630 0.0000
hospitalaccess1 0.1091 0.0024 1.1153 44.6470 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 0.0472 0.0030 1.0484 15.9870 0.0000
physiciansper1000 -0.0337 0.0004 0.9669 -91.3980 0.0000




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2.4 Carrier Visits Poisson Regression. Carrier visits include visits conducted by the 
beneficiary’s PCP. For this reason, we do not expect to see as large of a reduction in carrier 
utilization. However, carrier is also the catch-all for services not conducted in a hospital, outpatient 
center, the beneficiary’s home, or a skilled nursing facility. Therefore, a reduction in carrier services 
could imply a reduction in independent specialist care, etc. These trends are what we observe. 
Interestingly, FFS beneficiaries also exhibit these trends, but the trends are smaller than those for 
the MA beneficiaries. 
As can be seen in Table 4.27, MA beneficiaries under the care of a PCP with high capitation 
levels exhibit 35.0% fewer carrier visits than FFS beneficiaries under the care of a PCP with low 
capitation levels. This represents the largest reduction of carrier visits of any variable with the 
exception of comparing high Charlson Scores to low Charlson Scores. For MA beneficiaries, higher 
capitation levels are correlated with lower carrier utilization. MA beneficiaries under the care of PCPs 
with no capitation, low capitation, mid capitation, and high capitation exhibited 15.7%, 19.7%, 22.0%, 
and 35.0% reductions, respectively. Table 4.30 can be viewed for the relative impacts of age, 
Charlson Score, and the PCP categories. 
Table 4.27 contains the Poisson regression model for carrier visits. Table 4.28 contains an 
evaluation of the actual events for the fitting sample and the predicted events for the fitting sample. 
Table 4.29 contains a similar model comparison for the testing sample. Table 4.30 contains expected 
carrier visits for a white female of various ages, health statuses, and PCP variables. All other 
variables were set to rounded mean values for this analysis. 
 The model predicted 20,085 carrier visits per 1,000 beneficiaries for the testing sample. This 
is within 0.1% of the cumulative actual carrier visits. The group with the most carrier visits had 58,047 
visits per 1,000 beneficiaries. The group with the fewest carrier visits had 6,166 visits per 1,000 




beneficiaries. The model overpredicts the highest groups by about 2.4% and underpredicts the 
middle groups slightly. More research will be needed to determine the cause of this. 
Table 4.27 

















Intercept 2.3207 0.0032 10.1824 714.9060 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.2977 0.0005 1.3468 576.6000 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0198 0.0001 0.9804 -203.8640 0.0000
maxchscore3 5.84E-04 4.81E-06 1.0006 121.4620 0.0000
female 0.1350 0.0007 1.1446 203.7250 0.0000
ageover62 0.0083 0.0005 1.0083 17.9140 0.0000
ageover62sq -0.0002 0.0000 0.9998 -5.7720 0.0000
ageover62_3 -1.73E-07 5.11E-07 1.0000 -0.3380 0.7357
FFSNoPCPInd -0.3562 0.0010 0.7003 -352.0230 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0120 0.0021 0.9880 -5.8140 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.0272 0.0010 0.9731 -26.1400 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.0682 0.0013 0.9341 -51.1270 0.0000
MANoPCPInd -0.4830 0.0015 0.6169 -318.7090 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.1708 0.0055 0.8430 -31.2430 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.2193 0.0015 0.8031 -145.5640 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.2490 0.0012 0.7796 -206.7150 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.4301 0.0014 0.6504 -300.7530 0.0000
Asian -0.3288 0.0057 0.7198 -57.2280 0.0000
Black -0.1443 0.0014 0.8657 -105.2710 0.0000
Hispanic -0.1648 0.0086 0.8480 -19.2250 0.0000
Othernonwhite -0.0876 0.0029 0.9161 -30.5570 0.0000
medianhouseeval 0.0006 0.0000 1.0006 50.9620 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0038 0.0001 1.0038 58.1230 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0019 0.0001 0.9982 -22.3450 0.0000
hospitalaccess1 0.0151 0.0016 1.0152 9.3860 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 0.0366 0.0019 1.0373 19.0580 0.0000
physiciansper1000 0.0047 0.0002 1.0048 22.4860 0.0000





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2.5 Home Health Visits Poisson Regression. As can be seen in Table 4.31, MA 
beneficiaries under the care of a PCP with high capitation levels exhibit 74.3% fewer home health 
visits than FFS beneficiaries under the care of a PCP with low capitation levels. This represents the 
largest reduction of home health visits of any variable with the exception of comparing high Charlson 
Scores to low Charlson Scores. For MA beneficiaries, higher capitation levels are correlated with 
lower home health utilization. MA beneficiaries under the care of PCPs with no capitation, low 
capitation, mid capitation, and high capitation exhibited 53.9%, 53.7%, 43.1%, and 74.3% reductions, 
respectively. Table 4.34 can be viewed for the relative impacts of age, Charlson Score, and the PCP 
categories. 
Table 4.31 contains the Poisson regression model for home health visits. Table 4.32 
contains an evaluation of the actual events for the fitting sample and the predicted events for the 
fitting sample. Table 4.33 contains a similar model comparison for the testing sample. Table 4.34 
contains expected home health visits for a white female of various ages, health statuses, and PCP 
variables. All other variables were set to rounded mean values for this analysis. 
 The model predicted 1,642 home health visits per 1,000 beneficiaries for the testing sample. 
This is within 1.4% of the cumulative actual home health visits. The group with the most home health 
visits had 9,635 visits per 1,000 beneficiaries. The group with the fewest home health visits had 114 
visits per 1,000 beneficiaries. The model overpredicts the highest group by 11.5%. This may be due 
to payment limitations or coverage differences between beneficiaries. More research will be needed 
to investigate the cause of this. 
  






















Intercept -1.1386 0.0120 0.3203 -94.5380 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.6572 0.0021 1.9293 318.8100 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0512 0.0003 0.9501 -149.1510 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0014 1.60E-05 1.0015 91.2730 0.0000
female 0.3432 0.0024 1.4095 143.9330 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0540 0.0016 0.9475 -32.9590 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0058 0.0001 1.0058 62.9160 0.0000
ageover62_3 -1.00E-04 1.56E-06 0.9999 -61.1760 0.0000
FFSNoPCPInd -0.2942 0.0034 0.7451 -87.3860 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0721 0.0071 0.9304 -10.1770 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.0087 0.0034 0.9913 -2.5450 0.0109
FFSPCPHighCapInd 0.0034 0.0042 1.0034 0.8030 0.4221
MANoPCPInd -0.9465 0.0062 0.3881 -152.2560 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.7732 0.0248 0.4615 -31.1420 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.7695 0.0063 0.4632 -121.8340 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.5633 0.0044 0.5694 -128.1590 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -1.3568 0.0065 0.2575 -208.0760 0.0000
Asian -0.1932 0.0206 0.8243 -9.4010 0.0000
Black 0.2037 0.0042 1.2260 48.5410 0.0000
Hispanic -0.1945 0.0294 0.8232 -6.6180 0.0000
Othernonwhite -0.0863 0.0121 0.9173 -7.1610 0.0000
medianhouseeval 0.0002 0.0000 1.0002 4.6180 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore -0.0015 0.0002 0.9986 -6.3390 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0009 0.0003 0.9991 -2.9920 0.0028
hospitalaccess1 0.0169 0.0056 1.0171 3.0310 0.0024
hospitalaccess2 -0.0196 0.0068 0.9806 -2.8880 0.0039
physiciansper1000 0.0154 0.0007 1.0155 21.6760 0.0000






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2.6 Skilled Nursing Facility Discharges Poisson Regression. As can be seen in Table 
4.35, MA beneficiaries under the care of a PCP with high capitation levels exhibit 66.2% fewer skilled 
nursing facility discharges than FFS beneficiaries under the care of a PCP with low capitation levels. 
This represents the largest reduction of skilled nursing facility discharges of any variable with the 
exception of comparing high Charlson Scores to low Charlson Scores. For MA beneficiaries, higher 
capitation levels are correlated with lower skilled nursing facility utilization. MA beneficiaries under 
the care of PCPs with no capitation, low capitation, mid capitation, and high capitation exhibited 
55.6%, 53.4%, 56.8%, and 66.2% reductions, respectively. Table 4.38 can be viewed for the relative 
impacts of age, Charlson Score, and the PCP categories. 
Table 4.35 contains the Poisson regression model for skilled nursing facility discharges. 
Table 4.36 contains an evaluation of the actual events for the fitting sample and the predicted events 
for the fitting sample. Table 4.37 contains a similar model comparison for the testing sample. Table 
4.38 contains expected skilled nursing facility discharges for a white female of various ages, health 
statuses, and PCP variables. All other variables were set to rounded mean values for this analysis. 
 The model predicted 140 skilled nursing facility discharges per 1,000 beneficiaries for the 
testing sample. This is within 2.5% of the cumulative actual skilled nursing facility discharges. The 
group with the most skilled nursing facility discharges had 1,105 visits per 1,000 beneficiaries. The 
group with the fewest skilled nursing facility discharges had 14 visits per 1,000 beneficiaries. The 
model overpredicts the highest groups by about 5.0% and underpredicts the middle groups. More 
research will be needed to determine the cause of this. 
  






















Intercept -3.9566 0.0395 0.0191 -100.2010 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.9320 0.0076 2.5396 122.2420 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0869 0.0012 0.9168 -72.7850 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0027 5.20E-05 1.0028 52.6090 0.0000
female 0.4747 0.0084 1.6075 56.6640 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0427 0.0057 0.9582 -7.4650 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0060 0.0003 1.0061 19.4400 0.0000
ageover62_3 -1.00E-04 5.07E-06 0.9999 -19.0330 0.0000
FFSNoPCPInd 0.0491 0.0107 1.0504 4.6010 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0083 0.0234 0.9917 -0.3560 0.7215
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.2252 0.0126 0.7984 -17.9170 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.0601 0.0151 0.9417 -3.9710 0.0001
MANoPCPInd -1.1778 0.0244 0.3080 -48.2460 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.8125 0.0909 0.4438 -8.9370 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.7636 0.0228 0.4660 -33.5310 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.8396 0.0170 0.4319 -49.3200 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -1.0858 0.0211 0.3376 -51.3560 0.0000
Asian -0.2861 0.0775 0.7512 -3.6900 0.0002
Black -0.0694 0.0152 0.9330 -4.5780 0.0000
Hispanic -0.2572 0.1006 0.7732 -2.5560 0.0106
Othernonwhite -0.3974 0.0518 0.6721 -7.6770 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0032 0.0001 0.9968 -25.0320 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0064 0.0004 0.9936 -15.8920 0.0000
hospitalaccess1 0.1186 0.0176 1.1259 6.7570 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 0.1165 0.0216 1.1236 5.4050 0.0000





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2.7 Economics Discussion and Next Steps. The reduction in healthcare services 
utilization can be explained by either a reduction in demand, a reduction in supply, or a combination 
of both. Each beneficiary’s health care needs drive demand for health care services. These are 
caused by many factors including the beneficiary’s chronic medical conditions, age, genetics, etc. 
When conditions are not properly managed, more intensive care can result. It is possible greater 
provision of preventative care by PCPs bearing capitated financial risk leads to better patient health 
(Wolff, Starfield, & Anderson, 2002). This leads to fewer episodic health events resulting in less 
demand for inpatient and outpatient services.  
Anecdotally, we know a woman enrolled in Medicare who visited a PCP reimbursed via FFS. 
This woman had an open sore under her arm the size of a baseball. During the visit, she informed 
her PCP about the sore. However, she did not receive any treatment that day because the PCP told 
her she would need to schedule another appointment. This may have been less likely to happen if 
the PCP was financially responsible for this woman’s entire spectrum of care. If left untreated, this 
sore could become infected sending this woman to the hospital for an inpatient stay. Depending how 
long it took to treat the woman, the inpatient stay could easily cost over $100,000.  
If her PCP bore capitated risk, the PCP would have a financial incentive to make room in the 
schedule to treat the woman during the appointment. Also, it is unlikely the sore would become the 
size of a baseball before receiving treatment. If she informed her doctor a sore was starting to 
develop, she would likely receive an appointment soon to receive treatment. This would prevent the 
sore from growing or becoming infected resulting in a visit to the hospital. As Wolff et al. (2002) state, 
better provision of primary care can lead to reductions in more expensive forms of care. 
It is possible the reduction in demand could also be caused by MA Plans seeking relatively 
healthy patients who demand fewer services (Brown, Duggan, Kuziemko, & Woolston, 2014). While 
Stout (2020) found some evidence to support this hypothesis, it does not appear to be the entire 




explanation for the differences. Even after controlling for the effects of Charlson Score, age, race, 
and other demographics, MA patients under the care of PCPs with high capitation exhibit the lowest 
utilization of all healthcare services. Table 4.16 shows PCPs with high capitation serve on average 
the beneficiaries with the highest Charlson Score. 
It is possible the higher Charlson Scores are caused by diagnostic upcoding. However, the 
percentages found in prior studies of 6% – 16% higher diagnostic coding identified by Geruso and 
Layton (2015) do not account for the magnitude of health-care utilization reductions we observe in 
the five categories care. 
From a supply side, the role physicians play as gatekeepers as described by Kerr et al. 
(1995) could cause a reduction of supply for health care services. In a gatekeeper role, primary care 
physicians could seek to provide more services inside their practices to avoid costly external 
referrals. Stout (2018) identified this when interviewing PCPs with high capitation. However, the 
PCPs state this provides better service to their patients by avoiding scheduling issues with other 
offices and providing a “one-stop-shop” for their patients’ health care needs. Future research could 
investigate how the health state of beneficiaries change over time when they are under the care of 
PCPs with varying degrees of capitated risk. 
Our research shows the need to investigate this phenomenon further. If PCPs with high 
capitation are driving significantly lower utilization through better patient health, it is worth the effort 
to understand how they do it. If these efforts can be replicated, it could have a significant impact on 
the health of our nation and the national budget. 
 As an initial investigation, the next part of this chapter investigates the services provided by 
PCPs to each beneficiary. If the highly capitated PCPs are improving the health states of their 
patients, we expect they will provide more services to their patients. These could in turn have the 
impact of reducing other health-care utilization.  




4.3 PCP Visit Details 
In this section we discuss the Poisson Regression analysis we conducted on visits and 
procedures conducted by PCPs. This is exploratory analysis. For this reason, we do not have 
detailed hypotheses. We hypothesize MA beneficiaries under the care of highly capitated PCPs will 
receive more services than other FFS and MA beneficiaries. We are not sure how this will manifest, 
but we expect procedures will be offered that reduce external referrals and episodic events. To 
investigate this, we first validated our MA data did not contain duplicate records. These would have 
skewed our results in favor of our hypothesis. 
4.3.1 Note on MA PCP Data Duplication. As was mentioned earlier, the data stewards at 
ResDAC warn against duplicate records in the MA datasets (Stout, 2020). To investigate the 
procedures performed by PCPs, we need to evaluate activity at a more granular level than by a count 
of days of service. Instead, we need to count the number of procedures conducted. If there are 
duplicate records, our analysis would contain false and misleading results. 
For this analysis, we use the PCP Visit Annual Summary – Fitting Sample and PCP Visit 
Annual Summary – Testing Sample tables. All of the variables we are investigating were extracted 
from the Carrier FFS and MA table. The MA encounter data are received from the MA plans. Over 
time, updates can be made to a health care claim. For example, the initial submission may have 
been missing required information. Assuming the claim was rejected. Then, if the claim was 
submitted with the proper documentation, and the claim was paid. There could have been two 
encounters for the same activity. If the procedures contained in both encounters were counted, the 
procedures would have been double counted.  
To address this, the CMS data contain a field CLM_FINL_ACTN_IND. If this indicator is set 
to ‘Y’, it indicates this is the final version of the encounter. Therefore, researchers should be able to 
filter the data to only use records with the CLM_FINL_ACTN_IND = ‘Y’. This would remove any 




duplicates. Given the warning from the data stewards at ResDAC, we verified our data did not contain 
duplicates after applying the filter.  
To do this, we conducted a simple test. We compared the number of duplicate HCPCS_CDs 
(which identify procedures) for FFS data and MA data after applying the appropriate filters. If there 
was an issue with duplicates, we would expect the MA data to contain many more records containing 
the same HCPCS_CDs for the combination of BENE_ID, CLM_THRU_DT, and PhysnNPI. Table 
4.39 contains the results of our analysis. As can be seen, after the filters are applied, the MA PCP 
data contain fewer duplicate procedures than the FFS PCP data (2.008% for MA; 3.831% for FFS). 
Therefore, we concluded there were not material duplication issues with the MA data we used. 
Table 4.39 
Check for Duplicate MA PCP Procedures 
Calculation Description FFS MA 
   
Beneficiaries with visits to a PCP 325,543 202,487 
   
Duplicated procedures 107,662 40,262 
   
Total procedures 2,810,423 2,004,721 
   
Procedures per beneficiary 8.63 10.10 
   
Percent of total procedures duplicated 3.831% 2.008% 
   
 
  




4.3.2 Summary Statistics for PCP Visits and Procedures. In this exploratory analysis, we 
are looking for evidence of PCP care being provided differently for MA beneficiaries under the care 
of capitated PCPs. If the PCPs are simply cherry-picking beneficiaries who exhibit lower utilization, 
we would expect to see no material differences in the care. In contrast, if we observe material 
differences in care which align with the utilization shifts we observe, it gives the indication these 
PCPs are actively working to decrease utilization. While we can only report correlations, this 
explanation makes more sense than the converse. It does not make sense that PCPs would provide 
more services because their beneficiaries exhibit lower utilization in other venues. 
In the body of our dissertation, we provide summary statistics for all the procedure categories 
with sufficient event counts. These statistics are contained in Tables 4.40 to 4.45. We also present 
the Poisson regression results for three variables: VisitCnt, EMCmplxSum, and ProcCnt. VisitCnt 
measures the number of visits a beneficiary had with a PCP. EMCmplxSum provides a proxy for the 
time the PCP spent performing evaluation and management services with the beneficiary. ProcCnt 
is a count of all procedures conducted by the PCP for the beneficiary. All metrics are totals for 2016. 
If materially different care was conducted, we expect it would manifest in one or more of these 
variables. It is worth noting we are not able to differentiate between services the PCP personally 
conducted and other services that were conducted within the PCP’s practice.  
Refer to Appendix B for the full Poisson regression models for each variable presented in 
Table 4.40. Some of these results are for procedure categories with few events. We included these 
tables for completeness, but the results could be spurious. Specifically, we caution our readers from 
drawing conclusions based on the Poisson regression results for AnesthesiaCnt, EmrgTechCnt, 
HomHlthSrvcCnt, and OtherPrcCnt. 
To review, these are the factors of incidence for utilization for MA beneficiaries under the 
care of High Cap PCPs compared with FFS beneficiaries under the care of Low Cap PCPs: 0.51837 




for inpatient discharges, 0.42353 for outpatient visits, 0.6504 for carrier visits, 0.25749 for home 
health agency visits, and 0.33764 for skilled nursing facility discharges. This means if FFS 
beneficiaries under the care of a Low Cap PCPs averaged 10 carrier visits per year, MA beneficiaries 
under the care of High Cap PCPs averaged about 6.5 visits per year, ceteris paribus. MA 
beneficiaries under the care of High Cap PCPs exhibited the lowest utilization for all beneficiaries 
who visited a PCP. 
As was previously observed, Table 4.16 shows the MA beneficiaries under the care of High 
Cap PCPs have more chronic medical conditions as measured by the MaxChScoreAllServ variable. 
However, VisitCnt does not show a similar trend to the those observed for utilization. MA 
beneficiaries under the care of High Cap PCPs received statistically equivalent visits to FFS 
beneficiaries under the care of a Low Cap PCPs. The beneficiaries who received the most visits were 
under the care of Mid Cap PCPs. FFS beneficiaries under the care of High Cap PCPs received the 
fewest visits. 
Looking at Table 4.43, a similar trend emerges for EMCmplxSum. The most time was spent 
providing evaluation and management services to MA beneficiaries under the care of Mid Cap PCPs. 
Their FFS counterparts under the care of Mid Cap PCPs also received more PCP time compared 
with FFS beneficiaries under the care of Low Cap PCPs. MA beneficiaries under the care of High 
Cap PCPs exhibited statistically significantly higher utilization, but the difference was not as large as 
MA beneficiaries under the care of Mid Cap PCPs. Interestingly, FFS beneficiaries under the care of 
High Cap PCPs received the least evaluation and management services. 
Finally, ProcCnt exhibits the trend we were expecting to see. Comparing MA beneficiaries, 
we observe those under the care of High Cap PCPs receive the most services followed by those 
under the care of Mid Cap PCPs, No Cap PCPs, then Low Cap PCPs. FFS beneficiaries under the 
care of Mid Cap PCPs receive the most services of all beneficiaries. FFS beneficiaries under the 




care of High Cap PCPs also receive more procedures than FFS beneficiaries under the care of a 
Low Cap PCPs. Next, we will investigate the Poisson regression results to observe if similar trends 
hold while holding other explanatory variables constant. 
  





Summary Statistics for PCP Visit and Procedure Variables 
(Variable definitions are found in Tables 4.1 and 4.8) 
  
  
Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum
VisitCnt        317,737          4.3038          3.9909          1,367,468                   1               157 
NewPatThisYearInd        317,737          0.0704          0.2558               22,358                  -                     1 
EMCmplxSum        317,737          9.7702          9.0058          3,104,341                  -                 248 
EMCmplxLvlOneCnt        317,737          0.0484          0.5907               15,391                  -                   46 
EMCmplxLvlTwoCnt        317,737          0.0739          0.4531               23,490                  -                   43 
EMCmplxLvlThreeCnt        317,737          1.1940          1.7209             379,384                  -                   40 
EMCmplxLvlFourCnt        317,737          1.4032          1.7332             445,852                  -                   62 
EMCmplxLvlFiveCnt        317,737          0.0758          0.3743               24,082                  -                   27 
ProcCnt        317,737          9.2592        10.2854          2,941,998                   1               512 
AnesthesiaCnt        317,737          0.0000          0.0077                        7                  -                     4 
EmrgTechCnt        317,737          0.0003          0.0262                      82                  -                     5 
EvalAndMgmtCnt        317,737          3.4760          3.6692          1,104,457                  -                 194 
GenMedSrvcCnt        317,737          0.9696          2.1205             308,076                  -                 197 
HomHlthSrvcCnt        317,737                  -                    -                         -                    -                    -   
PthlgyAndLabCnt        317,737          2.1862          5.3317             694,633                  -                 191 
RadiologyCnt        317,737          0.1833          0.6352               58,228                  -                   29 
SurgeryCnt        317,737          1.0778          2.0336             342,468                  -                   61 
OthrPrcCnt        317,737          0.0023          0.0555                    729                  -                     6 
Level2Cnt        317,737          1.3638          2.6185             433,318                  -                 315 
maxchscoreallserv        317,737          2.3494          2.5073             746,498                  -                   19 
maxchscoresq        317,737        11.8064        23.2529          3,751,314                  -                 361 
maxchscore3        317,737        80.5998      260.7603        25,609,526                  -              6,859 
female        317,737          0.5887          0.4921             187,052                  -                     1 
ageover62        317,737        13.6721          7.4266          4,344,128                   3                 47 
ageover62sq        317,737      242.0795      249.6352        76,917,604                   9            2,209 
ageover62_3        317,737       5,104.00       7,685.00   1,621,656,452                 27        103,823 
FFSPCPNoCapInd        317,737          0.0352          0.1842               11,177                  -                     1 
FFSPCPMidCapInd        317,737          0.2191          0.4136               69,602                  -                     1 
FFSPCPHighCapInd        317,737          0.1010          0.3014               32,103                  -                     1 
MAPCPNoCapInd        317,737          0.0052          0.0722                 1,663                  -                     1 
MAPCPLowCapInd        317,737          0.0884          0.2839               28,097                  -                     1 
MAPCPMidCapInd        317,737          0.1662          0.3723               52,807                  -                     1 
MAPCPHighCapInd        317,737          0.1172          0.3216               37,227                  -                     1 
Asian        317,737          0.0047          0.0686                 1,503                  -                     1 
Black        317,737          0.0734          0.2608               23,315                  -                     1 
Hispanic        317,737          0.0015          0.0388                    478                  -                     1 
Othernonwhite        317,737          0.0154          0.1233                 4,903                  -                     1 
medianhouseeval        317,737      139.4397        34.8602        44,305,141                 56            197.3 
zpctbachelorsormore        316,047        29.9731        16.4707          9,472,902                  -                 100 
zpctmanprofoccs        316,004        36.7304        11.9149        11,606,948                  -                 100 
hospitalaccess1        317,737          0.8935          0.3085             283,883                  -                     1 
hospitalaccess2        317,737          0.0621          0.2414               19,735                  -                     1 
physiciansper1000        317,737          2.6484          1.8924             841,494                  -                   12 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3.3 Aggregate PCP Visit Counts. Table 4.46 confirms what we observed from the 
summary statistics. Beneficiaries under the care of Mid Cap PCPs exhibit the most PCP visits. 
Compared with FFS beneficiaries under the care of Low Cap PCPs, FFS beneficiaries under the 
care of Mid Cap PCPs received 5.38% more PCP visits, ceteris paribus. MA beneficiaries under the 
care of Mid Cap PCPs received 4.86% more PCP visits, ceteris paribus. All other beneficiaries 
received fewer PCP visits than FFS beneficiaries under the care of Low Cap PCPs. The number of 
PCP visits received in a year does not align with the utilization reductions we observe for other 
venues. 
Table 4.46 contains the Poisson regression model for the count of PCP visits. Table 4.47 
contains an evaluation of the actual events for the fitting sample and the predicted events for the 
fitting sample. Table 4.48 contains a similar model comparison for the testing sample. Table 4.49 
contains expected count of PCP visits for a white female of various ages, health statuses, and PCP 
variables. All other variables were set to rounded mean values for this analysis. 
 The model predicted 4,311 PCP visits per 1,000 beneficiaries for the testing sample. This is 
within 0.3% of the cumulative actual PCP visits. The group with the most skilled nursing facility 
discharges had 7,041 visits per 1,000 beneficiaries. The group with the fewest skilled nursing facility 


























Intercept 1.3869 0.0084 4.0025 164.5040 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.1875 0.0014 1.2062 131.5000 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0168 0.0003 0.9834 -57.7430 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0006 1.50E-05 1.0006 36.0970 0.0000
female 0.0700 0.0018 1.0725 39.6180 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0016 0.0013 0.9984 -1.2600 0.2078
ageover62sq 0.0008 0.0001 1.0008 9.9000 0.0000
ageover62_3 -2.00E-05 1.40E-06 1.0000 -11.3900 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0414 0.0050 0.9594 -8.3710 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.0524 0.0024 1.0538 21.4190 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.1026 0.0034 0.9025 -30.5600 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.1952 0.0133 0.8227 -14.6450 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.0383 0.0034 0.9625 -11.1060 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.0474 0.0027 1.0486 17.7940 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.0105 0.0032 0.9896 -3.3140 0.0009
Asian -0.0868 0.0137 0.9169 -6.3470 0.0000
Black -0.0751 0.0036 0.9277 -20.8410 0.0000
Hispanic -0.1095 0.0229 0.8963 -4.7820 0.0000
Othernonwhite -0.0498 0.0076 0.9515 -6.5320 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0020 0.0000 0.9980 -63.0880 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0030 0.0002 1.0030 16.9290 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0044 0.0002 0.9956 -19.4330 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.0273 0.0038 0.9731 -7.2610 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 -0.0624 0.0044 0.9396 -14.1540 0.0000
physiciansper1000 -0.0057 0.0006 0.9943 -10.1020 0.0000





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3.4 Aggregate Complexity of Evaluation and Management Procedures Performed by 
PCPs. In the following analysis, I will refer to PCP EM time. When I do this, I’m referring to the value 
for EMCmplxSum. Due to how this variable is calculated. PCP EM time is not a perfect description. 
This description assumes each level represents the same amount of time for all PCPs. It also 
assumes each level represents a proportion with equal intervals starting from zero. For example, 
Level 1 = 10 minutes, Level 2 = 20 minutes, Level 3 = 30 minutes, Level 4 = 40 minutes, and Level 
5 = 50 minutes. In practice, these assumptions are unlikely to hold. This variable serves as an 
aggregate proxy variable of all levels, so PCPs who conduct multiple Level 2 visits are not penalized 
when compared with a PCP who conducts a single Level 3 visit. We use the term PCP EM time for 
brevity. 
Again, Table 4.50 confirms what we observed from the summary statistics. Beneficiaries 
under the care of Mid Cap PCPs received the most PCP EM time. Compared with FFS beneficiaries 
under the care of Low Cap PCPs, MA beneficiaries under the care of Mid Cap PCPs received 9.79% 
more PCP EM time, ceteris paribus. FFS beneficiaries under the care of Mid Cap PCPs received 
7.64% more PCP EM time. Next, MA beneficiaries under the care of Low Cap PCPs received 3.17% 
more PCP EM time. Then, MA beneficiaries under the care of High Cap PCPs received 1.81% more 
PCP EM time. Again, these values do not align with the health-care utilization reductions we 
observed. 
Table 4.50 contains the Poisson regression model for EMCmplxSum. Table 4.51 contains 
an evaluation of the actual events for the fitting sample and the predicted events for the fitting sample. 
Table 4.52 contains a similar model comparison for the testing sample. Table 4.53 contains the 
expected value for EMCmplxSum for a white female of various ages, health statuses, and PCP 
variables. All other variables were set to rounded mean values for this analysis. 




 The model predicted a value for EMCmplxSum of 9,786 per 1,000 beneficiaries for the 
testing sample. This is within 0.0% of the cumulative actual value for EMCmplxSum. The group with 
the most PCP EM time had a value for EMCmplxSum of 14,816 per 1,000 beneficiaries. The group 
with the least PCP EM time had a value for EMCmplxSum of 6,196 per 1,000 beneficiaries.  
Table 4.50 


















Intercept 1.9518 0.0057 7.0413 341.5930 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.1987 0.0009 1.2198 209.2940 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0210 0.0002 0.9792 -107.3470 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0007 1.00E-05 1.0008 71.3680 0.0000
female 0.0781 0.0012 1.0812 66.5800 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0103 0.0009 0.9897 -11.8930 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0014 0.0001 1.0014 26.4550 0.0000
ageover62_3 -4.00E-05 1.02E-06 1.0000 -37.0840 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0204 0.0034 0.9798 -6.0650 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.0736 0.0016 1.0764 44.6430 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.1213 0.0023 0.8857 -53.8880 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.0923 0.0086 0.9119 -10.7880 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd 0.0312 0.0022 1.0317 13.9620 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.0934 0.0018 1.0979 52.7600 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd 0.0179 0.0021 1.0181 8.6830 0.0000
Asian -0.0223 0.0086 0.9780 -2.6060 0.0092
Black -0.0703 0.0023 0.9321 -30.3050 0.0000
Hispanic 0.0466 0.0141 1.0477 3.3120 0.0009
Othernonwhite -0.0465 0.0049 0.9546 -9.4200 0.0000
medianhouseeval 0.0003 0.0000 1.0003 16.3220 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0027 0.0001 1.0027 22.0780 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0051 0.0002 0.9949 -32.9020 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.1143 0.0027 0.8920 -43.0650 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 -0.2667 0.0033 0.7659 -79.9230 0.0000
physiciansper1000 0.0071 0.0004 1.0071 19.1010 0.0000




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3.5 Aggregate Count of PCP Procedures. Here we observe a possible explanation for 
the shifts in health-care utilization. When we control for other factors and consider the general 
observation that MA beneficiaries exhibit lower utilization than FFS beneficiaries, we observe a trend 
in incidence factors that aligns with the trends we observed for utilization in other venues. Table 4.54 
shows MA Beneficiaries under the care of High Cap PCPs received the most PCP procedures. 
Compared with FFS beneficiaries under the care of Low Cap PCPs, MA beneficiaries under the care 
of High Cap PCPs received 30.0% more PCP procedures, ceteris paribus. This was followed by 
22.1% more for MA beneficiaries under the care of Mid Cap PCPs. MA beneficiaries under the care 
of Low Cap PCPs and No Cap PCPs received 7.1% fewer and 18.3% fewer, respectively. Again, we 
observe FFS beneficiaries under the care of Mid Cap PCPs received more PCP procedures than 
FFS beneficiaries under the care of Low Cap PCPs (28.7% more). Here we observe FFS 
beneficiaries under the care of High Cap PCPs received 7.0% more PCP procedures than FFS 
beneficiaries under the care of Low Cap PCPs. 
Table 4.54 contains the Poisson regression model for the count of PCP procedures. Table 
4.55 contains an evaluation of the actual events for the fitting sample and the predicted events for 
the fitting sample. Table 4.56 contains a similar model comparison for the testing sample. Table 4.57 
contains expected count of PCP procedures for a white female of various ages, health statuses, and 
PCP variables. All other variables were set to rounded mean values for this analysis. 
 The model predicted 9,281 PCP procedures per 1,000 beneficiaries for the testing sample. 
This is within 0.4% of the cumulative actual count of PCP procedures. The group with the most PCP 
procedures had 15,577 per 1,000 beneficiaries. The group with the least PCP procedures had 5,275 
per 1,000 beneficiaries. 
  






















Intercept 2.1613 0.0057 8.6824 382.2390 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.1808 0.0010 1.1982 184.5790 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0160 0.0002 0.9841 -79.1260 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0005 1.10E-05 1.0005 45.2060 0.0000
female 0.0505 0.0012 1.0518 42.0210 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0057 0.0009 0.9943 -6.5160 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0009 0.0001 1.0009 16.1310 0.0000
ageover62_3 -2.00E-05 1.00E-06 1.0000 -21.7270 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0239 0.0036 0.9764 -6.7240 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.2519 0.0017 1.2865 149.5170 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd 0.0673 0.0023 1.0696 29.4090 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.2025 0.0096 0.8167 -21.0220 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.0737 0.0025 0.9290 -29.2520 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.1996 0.0018 1.2209 108.0760 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd 0.2623 0.0021 1.2999 125.8240 0.0000
Asian -0.0887 0.0094 0.9151 -9.4860 0.0000
Black -0.0460 0.0023 0.9550 -20.0630 0.0000
Hispanic -0.0307 0.0151 0.9698 -2.0340 0.0419
Othernonwhite -0.0271 0.0051 0.9733 -5.3200 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0025 0.0000 0.9975 -117.2220 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0041 0.0001 1.0041 35.0570 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0050 0.0002 0.9950 -32.3780 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.0385 0.0025 0.9622 -15.4730 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 -0.0302 0.0029 0.9702 -10.3680 0.0000














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3.6 Possible Explanation for PCP Care Metrics. Before discussing our observations, 
let’s revisit the anecdote we shared previously. In the story, a Medicare beneficiary went to a PCP 
for a visit. While she was there, she informed the PCP of an open sore under her arm the size of a 
baseball. The PCP’s response was she would need to set up another appointment for this. 
Under an FFS model, PCPs are rewarded to “assess and refer.” Their financial incentives 
reward them to fill their schedules with tightly packed appointments. In these appointments, patients 
should be seen quickly. If care is required, these patients should be referred to other venues. We do 
not imply all FFS PCPs operate this way, but this is one profit maximizing strategy. 
In contrast, capitated PCPs are rewarded to prevent referrals to other providers. Care 
performed by the PCP is reimbursed on an FFS basis. Also, the expense pool is not hit with the more 
expensive specialist referral. Under this model PCPs are rewarded to be available to provide needed 
care and to provide the most care possible. If this Medicare beneficiary received care from a 
capitated PCP, she would have likely been able to receive an appointment sooner, and she would 
have received treatment in the same visit. The capitated PCP would not want to risk the sore 
becoming infected. If it became infected, the beneficiary may go to the hospital, and spend several 
days or weeks fighting the infection in the hospital. This could result in a large medical payment, 
which would financially impact the capitation contract for the PCP. 
Our observations for VisitCnt, EMCmplxSum, and ProcCnt align fairly well with this 
description. We see slightly more values for VisitCnt and EMCmplxSum. This shows beneficiaries 
are seen slightly more frequently and for more time per visit. However, the largest difference is in the 
count of PCP procedures performed. MA beneficiaries under the care of High Cap PCPs received 
30.0% more procedures than FFS beneficiaries under the care of Low Cap PCPs. This indicates 
High Cap PCPs provide procedures more efficiently. Instead of operating under an “assess and refer” 
model, they provide the services needed when the PCP learns of the need. When these observations 




are combined with the general observation that MA beneficiaries have lower utilization than FFS 
beneficiaries, it seems the procedures conducted by a PCP has the largest impact on utilization in 
other venues. More research will be needed to investigate this further. 
Interestingly, both MA and FFS beneficiaries under the care of Mid Cap PCPs received the 
most visits and PCP EM time. Also, these FFS beneficiaries received almost as many procedures 
as MA beneficiaries under the care of High Cap PCPs. It appears the FFS and MA beneficiaries 
under the care of Mid Cap PCPs received the most equivalent care among PCPs with varying 
capitation levels. In contrast, the MA beneficiaries under the care of High Cap PCPs received 
significantly more care than their FFS counterparts. This brings into question a statement by a High 
Cap PCP that FFS and MA patients are treated the same (Stout, 2018). It is possible MA and FFS 
beneficiaries are treated the same in the practice that participated in this study. We did not investigate 
the results for this practice directly. It is also possible physicians perceive the care provided to be 
similar for FFS and MA patients, and the differences observed are driven by differences in the 
information available to the physicians for the patients.  
Next, we will investigate why capitation contracts failed in the past and how to avoid the 
failures in the future. The next chapter presents our Monte Carlo simulation for the capitated contract 
outcome. This is not a complete representation of an income statement for a primary care practice. 
However, it represents the source of financial risk created by a capitation contract. Financial failure 
can occur for capitated practices when protections are not provided in the contract against large 
losses. If the losses are large enough, they could cause the practices to declare bankruptcy.   




Chapter 5: Capitation Contract Simulation Using FFS Annual Medical Payments 
 With this information, we turn our attention to simulating the capitation contract outcomes for 
primary care practices. Remember that the MA data from CMS does not contain the medical 
payments for each encounter. Therefore, we need to use FFS data to get a starting point for the 
medical payments. However, as we saw from the previous section, health-care utilization for an MA 
beneficiary can be significantly different from that of an FFS beneficiary. To address this, we adjust 
these costs simply by multiplying them by the factor of incidence identified from the Poisson 
regression analysis. This approach is rudimentary, but it serves as a starting point to investigate the 
impact of reducing health-care utilization under capitation contracts. It also provides experimental 
control, so we can show the affect of shifting utilization while holding other variables constant. 
 We used the calculations presented earlier to guide our analysis. Stout (2020) provided one 
variation of a capitation contract, which we will used in this study (1). Future research could 
investigate the other contract variations he presents in his research. The second equation (2) is 
presented by Better Medicare Alliance (2017). They do not include the DIF factor in their equation. 
However, it is identified in prior research (GAO.gov, 2013; Geruso & Layton, 2015; Kronick & Welch, 
2014). We set this factor to one for our research since differing diagnosis intensity factors for MA 
and FFS beneficiaries would already be reflected in the CMS data. However, this would be an 
important factor to consider for FFS physicians transitioning to capitation reimbursement. 
PCP Earnings = ([C – (C * R)] – E) * S. (1) 
C = (Base Rate * MRA factor * DIF) * (1 – CIA). (2) 
• PCP Earnings represent the outcome of the capitation contract. Positive values would result 
in a bonus payment to the practice, whereas negative values would result in the practice 
paying the MA plan. We refer to positive amounts as gains and negative amounts as losses. 
• C represents the CMS payment to the MA plan. 




• R represents the retention rate for the MA plan. This can range from 0% to 15%. We set this 
value to 15% for our analysis. 
• E represents the medical expense for the patient pool net of both stop loss and patient 
copayments/deductibles. 
• S represents the percentage of risk the practice bears. 
• The Base Rate from CMS is calculated at a county level using the county where the 
beneficiary resides. 
• The Medicare Risk Adjustment (MRA) factor is an adjustment for the health status of each 
beneficiary. Having proportionately more sick patients will result in a higher reimbursement 
from CMS to the MA plan and a larger pool of funds for the contract. 
• DIF represents the diagnosis intensity factor. Physicians for MA beneficiaries may more 
diligently record diagnoses because this results in higher reimbursement from CMS 
(GAO.gov, 2013; Geruso & Layton, 2015; Kronick & Welch, 2014). We assume that this is 
already factored into our data and reflected in the Charlson Scores computed from the 
diagnosis data. Therefore, it is set to one for our analysis. 
• CIA represents the coding intensity adjustment. This is a reduction of payments because 
CMS realized diagnoses are recorded differently for MA and FFS beneficiaries. This was 
5.41% in 2016. 
5.1 Capitation Contract Analysis Details 
For this analysis, we performed Monte Carlo simulations of services delivered to individual 
beneficiaries covered under a contract between a MAO and the primary medica practice. The steps 
we performed are summarized below. 
  




5.1.1 High-Level Calculation Steps.  
1. We compiled the base data for the analysis from the annual beneficiary fitting and testing 
tables. These tables contained descriptive data for all beneficiaries and medical payments 
for FFS beneficiaries. 
2. We calculated a county base rate and risk factor using total annual medical payments for 
FFS beneficiaries. These were used to generate simulated payments from CMS to the MA 
plan for services delivered in the five major venues. 
3. We created two tables containing empirical distributions of total annual medical payments 
for FFS beneficiaries. One table contained the distribution for beneficiaries who received a 
PCP visit. The other table contained the distribution for beneficiaries who did not receive a 
PCP visit. Groups in these tables were identified by MedicaidInd, Gender, and 
MaxChScoreGroup. Summary Statistics for these tables are contained in Tables 5.4 and 
5.5. 
4. We assigned medical payments to each MA beneficiary receiving care from the practice 
randomly using the empirical distributions from step 3 considering MedicaidInd, Gender, and 
MaxChScoreGroup for each individual beneficiary.  
a. We generated total annual payments for each beneficiary randomly 1,000 times. 
We identified the replication number with a variable called RunID. 
b. For each Beneficiary and RunID combination, we selected randomly from the 
relevant empirical distribution of total medical payments. 
5. We adjusted the FFS medical payments by an MA Adjustment Factor to capture changes in 
health-care utilization. 
6. For each beneficiary and RunID combination we calculated the capitation results.  




7. For each RunID, we aggregated the capitation results to represent the results for the 
practice. 
8. We conducted stress tests to evaluate the impact of low probability events. 
9. We compiled summary statistics for the 1,000 replications of each scenario. These statistics 
are presented in the results tables. 
5.1.2 Compiling Annual Cost-of-Service Data for Each Beneficiary. The first step in 
producing distributions for annual costs of services delivered to individual beneficiaries in each venue 
was to compile annual summaries of costs for services derived from individual FFS encounter 
records. (We were able to estimate frequency of visits for MA beneficiaries from their encounter data 
but costs were not reported for them.) We employed the annual beneficiary tables used for the FFS 
Poisson regression analysis and used both the fitting and the testing samples for this analysis to 
maximize the number of records available to create the empirical distribution of medical payments.  
We then merged this information with the Master Beneficiary Summary records provided by 
CMS to get the additional variables needed for the analysis. Table 5.1 contains the descriptive 
variables used in this analysis. Each beneficiary has one record in this table. Records were removed 
from the dataset if the beneficiary did not have Missouri listed as the primary residence or if the 
county listed had fewer than 100 Medicare beneficiaries. Since we are using empirical distributions, 
small sample sizes would have distorted the results. 
  





Annual beneficiary data descriptive variables 
Variable Description 
  
BENE_ID A unique identifier for each Medicare beneficiary 
  
STATE_CODE A numeric code identifying the beneficiary’s state of residence 
  
COUNTY_CD A numeric code identifying the beneficiary’s county of residence 
  
DUAL_ELGBL_MONS A count of the number of months the beneficiary was eligible for 
both Medicare and Medicaid 
  
MedicaidInd 0-1, 1 if DUAL_ELGBL_MONS = 12 
  
GENDER Male or Female (data provided by CMS.) 
  
RACE Captures the race of the beneficiary. (This variable was not used 
in the analysis due to small sample sizes for some races.) 
  
YrEndAge Age of the beneficiary at the end of the coverage year. (This 
variable was not used in the analysis due to small sample sizes 
for some variable combinations.) 
  
AgeGroup A grouping of YrEndAge variable values. (This variable was not 





The maximum Charlson Score identified by diagnosis codes from 
all venues of service 
  
MaxChScoreGroup A grouping of MaxChScoreAllServ variable values. This variable 
was used to increase sample sizes for subgroups 
  
Note: Descriptions for the CMS variables can be found on the ResDAC website (ResDAC.org). 
 We compiled the financial variables from the Master Beneficiary Summary tables provided 
by CMS. These data are compiled for the various venues of care and for specific services 
provided. Table 5.2 contains the definitions of the variables containing the total medical expenses 
for a beneficiary. We also compile the CMS payments, other insurance payments, and beneficiary 
copayments/deductibles for each venue. These payments are captured with separate variables. 




The CMS payments from the Master Beneficiary Summary files can be identified by variables 
containing “MDCR” or “PERDIEM.” Other insurance payment variables contain “PRMRY.” 
Beneficiary copayments/deductibles can be identified by variables containing “BENE.” We 
summarize these payments and include it in the annual table for each beneficiary. Based on our 
literature review, we excluded any pharmacy payments. We also excluded payments for durable 
medical equipment because the ResDAC data stewards state the durable medical equipment data 
are unreliable. 
  





Annual Beneficiary Medical Payment Variables 




ACUTE_MDCR_PMT + ACUTE_PERDIEM_PMT + 
ACUTE_PRMRY_PMT + ACUTE_BENE_PMT + OIP_MDCR_PMT + 








ASC_MDCR_PMT + ASC_PRMRY_PMT + ASC_BENE_PMT + 
EM_MDCR_PMT + EM_PRMRY_PMT + EM_BENE_PMT + 
ANES_MDCR_PMT + ANES_PRMRY_PMT + ANES_BENE_PMT + 
DIALYS_MDCR_PMT + DIALYS_PRMRY_PMT + 
DIALYS_BENE_PMT + OPROC_MDCR_PMT + 
OPROC_PRMRY_PMT + OPROC_BENE_PMT + IMG_MDCR_PMT + 
IMG_PRMRY_PMT + IMG_BENE_PMT + TEST_MDCR_PMT + 
TEST_PRMRY_PMT + TEST_BENE_PMT + OTHC_MDCR_PMT + 
OTHC_PRMRY_PMT + OTHC_BENE_PMT + PHYS_MDCR_PMT + 
PHYS_PRMRY_PMT + PHYS_BENE_PMT 
  
Total Home Health 
Payments 
HH_MDCR_PMT + HH_PRMRY_PMT 
  
Total Skilled Nursing 
Facility Payments 



























ACUTE_MDCR_PMT + ACUTE_PERDIEM_PMT + 
ACUTE_PRMRY_PMT + ACUTE_BENE_PMT + OIP_MDCR_PMT + 
OIP_PERDIEM_PMT + OIP_PRMRY_PMT + OIP_BENE_PMT + 
HOP_MDCR_PMT + HOP_PRMRY_PMT + HOP_BENE_PMT + 
ASC_MDCR_PMT + ASC_PRMRY_PMT + ASC_BENE_PMT + 
EM_MDCR_PMT + EM_PRMRY_PMT + EM_BENE_PMT + 
ANES_MDCR_PMT + ANES_PRMRY_PMT + ANES_BENE_PMT + 
DIALYS_MDCR_PMT + DIALYS_PRMRY_PMT + 
DIALYS_BENE_PMT + OPROC_MDCR_PMT + 
OPROC_PRMRY_PMT + OPROC_BENE_PMT + IMG_MDCR_PMT + 
IMG_PRMRY_PMT + IMG_BENE_PMT + TEST_MDCR_PMT + 
TEST_PRMRY_PMT + TEST_BENE_PMT + OTHC_MDCR_PMT + 
OTHC_PRMRY_PMT + OTHC_BENE_PMT + PHYS_MDCR_PMT + 
PHYS_PRMRY_PMT + PHYS_BENE_PMT +  
HH_MDCR_PMT + HH_PRMRY_PMT +    
SNF_MDCR_PMT + SNF_PRMRY_PMT + SNF_BENE_PMT 
  
Note: Descriptions for the CMS variables can be found on the ResDAC website (ResDAC.org). 
5.1.3 Calculating the Reimbursements from CMS to the MA Plan. The CMS data do not 
contain the reimbursement rate for each MA beneficiary. Therefore, we estimated this 
reimbursement by using a similar methodology to CMS as described in Better Medicare Alliance 
(2017). We assume the CMS payment to MA plans is based on the total CMS payments for FFS 
beneficiaries instead of the total reimbursement FFS medical providers receive from all sources. The 
latter includes deductibles/copayments from other insurance companies and the beneficiaries. 
We took three steps to estimate the reimbursement for each MA beneficiary. We started with 
the total CMS payments for FFS beneficiaries. We first found the average CMS payment for all 
Missouri beneficiaries. The average total CMS payment per beneficiary was $7,486.12 for FFS 
beneficiaries in Missouri in 2016. 
We then calculated an index we call RiskFactor. To calculate RiskFactor, we divide the 
average total CMS payment for a subgroup of beneficiaries by the average CMS payment for all 
beneficiaries. Subgroups were identified by combinations of MedicaidInd, Gender, and 




MaxChScoreGroup. We initially included Race and Age combinations in the subgroup definitions to 
align with our Poisson regression analysis. However, we decided to remove these variables due to 
small sample sizes for most groups. Table 5.3 contains the RiskFactors for each group. 
Finally, we calculate a CountyBaseRate for each county. We first assign a RiskFactor to 
each beneficiary. Next, we normalize the CMS payments by dividing the total CMS payment by the 
RiskFactor for each beneficiary. Then, we find the average of this normalized amount for each 
county.  
We then assign each MA beneficiary a CountyBaseRate and RiskFactor. To calculate the 
CMS payment to the MA plan, we use the following formula. The Coding Intensity Adjustment (CIA) 
for 2016 was 5.41%. As we mentioned earlier, we set the DIF factor to one since coding differences 
between FFS and MA beneficiaries would already be reflected in the CMS data. 
C = (CountyBaseRate * RiskFactor * DIF) * (1 – CIA).  











Bene Count GroupAvg AllBeneAvg RiskFactor
0 F 0 81,159 2,374.47 7,486.12 0.3172
0 F 1 48,554 4,534.83 7,486.12 0.6058
0 F 2 33,160 6,818.21 7,486.12 0.9108
0 F 3-4 36,026 10,723.93 7,486.12 1.4325
0 F 5-7 17,721 18,113.31 7,486.12 2.4196
0 F Over 7 6,844 33,263.94 7,486.12 4.4434
0 M 0 53,851 1,891.99 7,486.12 0.2527
0 M 1 33,547 3,733.86 7,486.12 0.4988
0 M 2 26,762 5,760.08 7,486.12 0.7694
0 M 3-4 32,227 9,443.74 7,486.12 1.2615
0 M 5-7 18,823 16,648.74 7,486.12 2.2239
0 M Over 7 7,748 33,155.43 7,486.12 4.4289
1 F 0 3,353 2,391.74 7,486.12 0.3195
1 F 1 4,720 4,549.05 7,486.12 0.6077
1 F 2 4,474 7,562.41 7,486.12 1.0102
1 F 3-4 6,769 11,141.27 7,486.12 1.4883
1 F 5-7 4,784 18,635.24 7,486.12 2.4893
1 F Over 7 1,663 36,556.84 7,486.12 4.8833
1 M 0 1,580 1,730.99 7,486.12 0.2312
1 M 1 1,779 4,207.90 7,486.12 0.5621
1 M 2 1,661 6,381.85 7,486.12 0.8525
1 M 3-4 2,611 11,174.13 7,486.12 1.4926
1 M 5-7 1,992 19,665.00 7,486.12 2.6269
1 M Over 7 877 35,801.24 7,486.12 4.7824




5.1.4 Estimating Total Medical Expenses for MA Beneficiaries. Since the CMS data do 
not contain payment information for MA beneficiaries, we used an empirical distribution of total 
annual medical payments for FFS beneficiaries to provide distributions for our analysis. Based on 
the definitions contained in Table 5.2, we calculate the total payments made for each FFS 
beneficiary. We capture the total payments for each venue: inpatient, outpatient, carrier, home health 
agency, and skilled nursing facility. We also capture the sum of these venues and the total 
copayments/deductibles for each beneficiary. 
We then group FFS beneficiaries by MedicaidInd, Gender, and MaxChScoreGroup. We then 
sort the beneficiaries in each group by their total medical payments for all venues. This is used as 
an empirical distribution for assigning annual medical payments to an MA beneficiary. For each MA 
beneficiary we randomly selected cost for an FFS beneficiary from the same group. Based on this 
selection, the corresponding inpatient, outpatient, carrier, home health agency, and skilled nursing 
facility payments are captured. We also capture the total medical payments and the total copayments 
and deductibles. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 contain summary statistics for total medical payments from the 
distribution tables. We repeat this selection process 1,000 times for each MA beneficiary. This 
generates probability distributions for annual costs of services rendered to MA beneficiaries. 
Based on the Poisson regression results, it appears beneficiaries who do not receive a PCP 
visit exhibit systematically different levels of service utilization. For this reason, we split our 
distributions into two tables. One contains the distribution of beneficiaries who received a PCP visit. 
The other contains the distribution for beneficiaries who did not receive a PCP visit. With these tables, 
we can now assign medical payments to an MA beneficiary. We randomly identify MA beneficiaries 
to receive a PCP visit or not. For the body of this dissertation, we present the results for 20% of MA 
beneficiaries did not receive a PCP visit. We also present the results for 0% and 50% with no PCP 
visit in Appendix C.  




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.1.5 Calculating Capitation Contract Gains and Losses. We now have all the information 
needed to calculate the results of a capitation contract. Calculating the capitation contracts requires 
several parameters. We created a table with a single record to store these parameters. We calculate 
costs that would be incurred under five alternative contracts with each run. In Table 5.6, we define 
the parameters and illustrate values of parameters pertaining to terms of reimbursement from the 
MA Plan. 
Table 5.6 
Capitation Contract Simulation Parameters 
Variable Description 
  
CodingIntensityAdjustment The reduction in the CMS payment to MA plans (5.41% for 
2016) 
  
PctNoPCPVst The percentage of MA beneficiaries who did not receive a PCP 
visit 
  
MAMaxOutOfPocket The maximum copay/deductible for an MA beneficiary (We 
used a value of $10,000 for this analysis.) 
  
MAIPAdjFactor The factor of incidence from the Poisson Regression results 
comparing inpatient utilization for beneficiaries under the care 
of MA PCPs with various capitation levels to those under the 
care of FFS PCPs with low capitation levels 
  
MAOPAdjFactor The factor of incidence from the Poisson Regression results 
comparing outpatient utilization for beneficiaries under the care 
of MA PCPs with various capitation levels to those under the 
care of FFS PCPs with low capitation levels 
  
MACarAdjFactor The factor of incidence from the Poisson Regression results 
comparing carrier utilization for beneficiaries under the care of 
MA PCPs with various capitation levels to those under the care 
of FFS PCPs with low capitation levels 
  
MAHHAAdjFactor The factor of incidence from the Poisson Regression results 
comparing home health agency utilization for beneficiaries 
under the care of MA PCPs with various capitation levels to 
those under the care of FFS PCPs with low capitation levels 
  






MASNFAdjFactor The factor of incidence from the Poisson Regression results 
comparing skilled nursing facility utilization for beneficiaries 
under the care of MA PCPs with various capitation levels to 
those under the care of FFS PCPs with low capitation levels 
  
MAIPAdjFactorNoPCP The quotient of the factors of incidence from the Poisson 
Regression results comparing inpatient utilization MA 
beneficiaries who received no PCP visit with FFS beneficiaries 
who received no PCP visit 
  
MAOPAdjFactorNoPCP The quotient of the factors of incidence from the Poisson 
Regression results comparing outpatient utilization MA 
beneficiaries who received no PCP visit with FFS beneficiaries 
who received no PCP visit 
  
MACarAdjFactorNoPCP The quotient of the factors of incidence from the Poisson 
Regression results comparing carrier utilization MA 
beneficiaries who received no PCP visit with FFS beneficiaries 
who received no PCP visit 
  
MAHHAAdjFactorNoPCP The quotient of the factors of incidence from the Poisson 
Regression results comparing home health agency utilization 
MA beneficiaries who received no PCP visit with FFS 
beneficiaries who received no PCP visit 
  
MASNFAdjFactorNoPCP The quotient of the factors of incidence from the Poisson 
Regression results comparing skilled nursing facility utilization 
MA beneficiaries who received no PCP visit with FFS 
beneficiaries who received no PCP visit 
  
Contract1 Placeholder to identify the start of the Contract1 variables 
  
RetentionRate1 R - The retention rate of MA plans. Set to 15% for our analysis 
  
RiskShare1 S – The risk share for the primary care practice. This varies per 
contract. We tested values of 80%, 60%, and 25% 
  
UpsideOnlyInd1 0-1, Set to 1 if the contract is classified as upside only 
  
  
StopLossInd1 0-1, Set to 1 if the PCP has stop loss provisions in the contract 
  
StopLossYrPrem1 The cost of stop loss protection. The amount is entered as a 
total for the year. 
  






StopLossLimit1 The point at which stop loss starts to take effect (This is called 
the attachment point in industry.) 
  




For each MA beneficiary under the care of the PCP practice for each RunID, we calculate 
the CMS payment to the MA plan with the logic described above. We also calculate the MA adjusted 
medical payments. To do this, we multiply the total payments for a medical venue by the MA 
adjustment factor corresponding to that venue considering whether the patient has received a PCP 
visit. We then sum these amounts from each venue to get the total MA adjusted claim expense. 
Table 5.7 contains the MA adjustment factors we used. These were captured from the Poisson 
regression analysis results from Chapter 4. Finally, we calculate the MA applied deductible by taking 
the minimum value between the MAMaxOutofPocket variable and the total copay and deductible 
payments for the FFS beneficiary. A new variable MA Plan Claim Expense is the difference between 
the MA adjusted claim expense and the MA applied deductible. 
  
  


























































































































































































































































































































































We applied stop-loss protection against large MA Plan Claim Expense values. This 
information is proprietary, so we do not provide the details for each variable in the stop loss contract. 
We altered the values slightly for our analysis to protect that information. Our alterations will cause 
minor differences in our capitation results, but the results we observe for other factors are several 
magnitudes larger than those caused by the chosen values for the stop-loss parameters. We applied 
the stoploss values consistently for all runs. Future research will be needed to investigate the impact 
of different stop loss provisions.   
 Logically, in the event MA Plan Claim Expense for a beneficiary exceeds the Stop Loss 
Limit, the following calculation is performed. This amount becomes the Stop Loss Adjusted Claim 
Expense in our calculations. This becomes the value for E. If the MA Plan Claim Expense does not 
exceed the Stop Loss Limit, E is simply the MA Plan Claim Expense. 
E = StopLossLimit + (MAPlanClmExp – StopLossLimit) * (1 - StopLossPct). 
• The StopLossLimit is the point at which stop loss starts to reduce the impact of medical 
payments to the capitation contract. (This is called the attachment point in industry.)  
o For example, if the StopLossLimit = $150,000, only medical payments over 
$150,000 would be reduced. 
• The StopLossPct is the reinsurance rate for medical payments greater than the 
StopLossLimit. Only the portion of medical payments that exceed the stop loss limit receive 
the reduction. 
o In our example, if medical payments were $400,000 and the StopLossPct = 80%,  
E = $150,000 + ($400,000 - $150,000) * (1 – 80%) = $200,000. 
 In the next step, we calculate the gain or loss generated by each beneficiary according to 
the following formula. Remember that C represents the CMS payment to the MA Plan. R and S are 
specified by the capitation contract. 




Gain/Loss = ([C – (C * R)] – E) * S. 
 We take the sum of these values over all beneficiaries for each RunID. If the contract 
experiences a loss (by having a negative value) and the contract is upside only, the value of the 
contract becomes $0. Any gains under an upside only contract would result in a bonus payment to 
the practice. Finally, the stop loss premium is subtracted from the gain or loss from the contract. 
 
5.2 Capitation Simulation Results 
We ran the above simulations with several different parameters. In this section, we present 
these results and discuss the implications. As a reminder, we are using the filtered dataset created 
in Chapter 4. We are only considering FFS beneficiaries because the data for MA beneficiaries do 
not contain medical payment information. We noticed in our data that there were no extremely large 
annual medical payments for a beneficiary. The largest annual medical payments for a single 
beneficiary in our sample were $662K. However, based on prior research and industry experience, 
we know annual medical payments can exceed $4M. For example, Sheets et al. (2017) investigated 
patients of the University of Missouri Health System who were either enrolled in Medicare or 
Medicaid. The highest annual costs in their dataset were $3,029,833 in 2013 and $4,288,603 in 2012. 
The lack of extremely large payments in our dataset speaks to their infrequency. While we do not 
have similarly large payments in our dataset, we performed stress-tests to demonstrate what 
happens in a capitation contract if they occur for the patients included in the contract. We present 
some hypothetic scenarios in the last four rows of each table. Having a patient with the payments 
presented in these rows would be improbable, but it could occur. These rows represent stress tests 
to our model. Stress tests allow us to see how the results would change if unlikely but possible events 
occur. We much conduct the stress tests manually because the possible but improbable events are 
not contained in our dataset. To conduct the stress tests, we added one or two patients to the panel 




with large medical payments. We combined these results with the median contract result to evaluate 
how one or two very sick patients would impact the results. 
We present below the simulation results for ten scenarios which depend on the size of the 
practice and the degree medical payments reduction which can be expected to occur under different 
capitation arrangements. Five pertain to contracts for a five-PCP practice. Five pertain to contracts 
with a single PCP from the same practice if this physician were operating independently. The five 
scenarios for each practice represent the different levels of health-care utilization reduction identified 
by the Poisson regression analysis. The first scenario assumes no health-care utilization reduction 
occurs. The other four scenarios assume health-care utilization is reduced by the factor of incidence 
comparing the utilization for FFS beneficiaries under the care of a PCP with low capitation levels with 
the utilization of MA beneficiaries under the care of a PCP with varying capitation levels. These 
values are contained in Table 5.7. 
All tables we present in the body of this dissertation assume 20% of the MA beneficiaries 
did not receive a PCP visit. We also present in Appendix C the ten scenarios described above when 
0% and 50% of beneficiaries did not receive a PCP visit. We caution our readers not to draw 
conclusions based on the differing results caused by the proportion of beneficiaries who did not 
receive PCP visits. Our results are based on a single year of empirical Medicare data. We suspect 
not receiving a PCP visit would cause dynamic changes in future years. If a beneficiary did not 
receive a PCP visit this year, issues could grow more rapidly. These issues could manifest in future 
years. When we run these results using theoretical distributions in Chapter 6, we see the tails of the 
distribution of medical payments for beneficiaries who did not receive a PCP visit cause some large 
negative results. 
 5.2.1 Capitation Contract Results for a Five-PCP Practice. The simulation results for the 
capitation contracts for a five-PCP practice are contained in Tables 5.8 – 5.12. All results in the tables 




have been normalized to represent the average results for PCPs within the practice. To do this, we 
divided all contract results by the number of PCPs in the practice. Five contracts are presented in 
each table. Details for the contract are contained in the header rows for the table. Each column of 
the table represents summary statistics for 1,000 replications (effectively giving simulated results for 
1,000 practices operating under the stipulated conditions). The variation within each column is 
caused by the different medical payments assigned to each replication. The differences between 
each column in a table care caused by the differences in the contract terms. Finally, the differences 
between tables are caused by the utilization shifts, number of PCPs in a practice, etc. These 
parameters are provided in the header rows of each table. 
The contract results presented in each table were generated using the same calculations for 
C, R, and E. If a contract has stop loss, the same parameters were used for all stop loss provisions. 
The differences observed within each table are driven by the contract terms. The differences between 
Tables 5.8 – 5.12 are the result of the differing health-care utilization adjustments we applied to the 
simulation. When we talk about gains from capitation contracts, we are assuming this is due to better 
patient health. Future research with longitudinal data will be needed to verify that MA patients under 
the care of capitated PCPs are receiving their needed health care services. 
 When utilization reflects that of a FFS beneficiaries (Table 5.8), every contract without an 
upside resulted in a simulated loss per PCP in excess of $100K. The median contract bearing 80% 
risk with stop loss had a loss of $442K per PCP. If the practice is operated like an FFS practice for 
beneficiaries who have the health-care utilization of an FFS beneficiary, large negative results can 
be expected. These results represent the type of result an FFS PCP could expect with a practice 
consisting of newly transitioned FFS beneficiaries to MA plans unless immediate reductions in 
utilization are achieved. 




 We contrast these results with those for a practice serving MA patients who exhibit health-
care utilization achieved by beneficiaries under the care of MA High Cap PCPs (Table 5.12). The 
median contract bearing 80% risk with stop loss (after accounting for the premium for the stop loss 
coverage) had a gain of $200K per PCP. Of these contracts, 0.0% experienced a loss, and 99.8% 
of them had a contract gain of over $100K per PCP. The median outcome for contracts with 80% 
risk share and stop loss for MA No Cap (Table 5.9), MA Low Cap (Table 5.10), and MA Mid Cap 
(Table 5.11) were a loss of $58K, a loss of $16K, and a gain of $58K, respectively. These contracts 
experienced a loss 88.3%, 64.1%, and 9.8% of the time, respectively. They experienced a loss over 
$100K 20.1%, 5.0%, and 0.0% of the time, respectively and a gain over $100K 0.1%, 0.7%, and 
16.5% of the time, respectively. Lower health-care utilization in other venues can lead to larger gains 
while at the same time diminish the probability of experiencing a loss from the contract. Should a 
loss occur, lower utilization reduces the magnitude. 
 The introduction of stop loss into a contract has two effects. First, the stop loss premium 
(which we agreed to suppress for confidentiality) is a headwind to the contract which must be 
overcome. While the contract outcome is uncertain, the premium paid for stop loss is certain. For 
this reason, contracts bearing more risk were safer when stop loss was included. For the MA Mid 
Cap practice, contracts with stop loss had the following median values per PCP: $58K for S = 80%, 
$11K for S = 60%, -$71K for S=25 with upside only provisions. Likewise, every percentile value was 
greater comparing S=80% to S=60% and S=60% to S=25% with upside only provisions.  
Comparing contracts with 80% risk share with or without stop loss, it appears the results for 
contracts without stop loss are superior with median contract value of $180K compared with $58K 
when stop loss is included. This relationship holds when looking at the number of contracts with a 
deficit and the number with bonuses over $100K. The contract without stop loss had no contracts 
with a loss and 94.7% with a gain over $100K. Whereas contracts with stop loss provisions had 9.8% 




with losses and only 16.5% with bonuses over $100K. These results are driven by the effect of the 
stop loss premium. The benefit of carrying stop loss is observed when we add a single patient to the 
practice with large annual medical payments. If a patient was added who had $5M in medical 
payments, the contract without stop loss experienced a loss of $617K per PCP while the contract 
with stop loss only experienced a loss of $33K per PCP. While beneficiaries using $5M of health 
care for the year is rare, it does occur as shown by Sheets et al. (2017).  
Whether or not to carry stop loss becomes a question of how much financial risk PCPs in 
the practice are willing and able to bear. It also is a question of how much risk MA plans allow PCPs 
to bear. Should the PCP practice back out of a contract due to a large loss, the MA plan would be 
left with three options. The MA plan could sue the PCP to regain the loss. By doing this, the MA plan 
would experience bad press as the large insurance company attacking the small medical practice. 
Likewise, the MA plan could settle the dispute by setting up a long-term repayment plan with the 
practice. Finally, the MA plan could cover the loss. Stop loss provisions protect both the PCP practice 
and the MA plan from large medical payments resulting from very sick patients. 
Notice that, while upside only provisions provide protection from higher medical payments, 
they do not protect against stop loss premiums. Stop loss provisions have a distinctly negative impact 
on upside only contracts. For upside only contracts with stop loss provisions, all of them were 
negative except for 0.6% for the MA High Cap practice. Of these, the largest gain was a mere $9K 
for the MA High Cap practice. In contrast, upside only contracts with no stop loss provisions cannot 
result in a loss for the practice. This provides protection against both insufficiently decreasing health-
care utilization and a few really sick patients. However, the offset is smaller gains when the practice 
successfully decreases health-care utilization. We will compare the results for the S = 80% with stop 
loss contract to the S = 25% upside only contract with no stop loss for the MA High Cap practice. 




The minimum, median, and maximum gains per PCP for these contracts were $85K, $200K, and 
$316K compared to $60K, $102K, and $138K, respectively.  
In industry, upside only contracts are often used to train practices how to bear capitated risk. 
However, many are only short-term. After a few years, practices are expected to bear greater 
capitated risk or return to FFS. We argue the changed financial incentives for practices to drive lower 
utilization can justify long-term upside only contracts. The median gain for upside only contracts with 
no stop loss for No MA Adjustment, MA No Cap, MA Low Cap, MA Mid Cap, and MA High Cap 
practices were $0, $18K, $32K, $56K, and $102K per PCP, respectively. These differences could 




   




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2.2 Comparisons of Results for a Capitation Contract at a One-PCP Practice with 
those at a Five-PCP Practice. We will now compare the capitation contract results for a one-PCP 
practice with those for a five-PCP practice. Moving from five PCPs to one PCP impacts the number 
of patients under care. The five-PCP practice served 636 MA patients in 2016. However, the single 
PCP only served 148 patients in 2016. With fewer patients and physicians, there is less opportunity 
to reduce risk through diversification. Evaluating contracts with S = 80% with stop loss for a five PCP 
and one PCP MA High Cap practice, we observe the following minimum, median, and maximum 
contract results (five PCP presented first): gain of $85K, gain of $200K, and gain of $316K compared 
with a loss of $83K, a gain of $266K, and a gain of $529K, respectively. 
Stop loss becomes much more important for a single PCP practice. We compare the impact 
of adding a $5M patient in the contracts with S = 80% with and without stop loss for the single PCP 
MA High Cap practice. The contract without stop loss experienced a loss of $3.6M opposed to a loss 
of $190K with stop loss. These results per PCP for a five PCP MA High Cap practice were a loss of 
$471K without stop loss and a gain of $108K with stop loss. 
Upside only contracts, however, could result in large bonuses for the single PCP MA High 
Cap practice. The minimum, median, and maximum contracts resulted in gains of $0, $129K, and 
$213K, respectively. The equivalent five PCP practice had minimum, median, and maximum values 
with gains of $60K, $102K, and $138K respectively. The median values for upside only contracts 
with single PCP with No MA Adjustment, MA No Cap, MA Low Cap, MA Mid Cap, and MA High Cap 
practices were gains of $0, $21K, $39K, $70K, and $129K, respectively. Of these contracts, 0.0%, 
3.6%, 7.3%, 23.5%, and 82.5% experienced gains over $100K, respectively. Based on these results, 
an upside only contract with S=25% with no stop loss could provide strong financial incentives to 
PCPs to lower health-care utilization in other venues. These financial incentives would be achieved 
without exposing the practice to financial risk. 




In contrast, contracts for the single PCP MA Mid Cap practice with S = 80% and stop loss 
experience both large gains and large losses. The minimum, median, and maximum contracts 
resulted in a loss of $308K, a gain of $82K, and a gain of $398K, respectively. The equivalent five 
PCP practice had minimum, median, and maximum values with a loss of $76K, a gain of $58K, and 
a gain of $204K, respectively. The median values for contracts with S = 80% and stop loss for single 
PCP No MA Adjustment, MA No Cap, MA Low Cap, MA Mid Cap, and MA High Cap practices were 
a loss of $553K, a loss of $67K, a loss of $15K, a gain of $82K, and a gain of $266K, respectively. 
Of these contracts 99.7%, 39.6%, 25.1%, 6.6%, and 0.0% experienced losses over $100K; 100.0%, 
66.4%, 53.9%, 24.2%, and 1.1% experience losses; and 0.0%, 11.0%, 20.2%, 44.7%, and 94.8% 
experienced gains over $100K, respectively. Unless a single PCP is proficient at decreasing health-























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2.3 Discussion of Capitation Contract Results. First, we remind our readers of a few 
lessons from prior capitation attempts. Rosenthal et al. (2001) studied physician organizations in 
California. Between 1998 and 2001, 31 of the 153 organizations studied failed financially. During this 
time in California the average practice employed 343 physicians. Based on the comparisons we 
make between a single PCP and five PCP practices, the impact of a single care decision diminishes 
as the practice grows. Also, to experience gains from a Medicare capitation contract, health-care 
utilization must be reduced significantly for the patients under the care of the practice. When no 
reductions are made, there were consistently large losses for the practices. Table 5.18 shows the 
impact of a $10,000 utilization reduction for a beneficiary for a single physician where the practice 
bear 80% and 25% risk before stop loss reductions. As can be seen, a $10,000 health-care utilization 
reduction would have only had a $23 impact to a single physician in a practice with 343 physicians 
that bears 80% risk. This would not provide much if any financial incentive to a physician.  
Table 5.18 
Capitation Impact of a $10,000 Reduction to a Single Physician 
Physicians in the Practice Single Physician Impact S=80% Single Physician Impact S=25% 
   
1 $8,000 $2,500 
   
5 $1,600 $500 
   
10 $800 $250 
   
30 $267 $83 
   
50 $160 $50 
   
100 $80 $25 
   
343 $23 $7 
   
 




We suspect there is an optimal practice size for capitated contracts. If the practice is too 
small, the practice will be unable to bear much capitated risk without significant financial exposure. 
Likewise, if the practice is too large, personal financial incentives of PCPs are diminished. This 
means the health-care utilization reductions would likely be diminished. More research is needed to 
determine if there is an effective size range for capitated practices for differing levels of risk sharing. 
In another study, Simon and Emmons (1997) found use of capitation was widespread. More 
than 33 percent of physician practices had at least one capitated contract. Of these practices, nearly 
20 percent of revenue was capitated. Many of the contracts did not have stop loss provisions. Of the 
physicians surveyed, 54% did not know if there were stop-loss provisions in their contracts. These 
responses did not vary greatly by practice size. While 59 percent of practices of 50 physicians or 
more carried stop-loss, only 5 percent of solo physicians carried stop-loss.  
 The combination of our analysis with the findings of Simon and Emmons (1997) shows the 
vulnerability of healthcare providers to the risks associated with capitation contracts. In the 1990s 
and early 2000s, capitation was widespread, but the physicians in these contracts likely did not 
understand their financial exposure. While it appears safer to only have a small portion of the revenue 
capitated, how this is done can either lead to safety or greater exposure. If the practice only has a 
few patients in capitation contracts, but the risk share is large (80% risk share), the PCPs would have 
experienced tremendous exposure. In contrast, the PCPs would have had greater safety if they had 
limited financial exposure (25% risk share upside-only) on more patients. This was demonstrated 
with our comparison of a five PCP practice with a single PCP practice. 
 Also, physicians were ignorant of the impact of stop loss for their contracts. For the practices 
with 59 or more physicians, there would have been little need for stop loss if they effectively reduced 
health-care utilization. However, solo physicians were significantly exposed by not carrying stop loss. 
Regardless of whether stop loss was carried or not, our analysis shows stop loss can have a large 




impact on results of a capitation contract. Either way, physicians should understand the costs and 
benefits of carrying stop loss. 
 Given our analysis and prior research, we do not find it surprising that so many capitated 
physician practices failed financially in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Our analysis helps inform 
physicians how to experience the benefits from capitation contracts without overexposure to their 
risks. We also demonstrate the interplay that occurs between several elements of the contracts. This 
research should help physicians from repeating the same mistakes from the past. 
5.2.4 Analysis Advantages and Limitations. The approach we took with the analysis has 
several benefits and limitations. First, we used an empirical distribution of the total annual medial 
payments for FFS beneficiaries to assign total annual medical payments to MA beneficiaries. We 
selected this approach for an initial investigation because health care payment data are not normally 
distributed. This is seen in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. By using empirical distributions of medical payments 
for individual beneficiaries we were able to simulate accrual of costs of different patient segments 
based on different patient characteristics, whether they had a primary care visit, and capitation level 
of the primary care practice. We were able to maintain significant experimental control. We were able 
to use the same primary care practice beneficiaries and simply adjust their payments. This enabled 
us to keep the demographics of the beneficiaries constant. In turn, the results observed were caused 
by our adjusted experimental variables. 
However, to ensure a representative empirical distribution, we had to maintain large sample 
sizes within each of our groups and rely on just a few explanatory factors of service utilization. We 
were only able to use MedicaidInd, Gender, and MaxChScoreGroup to match an MA beneficiary with 
the appropriate distribution of medical payments for FFS beneficiaries. When we included each of 
the variables identified in Chapter 4 to affect utilization, sample sizes for many groups were too small. 
This would have caused issues as the distribution for the sample in each group would not reflect the 




distribution for the population of beneficiaries with these characteristics. This caused us not to include 
all the variables identified in Chapter 4 to affect health-care utilization. Also, empirical distributions 
can over or underrepresent extreme values. 
Also, our Poisson regression results from Chapter 4 show MA beneficiaries under the care 
of capitated PCPs exhibit lower utilization than FFS beneficiaries. To estimate these effects, we 
simply multiplied the medical payments from each venue by the factors of incidence identified in 
Chapter 4. This approach is rudimentary and has a couple issues. First, the range of outcomes is 
truncated. If we reduced an FFS range of $0 to $600,000 by a factor of 0.50, we would be left with a 
range of $0 to $300,000. This is not ideal because change in distribution may not exhibit scale effects 
only. While we observed significant reductions for MA beneficiaries, there is no guarantee the 
maximum values will always follow the same reductions. This would limit some of the variation 
observed in the simulation results. Also, with this approach we are assuming medical payments are 
reduced by the same percentage as visit count reductions. This may or may not be true. At least two 
other factors could impact medical payments. First, intensity of care could be different per visit. 
Second, some facilities providing the same care could be less expensive than others. For our 
analysis, we are holding these two factors constant. Future research will be needed to investigate 
the impact of these factors. 
Next, applying the MA reductions in this way almost guarantee better aggregate results for 
the capitation contracts as the FFS payments are reduced by larger amounts. Applying the MA 
reductions were important for demonstration purposes, but the specific contract values are 
questionable. The need to reduce health-care utilization holds. However, more accurate statistical 
methods will be needed to have confidence in the specific contract results. 
To address some of these concerns, we extend our analysis in the next two chapters. In 
Chapter 6, we will use an alternate method to estimate the medical payments for each beneficiary. 




We will determine the total annual medical payments for each beneficiary using theoretical probability 
distributions. We will then allocate these payments to each venue and use the MA adjustment factors 
to reduce the payments. This will be the only input change for the capitation calculations.  
In Chapter 7, we will predict the total medical payments using a two-step approach. First, 
we will simulate the number of visits to each health care venue for each beneficiary using the Poisson 
regression equations from Chapter 4. Then, we will use a theoretical distribution of payments per 
visit for each venue to apply a cost per visit. Finally, we will sum these medical payments as an input 
for our capitation contract analysis. The next two chapters will provide more robust statistical analysis 
to supplement our findings from Chapter 5. 
   




Chapter 6: Simulation of Capitation Contracts Using Theoretical Distributions of Medical 
Encounters and Related Payments 
 We now investigate how the results from Chapter 5 change as we use theoretical 
distributions to calculate medical payments. All other details for the calculations are the same as 
those used in Chapter 5. The calculations still used the formulas below. However, we used a different 
method to calculate the variable E. In Chapter 5, we selected total medical payments from an 
empirical distribution of total medical payments for FFS beneficiaries. We then crudely adjusted 
these payments using an MA Adjustment Factor. In this chapter, we used theoretical distributions of 
total medical payments. We then allocated these total payments to each venue and calculate the 
deductible/copayment for each beneficiary. Finally, we reduced these payments by using the MA 
Adjustment Factors identified previously. 
PCP Earnings = ([C – (C * R)] – E) * S. 
C = (Base Rate * MRA factor * DIF) * (1 – CIA). 
 
6.1 Capitation Contract Analysis Details 
Similar to Chapter 5, we ran a Monte Carlo simulation for the analysis in this chapter. We 
compiled the information required for the calculation using a custom database in SAS. In this section, 
we provide an overview of the high-level steps of the process. The following sections provide details 
for each piece of the analysis. 
6.1.1 High-Level Calculation Steps.  
1. We compiled the base data for the analysis from the annual beneficiary fitting and testing 
tables. These tables contained descriptive data for all beneficiaries and medical payments 
for FFS beneficiaries. 




2. We calculated a county base rate and risk factor using total annual medical payments for 
FFS beneficiaries. This enabled us to calculate a payment from CMS to the MA plan. 
3. We created two tables containing an empirical distribution of total annual medical payments 
for FFS beneficiaries. One table contained the distribution for beneficiaries who received a 
PCP visit. The other table contained the distribution for beneficiaries who did not receive a 
PCP visit. Groups in these tables were identified by MedicaidInd, Gender, and 
MaxChScoreGroup. Summary Statistics for these tables were contained in Tables 6.1 and 
6.2. 
4. We used the Input Analyzer built into Arena v14.7 to determine a theoretical distribution for 
each group’s total annual medical payments. 
5. We used the tables in Step 3 to determine the proportion of medical payments for each 
group for each venue and copayment/deductibles. 
6. We assigned medical payments to each MA beneficiary receiving care from the practice 
using the theoretical distributions from step 4. We identified the proper distribution group 
using MedicaidInd, Gender, and MaxChScoreGroup. We ran 1,000 replications for each 
beneficiary to capture variations in medical payments. 
7. We allocated the total medical payments to each venue using the tables created in step 5. 
8. We adjusted the FFS medical payments by an MA Adjustment Factor to capture changes in 
health-care utilization. 
9. We calculated the capitation contract for the practice for each replication. 
10. We conducted stress tests to evaluate the impact of low probability events. 
11. We compiled summary statistics for the 1,000 replications of each scenario. These statistics 
are presented in the results tables. 




6.1.2 Estimating Total Medical Payments for MA Beneficiaries. Based on the variable 
definitions contained in Table 5.2, we calculate the total medical payments made for each FFS 
beneficiary. We then used the Input Analyzer built into Arena v14.7 to determine a theoretical 
distribution of total medical payments for each group of beneficiaries. These groups were identified 
using MedicaidInd, Gender, and MaxChScoreGroup. We allocated the total payments to each venue: 
inpatient, outpatient, carrier, home health agency, and skilled nursing facility. We also applied the 
total copayments/deductibles for each beneficiary using historic trends.  
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 contain the theoretical distributions identified by Arena for each group. 
The distribution formulas are presented in the Arena Expression column. These expressions 
represent the formulas Arena provides. The Square Error column represents the sum of squares of 
differences between the actual and fitted relative frequencies for the intervals used when fitting the 
data. Each distribution used has a minimum value of zero and does not have a maximum value. The 
one exception is the Beta distribution which was selected for Medicaid beneficiaries with Charlson 
Scores of zero who did not receive a PCP visit. This distribution has a minimum value of zero and a 
maximum value of one, effectively distributing the cost between $0 and $75,000 in this case. 
Each Arena Expression was translated to the corresponding expression in SAS. These 
translations are provided in Table 6.3. The lognormal distribution required formulas to convert the 
Arena expression using log mean and log standard deviation to the SAS expression which uses 
mean and standard deviation. The formulas are found below. Table 6.4 contains a test for the 
distribution conversions. To test the conversions, we created a distribution in SAS using the 
converted expression with 10,000 replications. We tested the theoretical distributions of the SAS 
distributions by using the Input Analyzer in Arena. We verified the distributions in Arena had the 
same distribution with similar parameters as the original distribution. The Arena documentation was 




found in Kelton, Sadowski, and Zupick (2015). The SAS documentation was found in the SAS 
documentation online (Documentation.SAS.com, 2021a, 2021b). 
𝜇𝐿 = LogMean. 





2 +  𝜇𝐿
2
) 
σ = √ln (
𝜎𝐿




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Distribution Translations from Arena to SAS 
 
Table 6.4 




Distribution Arena Expression SAS Expression
Beta Coefficient * BETA(Beta, Alpha)  Coefficient * Quantile('beta', RandomNumber, Beta, Alpha) 
Exponential EXPO(Mean)  Quantile('exponential', RandomNumber, Mean) 
Gamma GAMM(Beta, Alpha)  Quantile('gamma', RandomNumber, Alpha, Beta) 
Lognormal LOGN(LogMean, LogStdDev)  Quantile('lognormal', RandomNumber, Mean, StdDev) 












0 F 0 LOGN(3640, 7350) LOGN(3640, 7440)        0.000061 
0 F 5-7 LOGN(24300, 51900) LOGN(21900, 42700)        0.000084 
0 F Over 7 EXPO(37400) EXPO(36500)        0.000119 
1 F Over 7 GAMM(36700, 1.27) GAMM(34100, 1.32)        0.000114 
1 M Over 7 WEIB(47100, 1.11) WEIB(46900, 1.16)        0.000163 
1 F 0 75000*BETA(0.581, 21.3) 75000*BETA(0.614, 21.9)        0.000090 




We simulated the total medical payments for each beneficiary 1,000 times. For each 
beneficiary, we identified the proper theoretical distribution based on the beneficiary’s MedicaidInd, 
Gender, and MaxChScoreGroup. Then for each replication, we used the Quantile function in SAS to 
generate the beneficiary’s total medical payments. We then allocated these total medical payments 
to the five venues using the percentages found in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. In these tables DedCoinsPct 
corresponds to the percentage of the total medical payment that was paid by FFS beneficiaries. 
IPPmtPct, OPPmtPct, CARRPmtPct, HHAPmtPct, and SNFPmtPct represent the proportion of total 
medical payments that were incurred at inpatient, outpatient, carrier, home health, and skilled nursing 
facility venues, respectively.  
Once the payments were allocated, we reduced the payments by the MA Adjustment Factors 
contained in Table 6.7 similar to Chapter 5. Finally, we applied a maximum annual total medical 
payment for each beneficiary. If the total adjusted medical payments exceeded $5M, we reduced the 
medical payments to $5M. This ensured the theoretical distributions did not generate medical 
payments that are unrealistic. For example, it is unrealistic for a single beneficiary to incur $100M of 
medical payments for a single year through traditional venues. We set the maximum payment to $5M 
based on industry experience. Future research could be conducted to investigate the proper 
maximum annual medical payment. Please note, we ran our analysis with and without the $5M 
maximum payment. We observed the same results. Therefore, this threshold was not reached in our 
analysis. The adjusted medical payments were then used as an input for the capitation calculations 
discussed in Chapter 5. All other parameters were kept the same with the same experimental 
variations. 
  


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.2 Capitation Simulation Results 
We ran the above simulations with several different parameters. In this section, we present 
these results and discuss the implications. In general, the same conclusions can be drawn from the 
analysis in this chapter as those from Chapter 5. The median and maximum contract values are 
similar between this chapter and Chapter 5. However, using theoretical results in more extreme 
negative results. Using theoretical distributions also enabled us to observe the possible impact if a 
PCP did not have visits with all patients.  
 6.2.1 Capitation Contract Results for a Five-PCP Practice. The simulation results for the 
capitation contracts for a five PCP practice are contained in Tables 6.8 – 6.14. Similar to Chapter 5, 
all results in the tables have been normalized to reflect the results of a single PCP within the practice. 
To do this, we divided all contract results by the number of PCPs in the practice. Five contracts are 
presented in each table. Details for the contract are contained in the header rows for the table. Each 
column of the table represents summary statistics for 1,000 replications (effectively giving simulated 
results for 1,000 practices operating under the stipulated conditions). The variation within each 
column is caused by the different medical payments assigned to each replication. The differences 
between each column in a table care caused by the differences in the contract terms. Finally, the 
differences between tables are caused by the utilization shifts, number of PCPs in a practice, etc. 
These parameters are provided in the header rows of each table. 
The contract results presented in each table were generated using the same calculations for 
C, R, and E. If a contract has stop loss, the same parameters were used for all stop loss provisions. 
The differences observed within each table are driven by the contract terms. The differences between 
Tables 6.8 – 6.12 are the result of the differing health-care utilization adjustments we applied to the 
simulation. The differences between Tables 6.12 – 6.14 are caused by the proportion of patients who 




received a PCP visit in the year. Future research with longitudinal data will be needed to verify MA 
patients under the care of capitated PCPs are receiving their needed health care services. 
 Again, lower health-care utilization drove positive contract results. When utilization reflects 
that of an FFS beneficiary (Table 6.8), every contract without an upside only provision had a result 
of over a $100K loss per PCP. The median contract bearing 80% risk with stop loss had a loss of 
$437K per PCP. The same contract and utilization shift from Chapter 5, resulted in a $442K median 
loss per PCP. These results represent the type of result an FFS PCP could expect with a practice 
consisting of newly transitioned FFS beneficiaries to MA plans. If the practice is operated like an FFS 
practice for beneficiaries who have the health-care utilization of an FFS beneficiary, large negative 
results would likely result. 
 We contrast these results with those for practices serving MA patients who exhibit health-
care utilization achieved by beneficiaries under the care of MA High Cap PCPs (Table 6.12). The 
median contract bearing 80% risk with stop loss had a gain of $173K per PCP. The same contract 
and utilization shift from Chapter 5, resulted in a $200K median gain per PCP. Of these contracts 
based on the analysis this chapter, 0.1% experienced a loss over $100K, and 93.8% of them had a 
contract gain of over $100K per PCP. The median outcome for contracts with 80% risk share and 
stop loss for MA No Cap (Table 6.9), MA Low Cap (Table 6.10), and MA Mid Cap (Table 6.11) were 
a loss of $72K, a loss of $32K, and a gain of $38K, respectively. These contracts experienced a loss 
89.9%, 74.1%, and 23.6% of the time, respectively. They experienced a loss over $100K 31.6%, 
11.6%, and 0.7% of the time, respectively and a gain over $100K 0.0%, 0.4%, and 11.5% of the time, 
respectively. Decreasing health-care utilization in other venues can lead to larger gains while at the 
same time decrease the probability of experiencing a loss from the contract. Should a loss occur, 
lowering utilization corresponds to the loss being smaller. 




 The minimum values for contract outcomes vary greatly between the analysis in this chapter 
and the analysis from Chapter 5. For contracts bearing 80% risk with stop loss, the MA High Cap 
practice had a minimum contract value of a loss of $230K. In contrast, the minimum contract value 
for this practice with the same contract in Chapter 5 was a gain of $85K. The tail of the theoretical 
distribution is capturing larger medical payments resulting in a more extreme minimum value. 
Minimum contract values for FFS, No Cap, Low Cap, and Mid Cap practices between this chapter 
and Chapter 5 were a loss of $967K compared to a loss of $665K for FFS, a loss $469K compared 
to a loss of $217K for No Cap, a loss of $430K compared to a loss of $166K for Low Cap, and a loss 
of $360K compared with a loss of $76K for Mid Cap.  
 These results are magnified when we evaluate contracts with 80% risk share and no stop 
loss. The minimum contract result for an MA High Cap practice in this chapter was a loss of $2.624M 
compared with a gain of $194K. Minimum contract values for FFS, No Cap, Low Cap, and Mid Cap 
practices between this chapter and Chapter 5 were a loss of $4.790M compared to a loss of $610K 
for FFS, a loss $2.892M compared to a loss of $123K for No Cap, a loss of $2.849M compared to a 
loss of $69K for Low Cap, and a loss of $2.771M compared with a loss of $31K for Mid Cap. The 
results from this chapter demonstrate the impact of stop loss. If an MA High Cap PCP were to 
experience a loss from the contract of $230K, it would be painful. Significant FFS revenue would be 
needed to offset the contract loss. However, if the PCP lost $2.624M, the impact to the PCP could 
be catastrophic. The results in this chapter demonstrate the protection stop loss provides PCPs. 
While it is expensive, not carrying stop loss could cause PCPs to potentially lose their practices and 
homes. 
 The analysis in this chapter revealed a relationship we expected to see in the last chapter, 
but it did not emerge with those results. The analysis in Chapter 5 showed PCPs performed better 
financially with their contracts if they had more beneficiaries who did not receive a PCP visit. This 




result was surprising, but we cautioned our readers these results were likely due to data limitations. 
These limitations were revealed when we used theoretical distributions. It appears a larger portion 
of the tail of the distribution was truncated for beneficiaries who did not receive a PCP visit compared 
with beneficiaries who did receive a PCP visit. This is revealed when we compare the results for 
contracts for PCPs who served varying proportions of beneficiaries who receive PCP visits.  
 To make these comparisons, we present the results for the MA High Cap practice who have 
0%, 20%, and 50% of its patients who did not receive a PCP visit. Similar results hold for each of the 
other practices. The reader can view the additional tables for this analysis in Appendix D. When 
evaluating the minimum, median, and maximum contract results for a contract with 80% risk share 
and stop loss, we observe these values for 0%, 20%, and 50% of patients without a PCP visit: gains 
of $80K, 217K, and $338K for 0%; a loss of $230K, a gain of $173K, and a gain of $296K for 20%; 
and a loss of $237K, a gain of $113K, and a gain of $240K for 50%. When evaluating these results 
without stoploss, we have the following: gains of $91K, 329K, and 464K for 0%; a loss of $2.624M, 
a gain of $273K, and a gain of $422K for 20%; and a loss of $2,631K, a gain of $189K, and a gain 
of $366K for 50%.  
 Notice the extreme negative values are not seen for the practice that serves patients who 
all receive a PCP visit. However, this changes when 20% and 50% of patients do not receive PCP 
visits. In the model, this causes the medical payments for these patients to be generated from the 
theoretical distributions for beneficiaries who did not receive a PCP visit. The extreme negative 
results demonstrate the probability of large medical payments is more likely for beneficiaries who do 
not receive a PCP visit. Also notice the minimum values are similar between 20% and 50%. This 
shows there are likely only a few beneficiaries who have significant medical payments. 
 
  






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.2.2 Comparisons of Capitation Contract Results for a One-PCP Practice with those 
of a Five-PCP Practice. We will now compare the capitation contract results for a one PCP practice 
with those for a five PCP practice. Tables 6.15 - 6.19 contain the contract results for a single PCP 
practice with No MA Adjustment, MA No Cap, MA Low Cap, MA Mid Cap, and MA High Cap 
adjustments of health-care utilization. Tables 6.19 – 6.21 contain the contract results for an MA High 
Cap single PCP practice when different proportions of patient have a PCP visit. Moving from five 
PCPs to one PCP impacts the number of patients under care. The five PCP practice served 636 MA 
patients in 2016. However, the single PCP only served 148 patients in 2016. Serving fewer patients 
magnifies capitation results. Evaluating contracts with S = 80% with stop loss for a five PCP and one 
PCP MA High Cap practice, we observe the following minimum, median, and maximum contract 
results (five PCP presented first): loss of $230K, gain of $174K, and gain of $296K compared with a 
loss of $205K, a gain of $248K, and a gain of $507K, respectively. Notice the five PCP practice had 
a larger negative minimum contract value. This would be caused by one or more beneficiaries with 
large medical payments being served by other PCPs in the practice. These beneficiaries impacted 
the five PCP practice, but they did not impact the one PCP practice. 
Again, stop loss is important for a single PCP practice. We compare the impact of adding a 
$5M patient in the contracts with S = 80% with and without stop loss for the single PCP MA High 
Cap practice. The contract without stop loss experienced a loss of $3.6M opposed to a loss of $208K 
with stop loss. These results per PCP for a five PCP MA High Cap practice were a loss of $523K 
without stop loss and a gain of $82K with stop loss. 
Upside only contracts could result in large bonuses for the single PCP MA High Cap practice. 
The minimum, median, and maximum contracts resulted in gains of $0, $117K, and $206K, 
respectively. The equivalent five PCP practice had minimum, median, and maximum values with 
gains of $0K, $85K, and $132K respectively. The median values for upside only contracts with single 




PCP with No MA Adjustment, MA No Cap, MA Low Cap, MA Mid Cap, and MA High Cap practices 
were gains of $0, $12K, $29K, $60K, and $117K, respectively. Of these contracts, 0.0%, 4.1%, 7.5%, 
20.4%, and 63.7% experienced gains over $100K, respectively. Based on these results, an upside 
only contract with S=25% with no stop loss could provide strong financial incentives to PCPs to lower 
health-care utilization in other venues. These financial incentives would be achieved without 
exposing the practice to financial risk. 
In contrast, contracts for the single PCP MA Mid Cap practice with S = 80% and stop loss 
experience both large gains and large losses. The minimum, median, and maximum contracts 
resulted in a loss of $430K, a gain of $76K, and a gain of $402K, respectively. The equivalent five 
PCP practice had minimum, median, and maximum values with a loss of $360K, a gain of $38K, and 
a gain of $189K, respectively. The median values for single PCP contracts with S = 80% and stop 
loss for single PCP No MA Adjustment, MA No Cap, MA Low Cap, MA Mid Cap, and MA High Cap 
practices were a loss of $525K, a loss of $64K, a loss of $15K, a gain of $76K, and a gain of $248K, 
respectively. Of these contracts 99.5%, 40.7%, 28.2%, 9.8%, and 0.4% experienced losses over 
$100K; 100.0%, 67.3%, 53.8%, 29.5%, and 2.5% experience losses; and 0.0%, 12.7%, 21.6%, 
43.0%, and 88.6% experienced gains over $100K, respectively. Unless a single PCP is proficient at 
decreasing health-care utilization in other venues, this type of contract will likely place excessive 
financial risk on the practice. Even if the PCP is successful, random variations in health-care 
utilization could cause the PCP to experience losses from the capitation contract. 
We saw similar results as the five PCP practice evaluating the proportion of patients have a 
PCP visit. For this comparison, we present the results for a 25% risk share contract with upside only 
provisions with no stop loss. We are comparing the results for the practice when 0%, 20%, and 50% 
of the patients under care do not receive a PCP visit. The minimum, median, and maximum contract 
outcomes for a MA High Cap practice with one PCP are as follows: gains of $0, $133K, and $224K 




for 0%; gains of $0K, $117, and $206K for 20%; and gains of $0K, 83K, and 198K. In this scenario, 
the upside only capitation contracts incentivize PCPs to have a visit with all patients included in the 
contract.  






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.2.3 Analysis Advantages and Limitations. The approach we took with the analysis in 
this chapter has several benefits and limitations. We expanded on the analysis conducted in Chapter 
5 by using theoretical probability distributions for total medical payments. This enabled us to capture 
low probability but very high annual medical payments we did not observe in the CMS data for 2016. 
We were also able to maintain significant experimental control. We were able to use the same 
primary care practice beneficiaries and simply adjust their payments by the MA Adjustment Factors. 
This enabled us to keep the demographics of the beneficiaries consistent. In turn, the results 
observed were caused by our adjusted experimental variables. 
The theoretical distributions for most beneficiaries range from [0,+∞). This alleviates a 
limitation we experienced in Chapter 5. When we multiply our FFS medical payments by a factor, 
our range of payments is preserved. In other words, when we multiply the FFS range of [0,+∞) by 
0.5, the resulting range is still [0,+∞). However, the upper range of these distributions is unrealistic. 
There are physical limitations that would prevent annual medical payments from exceeding a certain 
level. For example, there is simply not enough time in the year for a single patient to incur $100M in 
medical payments through traditional venues. To address this concern, we implemented an upper 
limit of $5M for the post adjusted medical payments. We ran the analysis with and without this 
restriction and received the same values. This shows the upper limit was not met in our analysis. 
Additional research could be performed to determine what an appropriate upper limit would be. 
Again, applying the MA reductions in this way guarantee better aggregate results for the 
capitation contracts as the FFS payments are reduced by larger percentages. Applying the MA 
reductions were important for demonstration purposes, but the specific contract values are 
questionable. The need to reduce health-care utilization holds. However, more accurate statistical 
methods will be needed to have confidence in specific contract results. 




Again, we did not consider all variables that correlate with lower utilization, which we 
identified in Chapter 4. To maintain sample size when determining the theoretical distributions, we 
only considered combinations of MedicaidInd, Gender, and MaxChScoreGroup. We used these 
combinations to define theoretical distributions. We then matched MA beneficiaries with the 
appropriate distribution using the same variables.  
To address some of these concerns, we extend our analysis in the next chapter. In Chapter 
7, we shall use an alternate method to estimate the medical payments for each beneficiary. We shall 
predict the total medical payments using a two-step approach. First, we shall simulate the number 
of visits to each health care venue for each beneficiary using the Poisson regression equations from 
Chapter 4. Then, we shall use a theoretical distribution of payments per visit for each venue to apply 
a cost to each simulated visit. The sum of these payments is the total cost of medical payments for 
a beneficiary for the year. This provides more robust statistical analysis to cross-validate our findings 
from Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
  




Chapter 7: Capitation Contract Simulation by Simulating Visits and Cost per Visit 
In this chapter we further refine the simulations conducted in Chapters 5 and 6. We used the 
Poisson regression models developed in Chapter 4 to simulate the number of visits to each health 
care venue. We then assigned a cost for each visit using a theoretical distribution of the cost of visits 
for each venue. All other details for the calculations are the same as those used in Chapter 5. The 
calculations still used the formulas below. However, we used a different method to calculate the 
variable E. In Chapter 5, we selected total medical payments from an empirical distribution for FFS 
medical payments. We then adjusted these payments using an MA Adjustment Factor. In this 
chapter, we used a Poisson distribution to predict the number of events. Then, we applied unadjusted 
FFS costs per visits. This better aligns with the findings of Curto et al. (2019), who investigated 
differences in total payments between MA and FFS beneficiaries. They found utilization shifts drove 
the differences, but reimbursement rates were similar. For this analysis, we are assuming the 
intensity of each visit is similar between MA and FFS beneficiaries. Future research will be needed 
to investigate this assumption.  
PCP Earnings = ([C – (C * R)] – E) * S. 
C = (Base Rate * MRA factor * DIF) * (1 – CIA). 
Finally, in this chapter we assume all beneficiaries under the care of the practice received a 
PCP visit. Each beneficiary is assigned to the PCP they visited in 2016. From the Poisson regression 
model, we calculate the expected number of visits to each venue for each beneficiary and then 
generate the simulated number of visits using a Poisson distribution with that mean. To assemble 
our practices, we determine the number of beneficiaries under care for FFS Low Cap, MA Low Cap, 
MA Mid Cap, and MA High Cap PCPs. We then, selected five PCPs in each category with the goal 
to have a total beneficiary count similar to those in Chapters 5 and 6. We also selected PCPs who 
serve the majority of beneficiaries with Hospital Access Level 1. This means their beneficiaries live 




in counties where a general hospital is located. However, we did not control for other variables. While 
we are simulating total medical payments with a more robust method, we lose some experimental 
control with this approach. In Chapters 5 and 6, we were able to keep the beneficiaries constant. 
Therefore, differences in results were driven by the manipulations we performed. In Chapter 7, our 
manipulation was changing the beneficiaries in the practice. This enabled us to capture the PCP 
capitation level variables, but in the process, many other demographic variables for the beneficiaries 
changed. 
Table 7.1 contains the details for the practices we used in this analysis. The MA Mixed Cap 
practice is the practice we used for analysis in Chapters 5 and 6. This practice has four of five PCPs 
who are classified as High Cap. The last PCP is classified as No Cap. Of the beneficiaries in the 
practice, 624 of the 636 were served by PCPs classified as High Cap. This practice is included to 
cross-validate the results from Chapters 5 and 6. Finally, in this chapter, we found PCPs who have 
large patient panels. We evaluate their results to distinguish between the effects of more PCPs in a 
practice and larger patient panels. Notice we are not evaluating an MA No Cap practice. Because 
we defined our proxy variables based on the number of MA patients under care, these practices did 
not have sufficient MA patients to provide a meaningful comparison. Likewise, when we evaluate 
large and very large single PCP practices, we only evaluated FFS Low Cap, MA Mid Cap, and MA 
High Cap PCPs.  
  





Practice Details for Capitation Simulation Using Events & Cost per Event 
 
7.1 Capitation Contract Analysis Details 
Similar to Chapters 5 and 6, we ran a Monte Carlo simulation for this analysis. We compiled 
the information required for the calculations using a custom database in SAS. In this section, we 
provide an overview of the high-level steps of the process. The following sections provide details for 
each piece of the analysis. 
7.1.1 High-Level Calculation Steps.  
1. We compiled the base data for the analysis from the annual beneficiary fitting and testing 
tables. These tables contained descriptive data for all beneficiaries and medical payments 
for FFS beneficiaries. 
2. We calculated a county base rate and risk factor using total annual medical payments for 
FFS beneficiaries. This enabled us to calculate a payment from CMS to the MA plan. 






FFS Low Cap 5 619 99.03%
MA Low Cap 5 630 98.25%
MA Mid Cap 5 628 100.00%
MA Mixed Cap 5 634 100.00%
MA High Cap 5 634 100.00%
FFS Low Cap 1 134 98.51%
MA Low Cap 1 131 100.00%
MA Mid Cap 1 127 100.00%
MA Mixed Cap 1 147 100.00%
MA High Cap 1 132 100.00%
Large FFS Low Cap 1 257 99.61%
Large MA Mid Cap 1 251 100.00%
Large MA High Cap 1 255 100.00%
Very Large FFS Low Cap 1 410 96.59%
Very Large MA Mid Cap 1 405 99.75%
Very Large MA High Cap 1 414 100.00%




3. We exported a list of visit costs for each venue. We used the Input Analyzer in Arena to 
determine the distribution of the cost per visit for each venue. 
4. We used the Poisson regression models developed in Chapter 4 to determine the mean 
count of visits to each health care venue for each beneficiary. 
5. We simulated the number of visits to each venue for each beneficiary using a Poisson 
distribution with a mean value that was calculated in Step 4. 
6. We used the distributions for cost per visit calculated in Step 3 to assign a cost for each visit 
from Step 5. 
7. We ran 1,000 replications for each beneficiary to capture variations in medical payments. 
8. We used these medical payments from Step 7 in the capitation calculations from Chapter 5. 
9. We calculated the capitation contract for the practice for each replication. 
10. We conducted stress tests to evaluate the impact of low probability events. 
11. We compiled summary statistics for the 1,000 replications of each scenario. These statistics 
are presented in the results tables. 
7.1.2 Estimating Medical Payments for MA Beneficiaries. We began our analysis by 
compiling a list of costs per visit for each venue. We used the same definition of a visit to each venue 
as we used in Chapter 4. For each list, we determined the percentage of visits which had a $0 
medical payment. These visits likely correspond to rejected claims, billing errors, etc. We used the 
Input Analyzer built into Arena v14.7 to determine a theoretical distribution of the cost per visit for 
each venue. We only included non-zero medical payments in this analysis. Table 7.2 contains the 
details of these distributions. We only used the records from the fitting sample for this analysis. 
  





Cost Per Visit Theoretical Probability Distributions 
 
 Next, we calculated the expected number of visits for each beneficiary to each venue. To do 
this, we took the exponential of the log(mean) of the Poisson distribution from the Poisson regression 
model output of the model for each beneficiary. We used the models developed in Chapter 4 for this 
analysis. The models can be found in Tables 7.3 – 7.7 for reference. Then for each beneficiary, we 
simulated the number of visits to each venue using a Poisson distribution with the mean values we 
calculated for each beneficiary.  
 For each visit, we first determined if the visit would receive a payment. Each venue had a 
portion of visits that resulted in no payment. We assumed these proportions were constant for all 
beneficiaries. The proportion of non-zero payments can be found in Table 7.2. To apply these 
proportions, we simply used a uniform random variable. If this value was less than the percent of 
non-zero payments for the venue, the visit received a payment. If not, the payment for the visit was 
recorded as $0. If the visit received a payment, the payment was assigned randomly using the 
distributions in Table 7.2. We then aggregated the payments that we assigned randomly for each 
visit in each venue to get the total payment for each venue for each beneficiary. We replicated this 
analysis 1,000 times to capture variations.  
These medical payments were then used as an input for the capitation calculations 
discussed in Chapter 5. Notice, we did not reduce payments by an MA Adjustment Factor for this 








Inpatient 87,859           GAMM(3690, 2.81) 0.016189 97.644%
Outpatient 2,636,375     WEIB(181, 1.05) 0.056144 97.287%
Carrier 6,441,022     2000 * BETA(1.68, 26.2) 0.016600 95.550%
HHA 47,532           9320 * BETA(0.987, 3.19) 0.048104 6.544%
SNF 36,595           WEIB(7600, 1.27) 0.001045 65.739%




were applied through the number of visits to each venue. No further reductions were made to the 
cost per visit. Future research will be needed to determine if there are additional costs or savings for 
each visit.  






















Intercept -2.2532 0.0248 0.1051 -90.9970 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.6811 0.0050 1.9761 135.5440 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0530 0.0008 0.9484 -64.9410 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0015 0.0000 1.0016 42.3610 0.0000
female 0.0973 0.0058 1.1021 16.7450 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0500 0.0040 0.9512 -12.4330 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0031 0.0002 1.0031 12.9250 0.0000
ageover62_3 -5.00E-05 4.30E-06 1.00E+00 -10.7250 0.0000
FFSNoPCPInd -0.3168 0.0088 0.7285 -36.0520 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0048 0.0178 0.9953 -0.2670 0.7896
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.0600 0.0091 0.9418 -6.6210 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.0136 0.0112 0.9865 -1.2140 0.2248
MANoPCPInd -0.6753 0.0143 0.5090 -47.2170 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.2164 0.0481 0.8054 -4.5020 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.2799 0.0134 0.7559 -20.8540 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.4214 0.0109 0.6562 -38.5710 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.6571 0.0131 0.5184 -49.9950 0.0000
Asian -0.3372 0.0553 0.7138 -6.1030 0.0000
Black -0.0621 0.0107 0.9398 -5.7890 0.0000
Hispanic -0.0209 0.0696 0.9793 -0.3000 0.7642
Othernonwhite -0.1966 0.0287 0.8215 -6.8610 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0014 0.0001 0.9986 -15.0910 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0013 0.0003 0.9987 -4.4760 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.0915 0.0118 0.9126 -7.7430 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 -0.0686 0.0134 0.9337 -5.1270 0.0000






















Intercept 1.4379 0.0053 4.2117 273.7550 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.3950 0.0009 1.4843 458.4910 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0333 0.0002 0.9672 -210.2960 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0011 0.0000 1.0011 145.3080 0.0000
female 0.2286 0.0011 1.2568 203.7710 0.0000
ageover62 0.0058 0.0007 1.0058 7.7020 0.0000
ageover62sq -0.0001 0.0000 1.0000 -1.1530 0.2487
ageover62_3 3.11E-06 7.96E-07 1.00E+00 3.9100 0.0001
FFSNoPCPInd 0.1409 0.0015 1.1513 92.3080 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd 0.0285 0.0034 1.0289 8.4010 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.1707 0.0018 0.8431 -92.9110 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.0836 0.0023 0.9199 -35.8150 0.0000
MANoPCPInd -0.4473 0.0026 0.6394 -175.2100 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.4502 0.0107 0.6375 -41.9580 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.5206 0.0029 0.5942 -176.5340 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.6987 0.0024 0.4972 -289.4250 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.8591 0.0030 0.4235 -288.4350 0.0000
Asian -0.2974 0.0100 0.7428 -29.7210 0.0000
Black -0.1130 0.0024 0.8931 -46.3530 0.0000
Hispanic -0.1032 0.0138 0.9020 -7.4970 0.0000
Othernonwhite -0.0852 0.0050 0.9183 -17.0960 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0030 0.0000 0.9970 -158.6660 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0009 0.0001 1.0009 8.8950 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs 0.0031 0.0001 1.0031 23.7630 0.0000
hospitalaccess1 0.1091 0.0024 1.1153 44.6470 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 0.0472 0.0030 1.0484 15.9870 0.0000
physiciansper1000 -0.0337 0.0004 0.9669 -91.3980 0.0000






















Intercept 2.3207 0.0032 10.1824 714.9060 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.2977 0.0005 1.3468 576.6000 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0198 0.0001 0.9804 -203.8640 0.0000
maxchscore3 5.84E-04 4.81E-06 1.0006 121.4620 0.0000
female 0.1350 0.0007 1.1446 203.7250 0.0000
ageover62 0.0083 0.0005 1.0083 17.9140 0.0000
ageover62sq -0.0002 0.0000 0.9998 -5.7720 0.0000
ageover62_3 -1.73E-07 5.11E-07 1.0000 -0.3380 0.7357
FFSNoPCPInd -0.3562 0.0010 0.7003 -352.0230 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0120 0.0021 0.9880 -5.8140 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.0272 0.0010 0.9731 -26.1400 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.0682 0.0013 0.9341 -51.1270 0.0000
MANoPCPInd -0.4830 0.0015 0.6169 -318.7090 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.1708 0.0055 0.8430 -31.2430 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.2193 0.0015 0.8031 -145.5640 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.2490 0.0012 0.7796 -206.7150 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.4301 0.0014 0.6504 -300.7530 0.0000
Asian -0.3288 0.0057 0.7198 -57.2280 0.0000
Black -0.1443 0.0014 0.8657 -105.2710 0.0000
Hispanic -0.1648 0.0086 0.8480 -19.2250 0.0000
Othernonwhite -0.0876 0.0029 0.9161 -30.5570 0.0000
medianhouseeval 0.0006 0.0000 1.0006 50.9620 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0038 0.0001 1.0038 58.1230 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0019 0.0001 0.9982 -22.3450 0.0000
hospitalaccess1 0.0151 0.0016 1.0152 9.3860 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 0.0366 0.0019 1.0373 19.0580 0.0000
physiciansper1000 0.0047 0.0002 1.0048 22.4860 0.0000






















Intercept -1.1386 0.0120 0.3203 -94.5380 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.6572 0.0021 1.9293 318.8100 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0512 0.0003 0.9501 -149.1510 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0014 1.60E-05 1.0015 91.2730 0.0000
female 0.3432 0.0024 1.4095 143.9330 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0540 0.0016 0.9475 -32.9590 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0058 0.0001 1.0058 62.9160 0.0000
ageover62_3 -1.00E-04 1.56E-06 0.9999 -61.1760 0.0000
FFSNoPCPInd -0.2942 0.0034 0.7451 -87.3860 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0721 0.0071 0.9304 -10.1770 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.0087 0.0034 0.9913 -2.5450 0.0109
FFSPCPHighCapInd 0.0034 0.0042 1.0034 0.8030 0.4221
MANoPCPInd -0.9465 0.0062 0.3881 -152.2560 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.7732 0.0248 0.4615 -31.1420 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.7695 0.0063 0.4632 -121.8340 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.5633 0.0044 0.5694 -128.1590 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -1.3568 0.0065 0.2575 -208.0760 0.0000
Asian -0.1932 0.0206 0.8243 -9.4010 0.0000
Black 0.2037 0.0042 1.2260 48.5410 0.0000
Hispanic -0.1945 0.0294 0.8232 -6.6180 0.0000
Othernonwhite -0.0863 0.0121 0.9173 -7.1610 0.0000
medianhouseeval 0.0002 0.0000 1.0002 4.6180 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore -0.0015 0.0002 0.9986 -6.3390 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0009 0.0003 0.9991 -2.9920 0.0028
hospitalaccess1 0.0169 0.0056 1.0171 3.0310 0.0024
hospitalaccess2 -0.0196 0.0068 0.9806 -2.8880 0.0039
physiciansper1000 0.0154 0.0007 1.0155 21.6760 0.0000






















Intercept -3.9566 0.0395 0.0191 -100.2010 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.9320 0.0076 2.5396 122.2420 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0869 0.0012 0.9168 -72.7850 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0027 5.20E-05 1.0028 52.6090 0.0000
female 0.4747 0.0084 1.6075 56.6640 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0427 0.0057 0.9582 -7.4650 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0060 0.0003 1.0061 19.4400 0.0000
ageover62_3 -1.00E-04 5.07E-06 0.9999 -19.0330 0.0000
FFSNoPCPInd 0.0491 0.0107 1.0504 4.6010 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0083 0.0234 0.9917 -0.3560 0.7215
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.2252 0.0126 0.7984 -17.9170 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.0601 0.0151 0.9417 -3.9710 0.0001
MANoPCPInd -1.1778 0.0244 0.3080 -48.2460 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.8125 0.0909 0.4438 -8.9370 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.7636 0.0228 0.4660 -33.5310 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.8396 0.0170 0.4319 -49.3200 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -1.0858 0.0211 0.3376 -51.3560 0.0000
Asian -0.2861 0.0775 0.7512 -3.6900 0.0002
Black -0.0694 0.0152 0.9330 -4.5780 0.0000
Hispanic -0.2572 0.1006 0.7732 -2.5560 0.0106
Othernonwhite -0.3974 0.0518 0.6721 -7.6770 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0032 0.0001 0.9968 -25.0320 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0064 0.0004 0.9936 -15.8920 0.0000
hospitalaccess1 0.1186 0.0176 1.1259 6.7570 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 0.1165 0.0216 1.1236 5.4050 0.0000




7.2 Capitation Simulation Results 
We ran the above simulations with several different parameters. In this section, we present 
these results and discuss the implications. In general, the same conclusions can be drawn from the 
analysis in this chapter as with those from Chapters 5 and 6. Bear in mind we need to compare the 
results for either Mixed Cap or High Cap in Chapter 7 to the results for High Cap with 0% no PCP 
visits from Chapters 5 and 6. The median and maximum contract values are similar between this 
chapter and Chapters 5 and 6. The minimum contract values are comparable with Chapter 5. 
Predicting the number of events and applying a cost for each event has removed the extreme 
negative results we observed in Chapter 6.  
 7.2.1 Capitation Contract Results for a Five PCP Practice. The simulation results for the 
capitation contracts for a five PCP practice are contained in Tables 7.8 – 7.12. Similar to Chapters 5 
and 6, all results in the tables have been normalized to reflect the results of a single PCP within the 
practice. To do this, we divided all contract results by the number of PCPs in the practice. Five 
contracts are presented in each table. Details for the contract are contained in the header rows for 
the table. Each column of the table represents summary statistics for 1,000 replications (effectively 
giving simulated results for 1,000 practices operating under the stipulated conditions). The variation 
within each column is caused by the different medical payments assigned to each replication. The 
differences between each column in a table are caused by the differences in the contract terms. 
Finally, the differences between tables are caused by utilization differences between the patients in 
the practice, number of PCPs in a practice, etc. These parameters are provided in the header rows 
of each table. 
The contract results presented in each table were generated using the same values for C, 
R, and E. If a contract has stop loss, the same parameters were used for all stop loss provisions. 




Future research with longitudinal data will be needed to verify MA patients under the care of capitated 
PCPs are receiving their needed health care services. 
 Again, decreasing health-care utilization drives positive financial results. For the FFS Low 
Cap practice (Table 7.8) every contract without an upside only provision resulted in over a $100K 
loss per PCP. The median contract bearing 80% risk with stop loss had a loss of $242K per PCP. 
The same contract and utilization shift from Chapter 5, resulted in a $442K median loss per PCP. 
These results represent the type of result an FFS PCP could expect with a practice consisting of 
newly transitioned FFS beneficiaries to MA plans. If the practice is operated like an FFS practice for 
beneficiaries who have the health-care utilization of an FFS beneficiary, large negative results can 
be expected. 
 We contrast these results with those for an MA High Cap practice (Table 7.12). The median 
contract bearing 80% risk with stop loss had a gain of $215K per PCP. The same contract and 
utilization shift from Chapter 5, resulted in a $221K median gain per PCP. Of the contracts from this 
chapter for the MA High Cap practice, 0.0% experienced a loss, 0.0% experienced a loss over 
$100K, and 100.0% of them had a contract gain of over $100K per PCP. The median outcome for 
contracts with 80% risk share and stop loss for MA Low Cap (Table 7.9), MA Mid Cap (Table 7.10), 
and MA Mixed Cap (Table 7.11) were a loss of $34K, a gain of $52K, and a gain of $205K, 
respectively. These contracts experienced a loss 92.1%, 0.4%, and 0.0% of the time, respectively. 
They experienced a loss over $100K 0.3%, 0.0%, and 0.0% of the time, respectively and a gain over 
$100K 0.0%, 0.5%, and 100.0% of the time, respectively. Again, decreasing health-care utilization 
in other venues can lead to larger gains while at the same time decreases the probability of 
experiencing a loss from the contract. Should a loss occur, lowering utilization corresponds to the 
loss being smaller. 




 The minimum values for contract outcomes are comparable between the analysis in this 
chapter compared with the analysis from Chapter 5 for 0% of patients with no PCP visits. For 
contracts bearing 80% risk with stop loss, the MA High Cap practice had a minimum contract value 
of a gain of $129K. The minimum contract value for this practice with the same contract in Chapter 
5 was a gain of $108K. The analysis in this chapter removed the extreme negative outcomes we 
observed in Chapter 6. Minimum contract values for FFS Low Cap, MA Low Cap, and MA Mid Cap 
practices between this chapter and Chapter 5 were a loss of $327K compared to a loss of $683K for 
FFS Low Cap, a loss $107K compared to a loss of $211K for MA Low Cap, and a loss of $12K 
compared to a loss of $101K for MA Mid Cap. The analysis in this chapter shows the results are not 
as extreme. However, not shifting utilization still results in negative contract results. Next, we 
evaluate the results for single PCP practices. 
  































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.2.2 Comparisons of Capitation Contract Results for a One PCP Practice with those 
of a Five PCP Practice. We will now compare the capitation contract results for a one PCP practice 
with those for a five PCP practice. Tables 7.13 - 7.17 contain the contract results for a single PCP 
practice. The practices are FFS Low Cap, MA Low Cap, MA Mid Cap, MA Mixed Cap, and MA High 
Cap. Moving from five PCPs to one PCP impacts the number of patients under care. The five PCP 
MA High Cap practice served 634 MA patients in 2016. However, the single PCP only served 132 
patients in 2016. Evaluating contracts with S = 80% with stop loss for a five PCP and a single PCP 
MA High Cap practice, we observe the following minimum, median, and maximum contract results 
(five PCP presented first): gains of $132K, $215K, and $273K compared with gains of $15K, $140K, 
and $246K, respectively. In prior chapters, shifting from five PCPs to one PCP magnified contract 
results. In this chapter, all contract results are shifted. This is likely caused by the composition of 
patients being served in each practice. The single PCP is likely serving patients who exhibit relatively 
higher health-care utilization compared with the patients served by the five PCP practice. Some 
demographic differences in utilization would not result in higher CMS to MA plan payments in our 
analysis. 
Again, stop loss is important for a single PCP practice. We compare the impact of adding a 
$5M patient in the contracts with S = 80% with and without stop loss for the single PCP MA High 
Cap practice. The contract without stop loss experienced a loss of $3.708M opposed to a loss of 
$316K with stop loss. These results per PCP for a five PCP MA High Cap practice were a loss of 
$453K without stop loss and a gain of $123K with stop loss. 
Upside only contracts resulted in large bonuses for the single PCP MA High Cap practice. 
The minimum, median, and maximum contracts resulted in gains of $47K, $86K, and $119K, 
respectively. The equivalent five PCP practice had minimum, median, and maximum values with 
gains of $82K, $107K, and $126K respectively. The median values for upside only contracts with 




single PCP FFS Low Cap, MA Low Cap, MA Mid Cap, MA Mixed Cap (the PCP is classified as High 
Cap), and MA High Cap practices were gains of $0, $38K, $75K, $142K, and $86K, respectively. Of 
these contracts, 0.0%, 0.1%, 5.0%, 98.4%, and 8.6% experienced gains over $100K, respectively. 
Based on these results, an upside only contract with S=25% with no stop loss could still provide 
strong financial incentives to PCPs to lower health-care utilization in other venues. These financial 
incentives would be achieved without exposing the practice to financial risk.  
In contrast, contracts for the single PCP MA Mid Cap practice with S = 80% and stop loss 
experience both large gains and large losses. The minimum, median, and maximum contracts 
resulted in a loss of $77K, a gain of $111K, and a gain of $248K, respectively. The equivalent five 
PCP practice had minimum, median, and maximum values with a loss of $12K, a gain of $52K, and 
a gain of $116K, respectively. The median values for contracts with S = 80% and stop loss for single 
PCP FFS Low Cap, MA Low Cap, MA Mid Cap, MA Mixed Cap (the PCP is classified as High Cap), 
and MA High Cap practices were a loss of $242K, a loss of $11K, a gain of $111K, a gain of $306K, 
and a gain of $139K, respectively. Of these contracts 99.7%, 8.6%, 0.0%, 0.0%, and 0.0% 
experienced losses over $100K; 100.0%, 55.7%, 2.1%, 0.0%, and 0.0% experience losses; and 
0.0%, 3.7%, 57.9%, 100.0%, and 84.0% experienced gains over $100K, respectively. Unless a single 
PCP is proficient at decreasing health-care utilization in other venues, this type of contract will likely 
place excessive financial risk on the practice. Even if the PCP is successful, random variations in 
health-care utilization could cause the PCP to experience losses from the capitation contract. 
Also notice the differences between the two MA High Cap practices (MA Mixed Cap and MA 
High Cap). This is likely caused by differences in demographics which cause shifts in health-care 
utilization that we did not capture with the CMS to MA Plan reimbursement calculations. Due to 
limited sample size, we only considered three variables for the CMS to MA Plan reimbursement: 
MedicaidInd, Gender, and MaxChScoreGroup. However, the Poisson regression models from 




Chapter 4 captured more demographic factors which impact utilization. The true CMS calculation 
considers more variables which should level these results if similar health-care utilization reductions 
are achieved. These variations demonstrate one limitation of this study. They also demonstrate the 
effect cherry-picking patients could have on capitation results. To address this concern, CMS would 
want to consider each descriptive variable that correlates with health-care utilization. 
  
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.2.3 Evaluating the impact of the number of beneficiaries under the care of a single 
PCP practice. In this final analysis, we compare the results of different single PCP practices with 
different patient panel sizes. We compare the results for practices with about 130 MA patients 
(medium), 255 MA patients (large), and 410 MA patients (very large). Within each of these practice 
sizes, we compare the results for FFS Low Cap, MA Mid Cap, and MA High Cap practices. We will 
only evaluate contracts with 80% risk share with stop loss provisions. Tables 7.18 – 7.23 contain 
the contract results for the large and very large practices. The medium sized practices can be 
found in Tables 7.13, 7.15, and 7.17. 
The median contract value for FFS Low Cap practices were a loss of $242K for the medium 
practice, a loss of $450K for the large practice, and a loss of $503K for the very large practice. Of 
these contracts 99.7%, 100.0%, and 100.0% experienced losses over $100K; 100.0%, 100.0%, and 
100.0% experience losses; and 0.0%, 0.0%, and 0.0% experienced gains over $100K, respectively. 
This shows large patient panels do not protect a practice against negative results caused by not 
shifting health-care utilization. In fact, the larger patient panels caused larger negative results. 
The median contract value for MA Mid Cap practices were a gain of $111K for the medium 
practice, a gain of $240K for the large practice, and a gain of $30K for the very large practice. Of 
these contracts 0.0%, 0.0%, and 6.3% experienced losses over $100K; 2.1%, 0.1%, and 35.9% 
experience losses; and 57.9%, 96.7%, and 18.7% experienced gains over $100K, respectively. 
When we added a $5M patient to the median contract value, the resulting contract values were a 
loss of $345K for the medium practice, a loss of $216K for the large practice, and a loss of $425K 
for the very large practice. In this analysis, we see at least two factors at play. First, the larger patient 
panels provide some protection against a single very sick patient. Second, the effects of cherry 
picking are demonstrated. The very large practice should have performed the best because the MA 
Mid Cap results from other analyses have generally been positive. As the patient panel grows, these 




positive results should have accumulated to larger positive results. However, the very large practice 
performed the worst. This was likely caused by having a patient panel with demographics that 
correlate to higher health-care utilization. This would have been captured in the higher healthcare 
utilization, but it would not have been captured by the CMS to MA plan payment calculations. 
Finally, the median contract value for MA High Cap practices were a gain of $140K for the 
medium practice, a gain of $325K for the large practice, and a gain of $707K for the very large 
practice. Of these contracts 0.0%, 0.0%, and 0.0% experienced losses over $100K; 0.0%, 0.0%, and 
0.0% experience losses; and 84.0%, 99.9%, and 100.0% experienced gains over $100K, 
respectively. When we added a $5M patient to the median contract value, the resulting contract 
values were a loss of $316K for the medium practice, a loss of $131K for the large practice, and a 
gain of $251K for the very large practice. These results show increasing the size of the patient panel 
provides protection against a single very sick patient. It also magnifies positive results. However, 
these results assume the very large practice can effectively reduce the health-care utilization for its 
patients. Our analysis would not show the impact of serving too many patients, so the PCP is unable 
to effectively reduce their health-care utilization. Future research will be needed to evaluate the 
maximum size of a patient panel for a PCP who is seeking to reduce health-care utilization in other 
venues. 
Also notice the very large MA High Cap single PCP practice could conceivably bear 80% 
risk with stop loss. Even when a single very sick patient was added, the practice still earned a 
capitation bonus of $251K. This shows the size of the patient panel and the ability to shift utilization 
ultimately determine how much capitated risk a practice can bear. The number of PCPs in the 
practice is not the driving factor. The size of the patient panel is. We conclude this chapter by 
discussing the advantages and limitations of this analysis. 
  

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.2.4 Analysis Advantages and Limitations. The approach we took with the analysis in 
this chapter has several benefits and limitations. We expanded on the analysis conducted in 
Chapters 5 and 6 by simulating the number of visits to each venue for each beneficiary. Then, we 
applied a cost for each visit. We first determined if the visit would result in a $0 payment. If not, we 
applied a theoretical distribution of the historic payments for each venue. With this approach, we 
were able to simulate the driver of medical payments, visits to each venue. It is encouraging how 
well the three approached agree. The general findings from each approach hold across all 
approaches. While the specific outcomes vary, each shows the ability for small practices to bear 
significant capitated risk. This statement assumes the practice successfully reduces utilization in 
other health care venues. 
However, there are a few limitations with this approach as well. CMS considers additional 
factors (such as ethnicity and specific conditions) to calculate the payment to an MA plan. The 
analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 do not shift utilization based on all demographic variables. We only shift 
utilization based on the PCP capitation proxy variables. We were able to keep the beneficiaries 
constant. Therefore, differences in results were driven by the manipulations we performed. In 
Chapter 7, our manipulation was changing the beneficiaries in the practice. This enabled us to 
capture the PCP capitation level variables, but in the process, many other demographic variables for 
the beneficiaries changed. These demographics differences between the runs would have caused 
utilization shifts when predicting the number of visits with the Poisson regression models. As a result, 
it is possible for a practice to either benefit or be penalized simply by having a patient panel from 
different segments of the population. This demonstrates the importance for CMS to accurately 
account for differences in health-care utilization between segments of the population. 
There is potential for discrepancies with the results caused by demographic differences 
between the patient panels in addition to our capitation proxy variables. Future research will be 




needed to evaluate distributions of results across multiple practices. Our results present a distribution 
of possible results for the practice included in the analysis assuming the CMS to MA plan payment 
reflects our calculation. 
This concludes the discussion on each analysis we conducted as part of our dissertation. In 
the next chapter, we will discuss the findings of our dissertation comprehensively. In the last chapter, 
we will discuss future research to expand our work. 
 
  




Chapter 8: Discussion 
 In this chapter, we will tie together the core findings from this dissertation. The technical 
details of the analysis can be found in Chapters 4-7. Therefore, we will not cover the technical details 
in this chapter. We will discuss the implications for policy makers, primary care practices, and MA 
payers, limitations of our research, and future research revealed by our analysis. 
 
8.1 Implications for Policy Makers 
There is a group of physicians in Missouri we classify as MA High Cap. Based on industry 
knowledge, these physicians bear capitated risk for their MA patient panel. We demonstrated the 
beneficiaries under the care of these physicians exhibit significantly less utilization in each of the five 
health care venues than their FFS counterparts. The specific reductions can be found in Table 8.1. 
These reductions could be a key to align health care spending in the U.S. with other developed 
nations. The total spending for inpatient, outpatient, and carrier accounted for about 80-97% of total 
medical payments. Based on the analysis we conducted, beneficiaries under the care of MA High 
Cap PCPs exhibited just over half of the utilization of a Traditional Medicare beneficiary. This degree 
of health care reduction demands more research to see if the results can be replicated and sustained. 
Table 8.1 
Utilization for Beneficiaries Under the Care of PCPs with Varying Capitation Levels 
  
8.1.1 Economic Explanation for Utilization Reductions. The reduction in healthcare 
services utilization can be explained by either a reduction in demand, a reduction in supply, or a 
Inpatient Outpatient Carrier Home Health
Skilled Nursing 
Facility
FFS Low Cap 1 1 1 1 1
MA No Cap 0.80540 0.63753 0.84300 0.46153 0.44376
MA Low Cap 0.75589 0.59417 0.80310 0.46322 0.46597
MA Mid Cap 0.65615 0.49722 0.77960 0.56935 0.43187
MA High Cap 0.51837 0.42353 0.65040 0.25749 0.33764




combination of both. Each beneficiary’s health care needs drive demand for health-care services. 
These are caused by many factors including the beneficiary’s chronic medical conditions, age, 
genetics, etc. When conditions are not properly managed, more intensive care can result. It is 
possible greater provision of preventative care by PCPs bearing capitated financial risk leads to 
better patient health (Wolff et al., 2002). This could lead to fewer episodic health events resulting in 
less demand for inpatient and outpatient services.  
It is possible that the reduction in demand could also be caused by MA Plans seeking 
relatively healthy beneficiaries who demand fewer services (Brown et al., 2014). While Stout (2020) 
found some evidence to support this hypothesis, it does not appear to be the entire explanation for 
the differences. Even after controlling for the effects of Charlson Score, age, race, and other 
demographics, MA beneficiaries under the care of PCPs with high capitation exhibited the lowest 
utilization of health care services of all beneficiaries who received a PCP visit. Furthermore, Table 
4.16 in Chapter 4 shows PCPs with high capitation serve on average the beneficiaries with the 
highest Charlson Scores. 
It is possible the higher Charlson Scores are caused by diagnostic upcoding. However, the 
percentages found in prior studies of 6% – 16% higher diagnostic coding identified by Geruso and 
Layton (2015) do not account for the magnitude of health-care utilization reductions we observe in 
the five categories of care. 
From a supply side, the role physicians play as gatekeepers as described by Kerr et al. 
(1995) could cause a reduction of supply for health care services. In a gatekeeper role, primary care 
physicians could seek to provide more services inside their practices to avoid costly external 
referrals. Stout (2018) identified this when interviewing PCPs with high capitation. However, the 
PCPs state this provides better service to their patients by avoiding scheduling issues with other 
offices and providing a “one-stop-shop” for their patients’ health care needs.  




We did not test that the lower utilization had an impact on future health of the beneficiaries. 
This was outside the scope of our study. It is however an important question to answer. It is important 
to verify the lower utilization is not driven by denial of care. We performed an initial investigation into 
differences in the services PCPs offered their patients. If the beneficiaries under the care of a 
capitated PCPs are healthier, we would expect this to be driven by different care dynamics of the 
capitated PCPs. 
8.1.2 Possible Explanation for PCP Care Metrics. Under an FFS model, PCPs are 
rewarded to “assess and refer.” Their financial incentives reward them to fill their schedules with 
tightly packed appointments. In these appointments, patients should be seen quickly. If care is 
required, these patients should be referred to other venues or rescheduled to receive care in a follow-
up appointment. We do not imply all FFS PCPs operate this way, but this is one profit maximizing 
strategy. 
In contrast, capitated PCPs are rewarded if they prevent referrals to other providers. Care 
performed by the PCP is reimbursed on an FFS basis. Also, the expense pool of the capitated 
contract has fewer expensive specialist referrals. Under this model PCPs are rewarded to keep their 
patients healthy. By doing this, they will avoid referrals to more expensive venues. They are also 
rewarded to help guide their patients through the healthcare system to return them to health quickly 
and cheaply. 
Our observations for VisitCnt, EMCmplxSum, and ProcCnt align fairly well with these 
incentives. We see slightly more VisitCnt and EMCmplxSum measures for MA capitated practices. 
This shows beneficiaries are seen slightly more frequently and for more time per visit. However, the 
largest difference is in the count of PCP procedures performed. MA beneficiaries under the care of 
High Cap PCPs received 30.0% more procedures than FFS beneficiaries under the care of Low Cap 
PCPs. This indicates High Cap PCPs provide procedures more efficiently. Instead of operating under 




an “assess and refer” model, it appears they provide the services needed when the PCP learns of a 
need. When these observations are combined with the general observation that MA beneficiaries 
have lower utilization than FFS beneficiaries, it appears the procedures conducted by a PCP has the 
largest impact on utilization in other venues.  
Our research shows the need to investigate this phenomenon further. If PCPs with high 
capitation are driving significantly lower utilization through better patient health, it is worth the effort 
to understand how they do it. If these results can be replicated and sustained, it could have a 
significant impact on the health of our nation and the national budget. 
 
8.2 Implications for Primary Care Practices 
While reductions in health-care utilization would be beneficial for our nation, capitated 
practices frequently failed financially in the past. The core purpose of our dissertation is the 
understand why these practices fail and how to effectively balance the financial rewards and risks. 
More details are provided in Chapters 5-7. We will provide an overview in this chapter. Tables 8.2 
and 8.3 provide summaries for the contract results across the three approaches to estimate medical 
payments for MA Mid Cap and MA High Cap practices where all patients received a PCP visit. As 
can be seen from these tables, results align well with median values within $10K. The least variation 
is observed when predicting the number of events and assigning a cost to each event. 
  





Capitation Results Comparison – MA Mid Cap 
  
  
Simulation Method Cum. Emp. Dist. Theor. Prob. Dist. Sim Event & Cost
FFS to MA Utilization Reduction MA Mid Cap MA Mid Cap MA Mid Cap
Patient with No PCP Visit 0% 0% 0%
MA Plan Retention Rate 15% 15% 15%
Risk Share 80% 80% 80%
Upside Only No No No
Stop Loss Yes Yes Yes
Count of PCPs 5                           5                           5                           
Count of MA Patients 636                        636                        628                        
Count of MA Patients per PCP 127.2                     127.2                     125.6                     
Mean Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 42,391.12 46,055.23 51,584.11
Std. Dev. Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 44,997.17 48,730.11 19,903.48
Minimum Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. (101,150.25) (115,812.27) (11,689.53)
1st Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. (64,259.82) (69,508.91) 3,102.57
5th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. (31,890.43) (35,373.67) 16,564.28
10th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. (15,082.92) (17,203.96) 26,277.94
20th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 4,005.96 4,955.56 34,888.13
30th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 19,310.58 21,964.78 41,951.40
40th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 31,263.55 34,155.10 47,125.66
Median Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 42,970.15 46,879.63 51,937.87
60th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 54,578.37 59,789.57 56,922.38
70th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 67,698.51 73,521.17 62,487.24
80th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 79,431.96 88,036.52 68,735.07
90th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 100,365.31 107,582.72 76,432.33
95th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 113,493.18 124,401.02 83,549.18
99th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 143,400.80 154,716.37 93,975.11
Maximum Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 176,386.04 198,815.47 115,796.55
% of Bonuses Net S.L. Prem Less than -$100K 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
% of Bonuses Net S.L. Prem Less than $0 17.4% 17.4% 0.4%
% of Bonuses Net S.L. Prem More than $100K 10.2% 13.4% 0.5%
Median Plus One Patient w/ $1M in Claims 15,766.15 19,675.63 24,733.87
Median Plus One Patient w/ $2M in Claims (233.85) 3,675.63 8,733.87
Median Plus One Patient w/ $5M in Claims (48,233.85) (44,324.38) (39,266.14)
Median Plus Two Patients w/ $5M in Claims (139,437.85) (135,528.38) (130,470.14)





Capitation Results Comparison – MA High Cap 
 
  
Simulation Method Cum. Emp. Dist. Theor. Prob. Dist. Sim Event & Cost
FFS to MA Utilization Reduction MA High Cap MA High Cap MA High Cap
Patient with No PCP Visit 0% 0% 0%
MA Plan Retention Rate 15% 15% 15%
Risk Share 80% 80% 80%
Upside Only No No No
Stop Loss Yes Yes Yes
Count of PCPs 5                           5                           5                           
Count of MA Patients 636                        636                        634                        
Count of MA Patients per PCP 127.2                     127.2                     126.8                     
Mean Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 220,240.48 215,612.50 214,036.64
Std. Dev. Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 35,368.81 39,935.99 21,031.47
Minimum Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 107,517.71 79,911.97 131,874.39
1st Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 137,037.71 119,611.66 165,365.45
5th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 159,448.55 148,842.17 178,261.37
10th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 174,310.53 164,905.69 185,974.16
20th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 189,908.96 181,258.42 196,241.19
30th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 202,105.31 195,513.73 203,398.52
40th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 212,067.15 205,941.49 209,488.45
Median Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 221,052.34 216,645.69 214,644.29
60th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 229,903.88 226,848.39 219,540.45
70th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 239,885.17 237,751.88 225,213.51
80th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 249,137.97 250,136.64 231,905.45
90th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 265,985.29 265,742.46 241,922.09
95th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 276,428.34 278,614.04 248,324.60
99th Percentile Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 298,899.10 303,697.15 259,203.07
Maximum Cap Bonus Net S.L. Prem. 326,202.95 337,959.46 273,182.06
% of Bonuses Net S.L. Prem Less than -$100K 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
% of Bonuses Net S.L. Prem Less than $0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
% of Bonuses Net S.L. Prem More than $100K 100.0% 99.8% 100.0%
Median Plus One Patient w/ $1M in Claims 193,848.34 189,441.69 187,440.29
Median Plus One Patient w/ $2M in Claims 177,848.34 173,441.69 171,440.29
Median Plus One Patient w/ $5M in Claims 129,848.34 125,441.69 123,440.29
Median Plus Two Patients w/ $5M in Claims 38,644.34 34,237.69 32,236.29




Here, we will remind our readers of a few lessons from prior capitation attempts. Rosenthal 
et al. (2001) studied physician organizations in California. Between 1998 and 2001, 31 of the 153 
organizations studied failed financially. During this time in California the average practice employed 
343 physicians. Mathematically, the impact of a single care decision diminishes as the practice 
grows. Also, to experience gains from a Medicare capitation contract, health-care utilization must be 
reduced significantly for the patients under the care of the practice. When no reductions are made, 
there were consistently large losses for the practices. Table 8.4 shows the impact of a $10,000 
utilization reduction for a beneficiary for a single physician where the practice bear 80% and 25% 
risk before stop loss reductions. As can be seen, a $10,000 health-care utilization reduction would 
have only had a $23 impact to a single physician in a practice with 343 physicians that bears 80% 
risk. This would not provide much if any financial incentive to a physician.  
Table 8.4 
Capitation Impact of a $10,000 Reduction to a Single Physician 
Physicians in the Practice Single Physician Impact S=80% Single Physician Impact S=25% 
   
1 $8,000 $2,500 
   
5 $1,600 $500 
   
10 $800 $250 
   
30 $267 $83 
   
50 $160 $50 
   
100 $80 $25 
   
343 $23 $7 
   
 
We suspect there is an optimal practice size for capitated contracts. If the practice is too 
small, the practice will be unable to bear much capitated risk without significant financial exposure. 




Likewise, if the practice is too large, personal financial incentives of PCPs are diminished. This 
means the health-care utilization reductions will be unlikely leading to financial failure under 
capitation. 
In another study, Simon and Emmons (1997) found use of capitation was widespread. More 
than 33 percent of physician practices had at least one capitated contract. Of these practices, nearly 
20 percent of revenue was capitated. Many of the contracts did not have stop loss provisions. Of the 
physicians surveyed, 54% did not know if there were stop-loss provisions in their contracts. These 
responses did not vary greatly by practice size. While 59 percent of practices of 50 physicians or 
more carried stop-loss, only 5 percent of solo physicians carried stop-loss.  
 The combination of our analysis with the findings of Simon and Emmons (1997) show the 
ignorance of the health care industry with capitation contracts in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Capitation was widespread, but the physicians in these contracts did not understand their financial 
exposure. While it appears safer to only have a small portion of the revenue capitated, how this is 
done can either lead to safety or greater exposure. If significant risk was shared on relatively few 
patients, the PCPs would have experienced tremendous exposure. This was demonstrated with our 
comparison of a five PCP practices with a single PCP practices. In contrast, the PCPs would have 
had greater safety if they had limited financial exposure on relatively more patients. 
 Also, physicians were ignorant to the impact of stop loss for their contracts. For the practices 
with 59 or more physicians, there would have been little need for stop loss if they effectively reduced 
health-care utilization. However, solo physicians were significantly exposed by not carrying stop loss. 
Regardless of whether stop loss was carried or not, our analysis shows stop loss can have a large 
impact on results of a capitation contract. Either way, physicians should understand the costs and 
benefits of carrying stop loss. 




 Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter 6 revealed a relationship we expected to see in Chapter 
5 but did not see. The analysis in Chapter 5 showed PCPs performed better financially in their 
capitation contracts if they had more beneficiaries who did not receive a PCP visit. This result was 
surprising, so we cautioned our readers these results could be due to data limitations which could 
be due to a lack of a range of full outcomes in 2016, small sample sizes for some groups of 
beneficiaries, and confounding factors as the groups occurred. These limitations were revealed when 
we used theoretical probability distributions to predict total annual medical payments. It appears a 
larger portion of the tail of the probability distribution was truncated for beneficiaries who did not 
receive a PCP visit compared with beneficiaries who did receive a PCP visit. This was revealed when 
we compare the results for contracts for PCPs who served varying proportions of beneficiaries who 
receive PCP visits.  
 The extreme negative values were not seen for practices that serves patients who all receive 
a PCP visit. However, for practices where 20% and 50% of patients do not receive PCP visits, the 
extreme negative results demonstrate the probability of large medical payments is more likely for 
beneficiaries who do not receive a PCP visit. Furthermore, the minimum values were similar 
comparing the results when 20% and 50% of patients did not receive a PCP visit. This shows how 
extreme negative results can be driven by a couple beneficiaries who have large total annual medical 
payments. 
 Finally, a single PCP practice may be able to sufficiently diversify to bear significant capitated 
risk. Tables 7.21 – 7.23 show a High Cap PCP could generate sufficient savings to protect against 
a single patient with large medical payments. The High Cap PCP with 414 patients earned a $251K 
bonus under the contract 80% risk with stop loss when a $5M patient was added to the contract. We 
suspect practices with over 300 patients may be sufficiently diversified to bear 80% risk with stop 
loss assuming they can sufficiently reduce health-care utilization for their patients. 




 We also showed even single PCP practices with small patient panels could engage in 
upside-only contracts. These contracts provided strong financial incentives to reduce utilization. The 
MA High Cap practice earned a median contract bonus of over $100K. This could be an effective 
way to reward PCPs for working to keep their patients healthy. At the same time, the PCPs would 
be protected from insufficient utilization shifts and a few sick patients. 
 Given our analysis and prior research, we do not find it surprising in retrospect so many 
capitated physician practices failed financially in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Our analysis helps 
inform physicians how to experience the benefits from capitation contracts without overexposure to 
their risks. We also demonstrate the interplay that occurs between several elements of the contracts. 
This research should help primary care practices from repeating the same mistakes from the past. 
 
8.3 Implications for MA Payers 
 Many of the implications for policy makers also apply to MA payers. MA payers would benefit 
from utilization being reduced for their members. These reductions appear to correlate with the level 
of capitated risk PCPs bear. It is also possible these reductions are driven by other factors. It is 
possible the Essence plan is most effective at providing its contracted PCPs with analytics aiding in 
patient care. More research will be needed to investigate the root cause of the reductions. 
 The findings for primary care practices could also help MA payers successfully migrate these 
practices to capitated arrangements. MA payers could specifically benefit from a couple findings. 
First, upside-only contracts can provide strong financial incentives to practices. In the past these 
contracts have been viewed as transitional contracts. Practices were not able to continue operating 
in these contracts on a long-term basis. We find these contracts could provide a good balance 
between financial rewards and risks for both small practices as well as practices new to capitation. 




We encourage MA payers to consider offering these contracts to small practices on a long-term 
basis. 
Finally, whether to carry stop loss is a question of the cost of such protection and how much 
financial risk PCPs in the practice are willing and able to bear. It also is a question of how much risk 
MA plans want to allow PCPs to bear. Should the PCP practice back out of a contract due to a large 
loss, the MA plan would be left with three options. The MA plan could sue the PCP to regain the loss. 
By doing this, the MA plan would experience bad press as the large insurance company attacking 
the small medical practice. Likewise, the MA plan could settle the dispute by setting up a long-term 
repayment plan with the practice. Finally, the MA plan could cover the loss. Stop loss provisions 
protect both the PCP practice and the MA plan from large medical payments resulting from very sick 
patients. The challenge is pricing the coverage appropriately. 
 
8.4 Limitations 
 As with all studies, our research has some limitations. In this section, we will discuss the 
high-level limitations of our study. We mentioned specific limitations with each analysis in Chapters 
4-7. We will not repeat every limitation identified in these chapters. Instead, we will keep everything 
provide general perspective where our study contributes and what still needs to be studied. 
 8.4.1 Our Study is Not Dynamic. Our analysis is based on a single year of Missouri 
Medicare data. While we have the insurance records for one million Medicare beneficiaries, we are 
unable to evaluate the long-term effects of capitation. Data for additional years would enable us to 
evaluate the effects of care over time. As a result, our capitation contract results represent the range 
of outcomes for a practice for one year. We ran 1,000 replications, but this translates to the range of 
results 1,000 identical practices could have experienced in a single year. The variations were driven 
by distributions of medical payments for their patients.  




 8.4.2 We Did Not Evaluate the Intensity of Care Per Visit. For our Poisson regression 
analysis in Chapter 4, we treated each visit equally. In other words, every outpatient visit received a 
count of one. Regardless of the intensity of the visit, they counted the same. For the capitation 
contract analysis in Chapter 7, the distribution of costs per visit did not reflect the intensity of each 
visit. Again, all visits to a venue were treated the same and used the same distribution of costs. 
 8.4.3 We Did Not Consider Variations in Cost Per Visit. Related to the limitation based 
on intensity of care per visit, we did not consider variations in cost per visit dependent on services 
rendered or the cost per facility. The analysis in Chapter 4 investigates potential savings if Medicare 
beneficiaries who were enrolled in Medicare Advantage and were under the care of a capitated PCP. 
However, we only considered frequency shifts in visit counts to each venue. It’s possible these PCPs 
also funnel their patients to lower cost facilities. If these beneficiaries are indeed healthier due to the 
primary care received, it’s possible they have fewer and less intense visits at lower cost facilities. 
The combination of these three could translate to savings greater than what we observed. 
8.4.4 We Are Unable to Evaluate the Effects if Traditional Medicare PCPs Were 
Capitated. Since only MA patients were included in capitation contracts for PCPs in our data, we 
were unable to evaluate the effect on utilization if PCPs were capitated for Traditional Medicare 
patients. We were able to investigate the utilization for Traditional Medicare FFS beneficiaries, MA 
FFS beneficiaries, and MA capitation beneficiaries. We were not able to evaluate the utilization for 
Traditional Medicare capitation beneficiaries. 
8.4.5 We Did Not Investigate the Specific Causes or Consequences of Lower 
Utilization. This did not affect our analysis. It did affect our interpretation of the results. It is possible, 
the lower utilization is caused by denial of care. We do not expect this to be the case. The results at 
the end of Chapter 4 corroborate our expectation. However, we were not able to test it thoroughly 




with cross-sectional data. If the effects observed were not caused by better patient health, capitation 
would not be as beneficial to the U.S. health care system. 
 
8.5 Future Research 
 In this section, we summarize plans for future research. In Chapter 3, we outlined the 
research program under which this dissertation was conducted. In Chapters 4-7, we identify future 
research identified by specific limitations of this investigation. 
 8.5.1 Discrete Event Simulation of a Primary Care Practice. Chapter 3 outlines the details 
of a discrete event simulation model to simulate the operations of a primary care practice. We have 
started constructing this model. However, we did not include the model in our dissertation. The foci 
of our dissertation are the correlation of capitation with health-care utilization and how to balance the 
financial rewards and risks for capitation contracts. One of the main findings was the necessity for 
PCPs to reduce the health-care utilization of their patients. Without effectively reducing utilization, 
they could expect large negative results. Contract terms can protect PCPs from a few sick patients, 
but they cannot protect PCPs from failing to reduce health-care utilization. We assume utilization 
reductions in the future will be achievable in accordance with the reductions achieved in 2016. Future 
research should investigate how PCPs reduce utilization, while contributing to better health 
outcomes. 
 A discrete-event process-oriented simulation will be needed to evaluate how PCPs can best 
adapt their practices to operate profitably under capitation. For example, at what point would it be 
beneficial to add an X-Ray machine and technician? This investment would increase equipment and 
personnel costs. However, it would enable to practice to earn additional FFS revenue and avoid 
external referrals. A discrete event simulation would help us analyze and balance these trade-offs. 




 8.5.2 Complete Income Statement Analysis for a Primary Care Practice. In our 
dissertation, we focused on the capitation contract results. These contracts represent the main 
source of financial rewards and risks for primary care practices. However, there are additional 
sources of revenue and costs for capitated practices. They likely impact each other. For example, to 
effectively reduce utilization for a group of patients, we expect fewer patients can be managed. This 
means FFS revenue may be reduced for capitated practices. Also, additional services may get 
offered in a capitated practice (Stout, 2018). This means there could be additional FFS revenue and 
equipment costs. More detailed analysis is needed to evaluate the full financial impact of capitation 
contracts on a primary care practice. 
8.5.3 Regression Analysis to Assign Costs per Visit. In Chapter 7, we used theoretical 
probability distributions to apply cost to each visit. We assumed a constant distribution for all 
beneficiaries. This is not an ideal assumption since sicker patients would likely incur more cost per 
visit to the hospital than healthier patients. Future research could apply multivariate regression to 
estimate the cost per visit for each venue. By doing this, we could consider additional factors which 
would likely correlate with the cost per visit. 
 8.5.4 Changes in Health Status for Beneficiaries Under the Care of Capitated PCPs. 
As we mentioned earlier, we assumed reduction of expensive health care services had no 
detrimental effect on beneficiaries. This assumption needs to be tested thoroughly. With multiple 
years of data, we could investigate the relative change in health status for beneficiaries under the 
care of PCPs with varying degrees of capitated risk. We could also investigate the intensity of care 
in the inpatient venue. If capitation beneficiaries are healthier, we would expect the length of inpatient 
stays to be shorter or the same length as those for FFS beneficiaries. 
 8.5.5 Longitudinal Studies of Capitation Results. In our analysis, we were unable to 
evaluate the effect of specific care provisions on future health states and their effect on capitation 




results. With additional years of data, we could evaluate dynamic effects of how care provision in 
one year impacts the capitation contract results in future years. We could also evaluate patient 
turnover for PCPs with varying degrees of risk. If patients feel healthier and receive better care, we 
expect them to continue under the care of their PCP.  
 8.5.6 Capitation Results for Additional Groups of Patients. In our analysis, we focused 
on capitation results for Medicare beneficiaries with the benefit of background information on 
practices in the St. Louis market who bear capitated risk for Medicare beneficiaries. Future research 
could investigate capitation results for commercially insured and Medicaid beneficiaries.  
 8.5.7 Stop Loss Contract Parameters. Our findings who the possible benefits and costs of 
stop loss. Future research could investigate different stop loss parameters to lower the cost of stop 
loss premiums while still providing sufficient protection from extreme events. 
 8.5.8 Further Investigation of Medical Payments Distributions. We identified a difference 
in the means between Chapters 5 and 6. This would be caused by differences in the means between 
the empirical distribution and the theoretical distribution used to predict medical payments. The 
theoretical distributions are skewed towards zero, bounded at zero, and unbounded in the positive 
direction. Therefore, the mean value could be different if the distribution has a fat tail that was not 
captured in the empirical distribution. More research is needed to investigate which method to predict 
medical payments is more appropriate. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
The results of this analysis provide many valuable findings to the players within the health 
care industry in general and the Medicare industry in specific. We show Medicare Advantage 
beneficiaries under the care of capitated PCPs exhibit utilization significantly less than their 
Traditional Medicare counterparts. This shift in utilization was the main driver for positive capitated 




contract results. Other contract characteristics provided protection against a few sick patients. 
However, no contract provisions protected practices against failing to reduce health-care utilization 
in other venues. Based on some initial investigation, these reductions appear to correlate with PCPs 
providing more procedures to their patients. In short, the PCPs seem to be returning their patients to 
a primary care model focused on preventative care. This shifts them away from the episodic care 
model rewarded by fee-for-service. We reveal some benefits and risks of capitation, but we did not 
investigate how the results were achieved. Research into how to affectively reduce utilization will be 
needed to provide primary care practices with a roadmap to transition to from fee-for-service to 
capitation or a combination of the two.  
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Appendix A: Full Poisson Regression Models – Service Utilization 
Table A.1 

















Intercept -2.3306 0.0288 0.0972 -80.8110 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.6811 0.0050 1.9761 135.5190 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0530 0.0008 0.9484 -64.9390 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0015 3.70E-05 1.0016 42.3630 0.0000
female 0.0974 0.0058 1.1023 16.7660 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0502 0.0040 0.9511 -12.4630 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0031 0.0002 1.0031 12.9530 0.0000
ageover62_3 -5.00E-05 4.30E-06 1.0000 -10.7460 0.0000
FFSNoPCPInd -0.3177 0.0088 0.7278 -36.0960 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0049 0.0178 0.9951 -0.2730 0.7846
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.0605 0.0091 0.9413 -6.6730 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.0132 0.0113 0.9869 -1.1730 0.2407
MANoPCPInd -0.6766 0.0143 0.5084 -47.2200 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.2165 0.0481 0.8053 -4.5040 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.2797 0.0134 0.7560 -20.8390 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.4215 0.0109 0.6561 -38.5680 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.6561 0.0132 0.5189 -49.7170 0.0000
Asian -0.3340 0.0553 0.7160 -6.0430 0.0000
Black -0.0557 0.0114 0.9459 -4.8750 0.0000
Hispanic -0.0185 0.0696 0.9817 -0.2650 0.7907
Othernonwhite -0.1955 0.0287 0.8224 -6.8230 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0014 0.0001 0.9986 -14.1070 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore -0.0003 0.0006 0.9997 -0.5170 0.6049
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0008 0.0007 0.9992 -1.1210 0.2624
hospitalaccess1 0.0738 0.0137 1.0765 5.3730 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.0227 0.0168 0.9775 -1.3510 0.1766
physiciansper1000 -0.0029 0.0018 0.9972 -1.5580 0.1192






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept 1.4379 0.0053 4.2117 273.7550 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.3950 0.0009 1.4843 458.4910 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0333 0.0002 0.9672 -210.2960 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0011 7.68E-06 1.0011 145.3080 0.0000
female 0.2286 0.0011 1.2568 203.7710 0.0000
ageover62 0.0058 0.0007 1.0058 7.7020 0.0000
ageover62sq -0.0001 0.0000 1.0000 -1.1530 0.2487
ageover62_3 3.11E-06 7.96E-07 1.0000 3.9100 0.0001
FFSNoPCPInd 0.1409 0.0015 1.1513 92.3080 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd 0.0285 0.0034 1.0289 8.4010 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.1707 0.0018 0.8431 -92.9110 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.0836 0.0023 0.9199 -35.8150 0.0000
MANoPCPInd -0.4473 0.0026 0.6394 -175.2100 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.4502 0.0107 0.6375 -41.9580 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.5206 0.0029 0.5942 -176.5340 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.6987 0.0024 0.4972 -289.4250 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.8591 0.0030 0.4235 -288.4350 0.0000
Asian -0.2974 0.0100 0.7428 -29.7210 0.0000
Black -0.1130 0.0024 0.8931 -46.3530 0.0000
Hispanic -0.1032 0.0138 0.9020 -7.4970 0.0000
Othernonwhite -0.0852 0.0050 0.9183 -17.0960 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0030 0.0000 0.9970 -158.6660 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0009 0.0001 1.0009 8.8950 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs 0.0031 0.0001 1.0031 23.7630 0.0000
hospitalaccess1 0.1091 0.0024 1.1153 44.6470 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 0.0472 0.0030 1.0484 15.9870 0.0000
physiciansper1000 -0.0337 0.0004 0.9669 -91.3980 0.0000






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept 2.3207 0.0032 10.1824 714.9060 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.2977 0.0005 1.3468 576.6000 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0198 0.0001 0.9804 -203.8640 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0006 4.81E-06 1.0006 121.4620 0.0000
female 0.1350 0.0007 1.1446 203.7250 0.0000
ageover62 0.0083 0.0005 1.0083 17.9140 0.0000
ageover62sq -0.0002 0.0000 0.9998 -5.7720 0.0000
ageover62_3 -1.73E-07 5.11E-07 1.0000 -0.3380 0.7357
FFSNoPCPInd -0.3562 0.0010 0.7003 -352.0230 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0120 0.0021 0.9880 -5.8140 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.0272 0.0010 0.9731 -26.1400 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.0682 0.0013 0.9341 -51.1270 0.0000
MANoPCPInd -0.4830 0.0015 0.6169 -318.7090 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.1708 0.0055 0.8430 -31.2430 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.2193 0.0015 0.8031 -145.5640 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.2490 0.0012 0.7796 -206.7150 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.4301 0.0014 0.6504 -300.7530 0.0000
Asian -0.3288 0.0057 0.7198 -57.2280 0.0000
Black -0.1443 0.0014 0.8657 -105.2710 0.0000
Hispanic -0.1648 0.0086 0.8480 -19.2250 0.0000
Othernonwhite -0.0876 0.0029 0.9161 -30.5570 0.0000
medianhouseeval 0.0006 0.0000 1.0006 50.9620 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0038 0.0001 1.0038 58.1230 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0019 0.0001 0.9982 -22.3450 0.0000
hospitalaccess1 0.0151 0.0016 1.0152 9.3860 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 0.0366 0.0019 1.0373 19.0580 0.0000
physiciansper1000 0.0047 0.0002 1.0048 22.4860 0.0000




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept -1.1386 0.0120 0.3203 -94.5380 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.6572 0.0021 1.9293 318.8100 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0512 0.0003 0.9501 -149.1510 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0014 1.60E-05 1.0015 91.2730 0.0000
female 0.3432 0.0024 1.4095 143.9330 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0540 0.0016 0.9475 -32.9590 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0058 0.0001 1.0058 62.9160 0.0000
ageover62_3 -1.00E-04 1.56E-06 0.9999 -61.1760 0.0000
FFSNoPCPInd -0.2942 0.0034 0.7451 -87.3860 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0721 0.0071 0.9304 -10.1770 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.0087 0.0034 0.9913 -2.5450 0.0109
FFSPCPHighCapInd 0.0034 0.0042 1.0034 0.8030 0.4221
MANoPCPInd -0.9465 0.0062 0.3881 -152.2560 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.7732 0.0248 0.4615 -31.1420 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.7695 0.0063 0.4632 -121.8340 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.5633 0.0044 0.5694 -128.1590 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -1.3568 0.0065 0.2575 -208.0760 0.0000
Asian -0.1932 0.0206 0.8243 -9.4010 0.0000
Black 0.2037 0.0042 1.2260 48.5410 0.0000
Hispanic -0.1945 0.0294 0.8232 -6.6180 0.0000
Othernonwhite -0.0863 0.0121 0.9173 -7.1610 0.0000
medianhouseeval 0.0002 0.0000 1.0002 4.6180 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore -0.0015 0.0002 0.9986 -6.3390 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0009 0.0003 0.9991 -2.9920 0.0028
hospitalaccess1 0.0169 0.0056 1.0171 3.0310 0.0024
hospitalaccess2 -0.0196 0.0068 0.9806 -2.8880 0.0039
physiciansper1000 0.0154 0.0007 1.0155 21.6760 0.0000













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept -3.9660 0.0426 0.0190 -93.1870 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.9319 0.0076 2.5394 122.2230 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0869 0.0012 0.9168 -72.7760 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0027 5.20E-05 1.0028 52.6030 0.0000
female 0.4745 0.0084 1.6072 56.6330 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0426 0.0057 0.9583 -7.4470 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0060 0.0003 1.0061 19.4220 0.0000
ageover62_3 -1.00E-04 5.08E-06 0.9999 -19.0200 0.0000
FFSNoPCPInd 0.0496 0.0107 1.0508 4.6320 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0077 0.0234 0.9923 -0.3300 0.7412
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.2250 0.0126 0.7985 -17.8950 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.0615 0.0152 0.9404 -4.0540 0.0001
MANoPCPInd -1.1778 0.0244 0.3080 -48.1960 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.8126 0.0909 0.4437 -8.9390 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.7640 0.0228 0.4658 -33.5460 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.8401 0.0170 0.4317 -49.3280 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -1.0881 0.0212 0.3369 -51.3080 0.0000
Asian -0.2882 0.0776 0.7496 -3.7160 0.0002
Black -0.0767 0.0162 0.9261 -4.7350 0.0000
Hispanic -0.2583 0.1006 0.7724 -2.5670 0.0103
Othernonwhite -0.3978 0.0518 0.6718 -7.6830 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0032 0.0001 0.9968 -23.4590 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore -0.0006 0.0008 0.9994 -0.7830 0.4335
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0059 0.0010 0.9942 -6.0880 0.0000
hospitalaccess1 0.1135 0.0180 1.1202 6.3110 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 0.1165 0.0216 1.1236 5.4050 0.0000
physiciansper1000 0.0033 0.0025 1.0033 1.3380 0.1809








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B: Full Poisson Regression Models – PCP Visit and Procedure Variables 
Table B.1 

















Intercept 1.3869 0.0084 4.0025 164.5040 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.1875 0.0014 1.2062 131.5000 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0168 0.0003 0.9834 -57.7430 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0006 1.50E-05 1.0006 36.0970 0.0000
female 0.0700 0.0018 1.0725 39.6180 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0016 0.0013 0.9984 -1.2600 0.2078
ageover62sq 0.0008 0.0001 1.0008 9.9000 0.0000
ageover62_3 -2.00E-05 1.40E-06 1.0000 -11.3900 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0414 0.0050 0.9594 -8.3710 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.0524 0.0024 1.0538 21.4190 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.1026 0.0034 0.9025 -30.5600 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.1952 0.0133 0.8227 -14.6450 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.0383 0.0034 0.9625 -11.1060 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.0474 0.0027 1.0486 17.7940 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.0105 0.0032 0.9896 -3.3140 0.0009
Asian -0.0868 0.0137 0.9169 -6.3470 0.0000
Black -0.0751 0.0036 0.9277 -20.8410 0.0000
Hispanic -0.1095 0.0229 0.8963 -4.7820 0.0000
Othernonwhite -0.0498 0.0076 0.9515 -6.5320 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0020 0.0000 0.9980 -63.0880 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0030 0.0002 1.0030 16.9290 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0044 0.0002 0.9956 -19.4330 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.0273 0.0038 0.9731 -7.2610 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 -0.0624 0.0044 0.9396 -14.1540 0.0000
physiciansper1000 -0.0057 0.0006 0.9943 -10.1020 0.0000






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept -1.8408 0.0641 0.1587 -28.7290 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv -0.0060 0.0110 0.9940 -0.5444 0.5861
maxchscoresq 0.0034 0.0024 1.0035 1.4606 0.1441
maxchscore3 -0.0001 1.28E-04 0.9999 -0.4911 0.6234
female 0.0806 0.0139 1.0839 5.8134 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0826 0.0101 0.9207 -8.1462 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0042 0.0007 1.0043 6.4133 0.0000
ageover62_3 -8.00E-05 1.30E-05 0.9999 -6.0092 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd 0.2073 0.0323 1.2303 6.4142 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.4023 0.0203 0.6688 -19.8151 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.2111 0.0255 0.8097 -8.2768 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd 0.4854 0.0682 1.6249 7.1145 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd 0.1698 0.0228 1.1850 7.4379 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.4021 0.0224 0.6689 -17.9499 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.1671 0.0242 0.8461 -6.9001 0.0000
Asian 0.2722 0.0839 1.3128 3.2462 0.0012
Black 0.0245 0.0270 1.0248 0.9085 0.3636
Hispanic 0.2918 0.1493 1.3389 1.9542 0.0507
Othernonwhite -0.0128 0.0537 0.9873 -0.2379 0.8119
medianhouseeval -0.0008 0.0002 0.9992 -3.4416 0.0006
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0017 0.0014 1.0017 1.2245 0.2207
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0041 0.0018 0.9959 -2.3222 0.0202
hospitalaccess2 -0.1385 0.0306 0.8707 -4.5192 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 -0.3079 0.0378 0.7350 -8.1524 0.0000
physiciansper1000 -0.0065 0.0043 0.9936 -1.4917 0.1358




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept 1.9518 0.0057 7.0413 341.5930 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.1987 0.0009 1.2198 209.2940 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0210 0.0002 0.9792 -107.3470 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0007 1.00E-05 1.0008 71.3680 0.0000
female 0.0781 0.0012 1.0812 66.5800 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0103 0.0009 0.9897 -11.8930 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0014 0.0001 1.0014 26.4550 0.0000
ageover62_3 -4.00E-05 1.02E-06 1.0000 -37.0840 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0204 0.0034 0.9798 -6.0650 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.0736 0.0016 1.0764 44.6430 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.1213 0.0023 0.8857 -53.8880 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.0923 0.0086 0.9119 -10.7880 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd 0.0312 0.0022 1.0317 13.9620 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.0934 0.0018 1.0979 52.7600 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd 0.0179 0.0021 1.0181 8.6830 0.0000
Asian -0.0223 0.0086 0.9780 -2.6060 0.0092
Black -0.0703 0.0023 0.9321 -30.3050 0.0000
Hispanic 0.0466 0.0141 1.0477 3.3120 0.0009
Othernonwhite -0.0465 0.0049 0.9546 -9.4200 0.0000
medianhouseeval 0.0003 0.0000 1.0003 16.3220 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0027 0.0001 1.0027 22.0780 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0051 0.0002 0.9949 -32.9020 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.1143 0.0027 0.8920 -43.0650 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 -0.2667 0.0033 0.7659 -79.9230 0.0000
physiciansper1000 0.0071 0.0004 1.0071 19.1010 0.0000






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Poisson Regression Model for Count of EM Complexity Level One PCP Visits (EMCmplxLvlOneCnt) 

















Intercept -2.8443 0.0841 0.0582 -33.8343 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.2035 0.0144 1.2257 14.1852 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0196 0.0031 0.9806 -6.2995 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0004 1.79E-04 1.0005 2.4908 0.0127
female -0.2163 0.0164 0.8055 -13.2340 0.0000
ageover62 0.0173 0.0134 1.0174 1.2922 0.1963
ageover62sq 0.0029 0.0008 1.0029 3.4618 0.0005
ageover62_3 -9.00E-05 1.50E-05 0.9999 -5.8375 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd 0.2939 0.0398 1.3416 7.3816 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.1760 0.0222 1.1925 7.9469 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.2175 0.0331 0.8045 -6.5632 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.5188 0.1483 0.5953 -3.4985 0.0005
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.3160 0.0366 0.7290 -8.6405 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.1294 0.0264 0.8786 -4.9077 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd 0.1030 0.0291 1.1085 3.5389 0.0004
Asian -1.2852 0.2297 0.2766 -5.5953 0.0000
Black -0.3781 0.0386 0.6851 -9.8030 0.0000
Hispanic -1.8419 0.5001 0.1585 -3.6830 0.0002
Othernonwhite -0.3638 0.0856 0.6951 -4.2507 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0047 0.0003 0.9953 -15.5671 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0141 0.0017 1.0142 8.5180 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0185 0.0021 0.9817 -8.7087 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.0671 0.0354 0.9351 -1.8957 0.0580
hospitalaccess3 -0.0494 0.0403 0.9519 -1.2256 0.2204
physiciansper1000 0.0202 0.0052 1.0205 3.9114 0.0001














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Poisson Regression Model for Count of EM Complexity Level Two PCP Visits (EMCmplxLvlTwoCnt) 

















Intercept -1.6474 0.0635 0.1926 -25.9617 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.0015 0.0112 1.0015 0.1373 0.8908
maxchscoresq 0.0004 0.0025 1.0004 0.1553 0.8766
maxchscore3 -0.0001 1.47E-04 0.9999 -0.5404 0.5890
female -0.1070 0.0133 0.8985 -8.0252 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0043 0.0100 0.9957 -0.4321 0.6657
ageover62sq 0.0014 0.0006 1.0014 2.2729 0.0230
ageover62_3 -4.00E-05 1.20E-05 1.0000 -3.3652 0.0008
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.3755 0.0380 0.6870 -9.8843 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.4189 0.0192 0.6578 -21.8692 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.5515 0.0279 0.5761 -19.7809 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.3831 0.0983 0.6818 -3.8984 0.0001
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.0474 0.0238 0.9537 -1.9893 0.0467
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.3507 0.0207 0.7042 -16.9231 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.0225 0.0225 0.9777 -1.0009 0.3169
Asian -0.0675 0.1025 0.9348 -0.6585 0.5102
Black -0.0975 0.0278 0.9071 -3.5040 0.0005
Hispanic 0.1980 0.1510 1.2190 1.3116 0.1897
Othernonwhite -0.0905 0.0580 0.9135 -1.5603 0.1187
medianhouseeval -0.0035 0.0002 0.9966 -14.1878 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0023 0.0013 1.0023 1.7063 0.0880
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0138 0.0017 0.9863 -8.2180 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 0.3842 0.0247 1.4685 15.5446 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 0.1469 0.0301 1.1583 4.8741 0.0000
physiciansper1000 0.0346 0.0041 1.0352 8.4401 0.0000



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Poisson Regression Model for Count of EM Complexity Level Three PCP Visits 

















Intercept 0.2651 0.0161 1.3035 16.4663 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.0902 0.0027 1.0944 33.2802 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0121 0.0006 0.9880 -20.7704 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0005 3.20E-05 1.0005 16.2460 0.0000
female 0.0502 0.0034 1.0515 14.9665 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0140 0.0025 0.9861 -5.6322 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0018 0.0002 1.0018 11.3894 0.0000
ageover62_3 -4.00E-05 2.91E-06 1.0000 -14.7337 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.1007 0.0094 0.9042 -10.6632 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.0801 0.0047 0.9230 -17.0263 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.2167 0.0065 0.8052 -33.3589 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.1977 0.0246 0.8207 -8.0284 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd 0.0417 0.0062 1.0426 6.7772 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.0109 0.0050 1.0109 2.1744 0.0297
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.0698 0.0060 0.9326 -11.6646 0.0000
Asian -0.0045 0.0242 0.9955 -0.1848 0.8534
Black -0.0079 0.0067 0.9921 -1.1752 0.2399
Hispanic -0.0420 0.0425 0.9588 -0.9901 0.3221
Othernonwhite -0.0151 0.0138 0.9851 -1.0909 0.2753
medianhouseeval -0.0010 0.0001 0.9990 -16.8085 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0025 0.0003 1.0025 7.4815 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0030 0.0004 0.9970 -6.9556 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.0590 0.0073 0.9427 -8.1123 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 -0.1128 0.0086 0.8934 -13.0659 0.0000
physiciansper1000 -0.0093 0.0011 0.9907 -8.6259 0.0000





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Poisson Regression Model for Count of EM Complexity Level Four PCP Visits 

















Intercept -0.3174 0.0153 0.7281 -20.7940 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.2781 0.0025 1.3207 110.1970 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0296 0.0005 0.9709 -58.0780 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0010 2.70E-05 1.0010 38.1720 0.0000
female 0.1045 0.0031 1.1102 33.7520 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0099 0.0023 0.9901 -4.3230 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0013 0.0001 1.0013 9.1730 0.0000
ageover62_3 -4.00E-05 2.68E-06 1.0000 -13.2350 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd 0.0226 0.0092 1.0229 2.4580 0.0140
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.2084 0.0044 1.2317 47.4090 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.0198 0.0059 0.9804 -3.3370 0.0008
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.0226 0.0228 0.9777 -0.9900 0.3224
MAPCPLowCapInd 0.0408 0.0061 1.0417 6.6830 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.1975 0.0047 1.2183 41.8130 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd 0.1192 0.0054 1.1266 22.0740 0.0000
Asian -0.0217 0.0226 0.9785 -0.9610 0.3365
Black -0.1098 0.0061 0.8961 -18.1070 0.0000
Hispanic 0.0963 0.0360 1.1011 2.6780 0.0074
Othernonwhite -0.0585 0.0132 0.9432 -4.4420 0.0000
medianhouseeval 0.0015 0.0001 1.0015 26.8170 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0029 0.0003 1.0029 8.9140 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0066 0.0004 0.9934 -15.9320 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.1882 0.0073 0.8284 -25.7170 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 -0.4190 0.0097 0.6577 -43.2890 0.0000
physiciansper1000 0.0149 0.0010 1.0151 15.3030 0.0000
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Poisson Regression Model for Count of EM Complexity Level Five PCP Visits 

















Intercept -3.0124 0.0643 0.0492 -46.8209 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.2873 0.0106 1.3328 27.2413 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0219 0.0020 0.9783 -10.9040 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0007 1.01E-04 1.0007 6.7938 0.0000
female 0.0586 0.0133 1.0604 4.4224 0.0000
ageover62 0.0118 0.0099 1.0119 1.1936 0.2326
ageover62sq -0.0001 0.0006 0.9999 -0.0994 0.9208
ageover62_3 -1.00E-05 1.20E-05 1.0000 -1.2763 0.2019
FFSPCPNoCapInd 0.1869 0.0312 1.2055 5.9886 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.1813 0.0181 0.8342 -10.0396 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.4510 0.0258 0.6370 -17.4585 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd 0.0809 0.0794 1.0843 1.0189 0.3083
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.0656 0.0236 0.9365 -2.7843 0.0054
MAPCPMidCapInd -0.3451 0.0207 0.7081 -16.6864 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.6530 0.0262 0.5205 -24.9217 0.0000
Asian -0.0746 0.0980 0.9282 -0.7607 0.4469
Black -0.0338 0.0257 0.9667 -1.3168 0.1879
Hispanic 0.1063 0.1564 1.1121 0.6796 0.4968
Othernonwhite -0.1312 0.0583 0.8770 -2.2529 0.0243
medianhouseeval -0.0015 0.0002 0.9986 -6.1080 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0013 0.0013 1.0013 0.9969 0.3188
zpctmanprofoccs 0.0012 0.0017 1.0012 0.6779 0.4979
hospitalaccess2 0.0640 0.0285 1.0661 2.2448 0.0248
hospitalaccess3 -0.2703 0.0375 0.7632 -7.2016 0.0000
physiciansper1000 0.0369 0.0040 1.0376 9.2002 0.0000
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept 2.1635 0.0058 8.7017 373.7710 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.1808 0.0010 1.1982 184.5820 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0160 0.0002 0.9841 -79.1290 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0005 1.10E-05 1.0005 45.2080 0.0000
female 0.0505 0.0012 1.0518 42.0470 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0057 0.0009 0.9943 -6.5420 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0009 0.0001 1.0009 16.1560 0.0000
ageover62_3 -2.00E-05 1.00E-06 1.0000 -21.7470 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0240 0.0036 0.9763 -6.7510 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.2519 0.0017 1.2864 149.4510 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd 0.0676 0.0023 1.0699 29.4620 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.2025 0.0096 0.8167 -21.0220 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.0736 0.0025 0.9291 -29.2170 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.1997 0.0018 1.2210 108.0910 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd 0.2627 0.0021 1.3005 125.1270 0.0000
Asian -0.0882 0.0094 0.9156 -9.4250 0.0000
Black -0.0447 0.0024 0.9563 -18.4790 0.0000
Hispanic -0.0303 0.0151 0.9701 -2.0100 0.0444
Othernonwhite -0.0269 0.0051 0.9734 -5.2980 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0025 0.0000 0.9975 -116.4260 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0042 0.0001 1.0042 34.1810 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0050 0.0002 0.9950 -32.2950 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.0398 0.0026 0.9610 -15.3530 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 -0.0316 0.0030 0.9689 -10.4900 0.0000
physiciansper1000 -0.0007 0.0004 0.9993 -1.7850 0.0742











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept -13.7472 . 0.0000 . .
maxchscoreallserv 2.2407 . 9.4000 . .
maxchscoresq -0.8764 . 0.4200 . .
maxchscore3 0.0419 . 1.0400 . .
female 1.4503 . 4.2600 . .
ageover62 -3.2494 . 0.0400 . .
ageover62sq 0.4172 . 1.5200 . .
ageover62_3 -2.00E-02 . 0.9800 . .
FFSPCPNoCapInd 0.5226 . 1.6900 . .
FFSPCPMidCapInd -0.5430 . 0.5800 . .
FFSPCPHighCapInd 0.3559 . 1.4300 . .
MAPCPNoCapInd 0.3280 . 1.3900 . .
MAPCPLowCapInd 12.5021 . 268894.7200 . .
MAPCPMidCapInd 11.5136 . 100072.3300 . .
MAPCPHighCapInd 11.1047 . 66483.5500 . .
Asian -10.8004 . 0.0000 . .
Black -11.1308 . 0.0000 . .
Hispanic -10.5758 . 0.0000 . .
Othernonwhite -10.7690 . 0.0000 . .
medianhouseeval -0.0172 . 0.9800 . .
zpctbachelorsormore -0.0122 . 0.9900 . .
zpctmanprofoccs 0.0585 . 1.0600 . .
hospitalaccess2 1.4401 . 4.2200 . .
hospitalaccess3 -9.9531 . 0.0000 . .
physiciansper1000 0.1819 . 1.2000 . .





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept -7.8984 1.1083 0.0004 -7.1268 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.2643 0.1797 1.3025 1.4710 0.1413
maxchscoresq -0.0620 0.0381 0.9399 -1.6293 0.1033
maxchscore3 0.0031 1.86E-03 1.0031 1.6621 0.0965
female 0.4306 0.2416 1.5382 1.7825 0.0747
ageover62 -0.3630 0.1924 0.6956 -1.8867 0.0592
ageover62sq 0.0258 0.0133 1.0262 1.9392 0.0525
ageover62_3 -5.30E-04 2.73E-04 0.9995 -1.9383 0.0526
FFSPCPNoCapInd -24.2865 69671.0000 0.0000 -0.0004 0.9997
FFSPCPMidCapInd -1.9316 0.4003 0.1449 -4.8258 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -24.4931 41400.0000 0.0000 -0.0006 0.9995
MAPCPNoCapInd 0.9393 0.5922 2.5583 1.5861 0.1127
MAPCPLowCapInd -1.3106 0.4298 0.2697 -3.0494 0.0023
MAPCPMidCapInd -2.5119 0.5929 0.0811 -4.2367 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -3.4202 1.0132 0.0327 -3.3756 0.0007
Asian -23.5362 178441.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.9999
Black -0.1040 0.5319 0.9013 -0.1954 0.8450
Hispanic -23.1565 323357.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.9999
Othernonwhite -23.4762 99442.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 0.9998
medianhouseeval 0.0111 0.0041 1.0111 2.6793 0.0074
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0150 0.0218 1.0151 0.6879 0.4915
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0019 0.0290 0.9982 -0.0641 0.9489
hospitalaccess2 -1.3587 1.0292 0.2570 -1.3201 0.1868
hospitalaccess3 1.1481 0.4209 3.1523 2.7277 0.0064
physiciansper1000 -0.1528 0.0903 0.8583 -1.6925 0.0906
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Poisson Regression Model for Count of PCP Evaluation and Management Procedures 

















Intercept 0.8630 0.0095 2.3703 91.2480 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.2082 0.0016 1.2314 131.8760 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0168 0.0003 0.9834 -53.3300 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0005 1.60E-05 1.0005 32.6630 0.0000
female 0.0957 0.0020 1.1005 48.5540 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0074 0.0014 0.9926 -5.3640 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0010 0.0001 1.0010 12.0360 0.0000
ageover62_3 -2.00E-05 1.51E-06 1.0000 -10.8160 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0461 0.0056 0.9549 -8.2730 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.0107 0.0027 1.0107 3.8840 0.0001
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.1523 0.0037 0.8588 -40.9800 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.1542 0.0145 0.8571 -10.6530 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.0105 0.0037 0.9896 -2.8060 0.0050
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.0291 0.0030 1.0295 9.8280 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.1089 0.0035 0.8968 -31.0330 0.0000
Asian -0.0187 0.0145 0.9815 -1.2900 0.1970
Black -0.0021 0.0038 0.9979 -0.5460 0.5848
Hispanic -0.0249 0.0242 0.9754 -1.0260 0.3049
Othernonwhite -0.0455 0.0085 0.9555 -5.3690 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0001 0.0000 1.0000 -1.3630 0.1729
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0031 0.0002 1.0031 15.3580 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0050 0.0003 0.9950 -19.2030 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.1053 0.0045 0.9000 -23.6700 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 -0.2232 0.0055 0.8000 -40.7640 0.0000
physiciansper1000 0.0073 0.0006 1.0073 11.7860 0.0000


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Poisson Regression Model for Count of PCP General Medical Services Procedures 

















Intercept 0.0868 0.0178 1.0907 4.8675 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.1378 0.0030 1.1478 45.8236 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0141 0.0006 0.9860 -22.1512 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0005 3.50E-05 1.0005 14.3286 0.0000
female 0.0157 0.0037 1.0158 4.2511 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0404 0.0028 0.9604 -14.5567 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0024 0.0002 1.0024 13.2477 0.0000
ageover62_3 -5.00E-05 3.39E-06 1.0000 -14.8076 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0822 0.0114 0.9211 -7.2082 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.2719 0.0052 1.3125 52.2236 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.0194 0.0073 0.9808 -2.6485 0.0081
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.0674 0.0280 0.9348 -2.4072 0.0161
MAPCPLowCapInd 0.0615 0.0074 1.0635 8.3352 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.3133 0.0056 1.3679 56.2773 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd 0.1152 0.0068 1.1221 16.9597 0.0000
Asian -0.1017 0.0282 0.9033 -3.6031 0.0003
Black -0.1846 0.0080 0.8314 -23.0829 0.0000
Hispanic -0.1196 0.0486 0.8873 -2.4620 0.0138
Othernonwhite -0.0161 0.0148 0.9841 -1.0872 0.2769
medianhouseeval -0.0012 0.0001 0.9988 -17.8435 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0068 0.0004 1.0068 17.9072 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0049 0.0005 0.9952 -9.9620 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.1701 0.0084 0.8436 -20.3408 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 -0.1802 0.0099 0.8351 -18.1855 0.0000
physiciansper1000 -0.0240 0.0012 0.9763 -19.3754 0.0000


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Poisson Regression Model for Count of PCP Home Health Services Procedures (HomHlthSrvcCnt) 

















Intercept -50.6931 1766400000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.0000 307150000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
maxchscoresq 0.0000 68676285.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
maxchscore3 0.0000 3.90E+06 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
female 0.0000 372020000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
ageover62 0.0000 263960000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
ageover62sq 0.0000 16442859.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
ageover62_3 -2.50E-13 3.03E+05 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd 0.0000 1029400000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.0000 524410000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd 0.0000 680750000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd 0.0000 2528200000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd 0.0000 707580000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.0000 570720000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd 0.0000 662170000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Asian 0.0000 2645000000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Black 0.0000 749830000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Hispanic 0.0000 4673300000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Othernonwhite 0.0000 1480100000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
medianhouseeval 0.0000 6699459.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0000 37404376.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
zpctmanprofoccs 0.0000 48159271.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
hospitalaccess2 0.0000 804740000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
hospitalaccess3 0.0000 947530000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
physiciansper1000 0.0000 120190000.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept 0.9947 0.0120 2.7040 82.9450 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.2493 0.0021 1.2831 121.1830 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0253 0.0004 0.9750 -59.5080 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0008 2.30E-05 1.0008 34.0080 0.0000
female 0.0386 0.0025 1.0393 15.6480 0.0000
ageover62 0.0078 0.0019 1.0078 4.1830 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0005 0.0001 1.0005 3.9220 0.0001
ageover62_3 -3.00E-05 2.20E-06 1.0000 -11.4530 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd 0.1076 0.0075 1.1136 14.2930 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.6973 0.0035 2.0084 196.8160 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd 0.3649 0.0049 1.4404 73.7510 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.2440 0.0226 0.7835 -10.8170 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.2732 0.0064 0.7610 -42.6050 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.4314 0.0041 1.5393 106.4890 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd 0.8546 0.0043 2.3504 199.1430 0.0000
Asian -0.1259 0.0209 0.8818 -6.0180 0.0000
Black 0.1128 0.0048 1.1194 23.3210 0.0000
Hispanic 0.1078 0.0296 1.1138 3.6400 0.0003
Othernonwhite -0.0171 0.0108 0.9830 -1.5860 0.1127
medianhouseeval -0.0080 0.0000 0.9921 -175.3850 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0057 0.0002 1.0058 23.0980 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0055 0.0003 0.9945 -17.6120 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -0.0043 0.0051 0.9957 -0.8490 0.3961
hospitalaccess3 0.1792 0.0054 1.1962 33.2630 0.0000
physiciansper1000 -0.0085 0.0008 0.9915 -10.8610 0.0000































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept -0.8759 0.0402 0.4165 -21.8170 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.1502 0.0069 1.1621 21.6571 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0194 0.0015 0.9808 -13.0415 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0008 8.10E-05 1.0008 9.4720 0.0000
female 0.3629 0.0089 1.4375 40.9549 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0081 0.0065 0.9920 -1.2414 0.2145
ageover62sq 0.0011 0.0004 1.0011 2.6482 0.0081
ageover62_3 -4.00E-05 7.98E-06 1.0000 -5.0097 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd 0.0376 0.0217 1.0383 1.7298 0.0837
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.2388 0.0112 1.2697 21.4122 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd -0.1507 0.0173 0.8601 -8.7084 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.1647 0.0622 0.8482 -2.6491 0.0081
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.2124 0.0180 0.8087 -11.7874 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.1140 0.0128 1.1208 8.9387 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd -0.2717 0.0181 0.7621 -15.0121 0.0000
Asian -0.0706 0.0668 0.9318 -1.0577 0.2902
Black -0.4331 0.0221 0.6485 -19.6254 0.0000
Hispanic 0.2151 0.0955 1.2399 2.2521 0.0243
Othernonwhite -0.0337 0.0366 0.9669 -0.9196 0.3578
medianhouseeval -0.0088 0.0002 0.9913 -55.2667 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0141 0.0008 1.0142 17.2028 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0115 0.0010 0.9886 -11.1099 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 0.1663 0.0162 1.1809 10.2811 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 0.4325 0.0163 1.5411 26.6028 0.0000
physiciansper1000 -0.0239 0.0029 0.9764 -8.1590 0.0000































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept 0.3821 0.0170 1.4654 22.4590 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.1650 0.0029 1.1794 56.1870 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0149 0.0006 0.9852 -23.8280 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0004 3.50E-05 1.0004 11.0210 0.0000
female -0.0515 0.0035 0.9498 -14.7490 0.0000
ageover62 0.0098 0.0026 1.0099 3.7180 0.0002
ageover62sq 0.0006 0.0002 1.0006 3.3850 0.0007
ageover62_3 -2.00E-05 3.06E-06 1.0000 -7.9980 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.0020 0.0103 0.9980 -0.1930 0.8472
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.2070 0.0051 1.2299 40.5600 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd 0.2147 0.0067 1.2395 32.1540 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.2776 0.0300 0.7576 -9.2410 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.0576 0.0077 0.9440 -7.5210 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.2873 0.0054 1.3328 52.8410 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd 0.6100 0.0059 1.8404 103.3980 0.0000
Asian -0.1862 0.0294 0.8301 -6.3290 0.0000
Black -0.2644 0.0078 0.7677 -34.0940 0.0000
Hispanic -0.0713 0.0455 0.9312 -1.5670 0.1171
Othernonwhite -0.0725 0.0154 0.9300 -4.7090 0.0000
medianhouseeval -0.0050 0.0001 0.9950 -78.0490 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0055 0.0004 1.0055 15.5420 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0101 0.0004 0.9900 -22.4930 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 0.1763 0.0068 1.1928 25.8190 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 0.1302 0.0080 1.1391 16.3420 0.0000
physiciansper1000 0.0006 0.0011 1.0006 0.5250 0.5997


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept -31.7549 0.8171 0.0000 -38.8636 0.0000
maxchscoreallserv 0.5601 0.0665 1.7500 8.4172 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0625 0.0128 0.9400 -4.8736 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0021 6.64E-04 1.0000 3.1024 0.0019
female 0.1303 0.0763 1.1400 1.7084 0.0876
ageover62 0.1223 0.0602 1.1300 2.0309 0.0423
ageover62sq -0.0071 0.0038 0.9900 -1.8703 0.0614
ageover62_3 1.06E-04 7.10E-05 1.0000 1.5049 0.1323
FFSPCPNoCapInd 22.4893 1.2258 5847884065.1600 18.3472 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.0754 34522.0000 1.0800 0.0000 1.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd 0.0280 51539.0000 1.0300 0.0000 1.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd 26.3985 0.7915 291570981019.3900 33.3541 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd 26.5278 0.7119 331809960374.7600 37.2635 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 27.0768 0.7093 574520006964.7800 38.1752 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd 21.6614 . 2555250122.2600 . .
Asian 0.1332 0.5025 1.1400 0.2650 0.7910
Black -0.5114 0.1394 0.6000 -3.6691 0.0002
Hispanic 0.4917 0.5796 1.6400 0.8483 0.3963
Othernonwhite 0.0271 0.3200 1.0300 0.0847 0.9325
medianhouseeval -0.0015 0.0015 1.0000 -1.0127 0.3112
zpctbachelorsormore 0.0374 0.0082 1.0400 4.5524 0.0000
zpctmanprofoccs -0.0695 0.0104 0.9300 -6.7027 0.0000
hospitalaccess2 -25.1627 46276.0000 0.0000 -0.0005 0.9996
hospitalaccess3 -25.2593 54485.0000 0.0000 -0.0005 0.9996
physiciansper1000 0.1186 0.0232 1.1300 5.1204 0.0000



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept -0.0017 0.0153 0.9983 -0.1091 0.9131
maxchscoreallserv 0.0691 0.0026 1.0716 26.6462 0.0000
maxchscoresq -0.0045 0.0006 0.9955 -7.8387 0.0000
maxchscore3 0.0000 3.20E-05 1.0000 1.2813 0.2001
female 0.0214 0.0031 1.0216 6.8333 0.0000
ageover62 -0.0209 0.0023 0.9794 -9.0134 0.0000
ageover62sq 0.0015 0.0001 1.0015 9.8578 0.0000
ageover62_3 -3.00E-05 2.77E-06 1.0000 -12.3273 0.0000
FFSPCPNoCapInd -0.1490 0.0099 0.8615 -15.0425 0.0000
FFSPCPMidCapInd 0.2028 0.0044 1.2248 45.8321 0.0000
FFSPCPHighCapInd 0.1773 0.0056 1.1939 31.5244 0.0000
MAPCPNoCapInd -0.3563 0.0269 0.7003 -13.2379 0.0000
MAPCPLowCapInd -0.1789 0.0067 0.8362 -26.7795 0.0000
MAPCPMidCapInd 0.2009 0.0048 1.2225 42.1282 0.0000
MAPCPHighCapInd 0.1429 0.0055 1.1536 25.9910 0.0000
Asian -0.1506 0.0239 0.8602 -6.2934 0.0000
Black -0.1440 0.0065 0.8659 -22.2821 0.0000
Hispanic -0.2079 0.0433 0.8123 -4.7994 0.0000
Othernonwhite 0.0142 0.0123 1.0143 1.1550 0.2481
medianhouseeval 0.0013 0.0001 1.0013 23.4480 0.0000
zpctbachelorsormore -0.0006 0.0003 0.9994 -1.9184 0.0551
zpctmanprofoccs 0.0006 0.0004 1.0006 1.3591 0.1741
hospitalaccess2 -0.0937 0.0071 0.9106 -13.1625 0.0000
hospitalaccess3 -0.2335 0.0091 0.7918 -25.6253 0.0000
physiciansper1000 0.0108 0.0010 1.0109 10.7448 0.0000









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix C: Capitation Contract Simulation Results Using Empirical Distributions of Total 
Medical Payments (0% and 50% No PCP Visit) 
Tables start on the next page.  
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